With the British Army in The Holy Land
H >> Henry Osmond Lock >> With the British Army in The Holy LandWe have seen that the western bank of the Suez Canal was already
provided with a plentiful supply of fresh water by the Sweet Water
Canal. Plant was now installed for making this water available for the
troops. Purity had to be considered as well as adequacy of supply. A
peculiar danger had to be guarded against. There is a disease prevalent
in Egypt, of a particularly unpleasant character and persistent type,
called by the medical profession Bilhaziosis, but better known to our
men as "Bill Harris." This disease is conveyed by a parasitic worm found
in the waters of the Nile, and affects not only those who drink the
water, but also those who bathe in it or merely wash. Consequently,
orders were stringent against even touching Nile water which had not
previously been treated. This necessitated the troops east of the Canal
being put upon a very restricted supply, and they were accordingly
rationed at the rate of a gallon of water per head per day for all
purposes, including washing, cooking and drinking. At the Kantara
waterworks water was drawn in from the Sweet Water Canal, mixed with
alum, and pumped through settling tanks into filters. When it had passed
through these, it was pumped underneath the Suez Canal into reservoirs
on the eastern bank. Here it was chlorinated; and hence the water, now
fit for all purposes, was pumped forward to its destination. There being
no gradient to assist the natural flow of the water, it had to be pumped
forward by successive stages. The first stage was as far as Romani; when
working at greatest length the pumping stages numbered no less than
seventeen. At times, during the advance, the railway had to be called in
aid; and train-loads of water for the use of advanced troops were railed
from pipe-head up to rail-head. At some stages of the advance this
supply could be supplemented by local water, which, though generally
somewhat brackish, was employed for the horses, mules and camels. It was
even found to have no ill-effect upon the troops, if used for a limited
period, and if necessary precautions were taken. At other stages, where
water was non-existent, or rendered wholly unapproachable by enemy
dispositions, our force became entirely dependent upon the supply
delivered through the pipe-line. Ultimately, when we settled down to
protracted trench warfare before Gaza, this pipe-line was delivering a
constant supply of water into our trenches, distant some couple of
hundred miles from the banks of the Nile.
Kantara started upon a process of development worthy of the base of such
an expedition. Before the war, it had been little more than a small
Canal village, comprising a few huts. It eventually grew into an
important railway terminus with wharves and cranes, a railway ferry and
40 miles of sidings. Miles of first-class macadamized roads were made,
vast ordnance and supply dumps arose, and camps and depots were
established for man and beast. The scale on which this mushroom town
developed was stupendous.
Early in 1916, the Turks, relieved from imminent danger near home by our
evacuation of Gallipoli, came down again in force through Syria,
Palestine and the Desert, to attack us in Egypt. Our construction gangs,
engaged upon the new railway and upon the development of local water
supplies, were at this time covered by escorts, mainly of cavalry,
spread out upon a wide front. On the 23rd of April several thousand
Turks, operating in three columns, attacked our desert posts at
Oghratina, Katia and Dueidar respectively, the two former being about 30
miles and the last named about 10 miles to the east of Kantara.
Oghratina and Katia, being well out in the desert, were cavalry posts
held by yeomanry. These two posts were rushed by a large force of the
enemy under cover of fog, and, though a stubborn resistance was offered,
and the fighting was severe, the posts were overwhelmed. At Dueidar, an
infantry post, some 20 miles or so nearer our base, the Turk was less
successful. Under cover of the same fog, about 900 Turks tried to rush
this post at dawn. They found the garrison standing to, and were beaten
off. Though they made three distinct attempts to break through, they
were unsuccessful. The garrison was reinforced and the Turks were
repulsed.
In order to hamper or prevent such bodies of Turks from again crossing
the desert and approaching the Canal, it was decided to draw off the
local water supplies in the desert. Accordingly, these supplies, mainly
in pools and cisterns constructed by men in a bygone age, were
systematically pumped or drained dry. By the end of June, no water was
left available for enemy use within easy reach of the Canal. From this
time forward the enemy attempted no more sporadic raids. He concentrated
instead upon a serious attack against our main positions, which attack
materialized at Romani.
By July, 1916, our railway had reached the village of Romani, which is
some 25 miles from Kantara, and is in the neighbourhood of Oghratina
and Katia, where the enemy had secured his success in April. The Turkish
force had been stiffened with Germans and Austrians, and was under the
command of the German General Von Kressenstein. It moved from the
Turkish railroad at Auja on the frontier, and advanced by way of
Maghdaba and the Wadi El Arish to El Arish, and thence westward along
the caravan route towards Egypt. This force had been well equipped and
trained for this class of warfare, and it succeeded in dragging heavy
guns across the desert byroads which it improvised for the purpose.
Making his advanced base at Bir-el-Abd, the enemy first occupied and
fortified a line about Mageiba. On the morning of the 3rd August, he
made a general advance, and took up a line fronting our position at
Romani. Here our left flank rested on the sea; the left of the line was
held by the 52nd Division, while the 53rd Division was on the right. The
East Lancashire Division was in reserve. The right flank comprised a
chain of posts, behind which were a force of cavalry. The weak point
was, therefore, our right flank, for a little force working round by the
south would threaten our communications and might possibly cut us off
from our reinforcements down the line and from our base at Kantara.
Accordingly, on the night of the 3rd/4th, one Light Horse Brigade moved
out to hold a three-miles line from our infantry post on the right,
sending out patrols a considerable distance in front. About midnight,
the enemy were found to be advancing in this direction. Before light
next morning this Brigade were heavily engaged, holding up the advance
of a considerable body of the enemy. Gradually the Brigade were pressed
back by weight of numbers, until, at about five o'clock in the morning,
the timely arrival of reinforcements secured the complete arrest of the
enemy advance in this direction. Soon after daylight the enemy swung
round his left flank and established himself upon Mount Royston. This
enforced upon us a further retirement; but he had reached the limit of
his success. Towards the sea, the enemy attacks against the 52nd
Division were beaten off, and here he could make no progress. At about
5.30 in the afternoon, a counter-attack was launched against Mount
Royston, and this position was recaptured. Early on the following
morning, the 5th, before daylight, the 52nd Division recaptured
Wellington Ridge, the last of our lost positions remaining in the hands
of the Turk. The tide had now turned definitely in our favour and the
Turk was in full retreat. An attempt was made to encircle his southern
flank and to cut him off with our cavalry, but his rearguard actions
were fought stubbornly, and the pursuing cavalry had to be withdrawn.
During the night of the 5th/6th, the enemy evacuated Katia, which was
occupied by us on the following morning. By the 8th, he had abandoned
Oghratina, and had fallen back to his advanced base at Bir-el-Abd. From
this base he now proceeded to evacuate camps and stores, but he was not
allowed to do so unmolested. He was followed up by the whole of our
cavalry and effectually shelled by our horse artillery. On the afternoon
and evening of this day (the 8th) the Turk counter-attacked our cavalry,
who were clearly outnumbered. Nevertheless the Turk considered it more
prudent to burn the remainder of his stores. He completed the evacuation
of Abd by the 12th, and it remained in our hands from this time forward.
This abortive advance against Romani marked the last determined attempt
of the Turks to invade the Suez Canal and Egypt. Henceforth the efforts
of the Turks were confined to opposing the storm which their misguided
cupidity had raised up against them.
After the battle of Romani, our mounted troops held a line about Abd.
The enemy now consolidated a position at Mazar, a little more than 20
miles further to the east. In the middle of September, a cavalry column
moved out to Mazar and attacked the Turkish positions. Neither side was
anxious to bring on a general engagement at that time. However, the
losses which the Turk suffered in this operation caused him sufficient
uneasiness to induce him to withdraw altogether from Mazar. He therefore
withdrew his troops to a position close to El Arish.
The Turkish garrison at El Arish consisted of some 1,600 infantry in
all, in a strong entrenched position. In the second week of December
increased activity was shown by the Turks, and aerial reconnaissance of
their camps behind their front line showed evidence of the proximity of
reinforcements. Our preparations for a forward move were pressed on
strenuously, and, though they were somewhat delayed through lack of
water, we were ready to move by the 20th December. The enemy realized
that the swiftness of our final preparations had been too much for him.
Knowing that his reinforcements could not arrive in time, he hurriedly
withdrew his troops from El Arish. This retirement was reported by the
R.F.C. on the 20th December, and our mounted troops, supported by
infantry, were ordered to move on El Arish the same night. The town was
found to be evacuated. Aircraft reports showed that about 1,600 of the
enemy were on the march, in two columns, in the neighbourhood of
Maghdaba and Abu Aweigila, while Sheikh Zowaid and Rafa appeared to be
clear. The enemy were evidently not retreating by the caravan route
towards Gaza, but were falling back southwards by the Wadi El Arish (the
Biblical "River of Egypt") upon their rail-head at Auja.
This evidence went to show that the garrison which had recently
evacuated El Arish were at Maghdaba, and it seemed likely that this
force were preparing to hold Maghdaba as a rearguard. A flying column of
cavalry was immediately despatched against them from El Arish. This
column found the enemy strongly posted and entrenched on both banks of
the Wadi El Arish. An attack was set in motion on the morning of the
23rd December, and lasted for the greater part of the day. By half-past
four that afternoon, however, all organized resistance was over, and the
enemy were surrendering everywhere. No further advance was attempted
along the enemy's line of communications towards Auja, and the troops,
being but a flying column, retired at once to El Arish.
Within a few days after the destruction at Maghdaba of the rearguard, or
garrison withdrawing from El Arish, another body of the enemy started to
entrench a position at Magruntein near Rafa. This was obviously intended
to bar our progress eastwards along the coastal route, the old caravan
route to Gaza. Rafa is the frontier town upon the Turco-Egyptian
frontier. The operation to which we are about to refer was, therefore,
the last engagement that took place upon Egyptian territory. It was not
possible at the end of December for the British force to push on and
occupy Rafa permanently, owing to difficulties of supply. But since the
enemy had again placed a small detached garrison within striking
distance of our mounted troops, the temptation was held out for a
repetition of the Maghdaba success at Magruntein. Accordingly, a flying
column, composed wholly of mounted troops and artillery, moved out from
El Arish on the evening of the 8th/9th January, 1917. The enemy was
taken completely by surprise, and by dawn on the 9th January his
position was almost entirely surrounded. The position, however, was a
formidable one, with ground in front entirely open and devoid of cover.
The main attack was timed for ten o'clock a.m., and was delivered from
the east and south-east. The town of Rafa was soon occupied, and, in the
course of the morning, our attack against the Turkish system of defences
developed on every side. The enemy's works were dominated by a central
redoubt or keep, and orders were given for a concerted attack to be
developed against this at 3.30 p.m. Meanwhile the enemy had despatched a
relieving force from Shellal, which is about twenty miles to the
south-east of Rafa and mid-way between that town and the nearest Turkish
railway. This relieving force was detected by our aircraft, who
frequently attacked it with bombs and machine gun fire. Orders were at
once given for the attack on the redoubt to be pressed with vigour, and,
before five o'clock, the redoubt was captured. With this position in our
hands, the remaining works soon fell, and by 5.30 p.m. all organized
resistance was over, and the enemy position, with all its garrison, was
captured. The relieving force were driven off without much difficulty,
and withdrew, presumably, to Shellal, which thereafter became the
enemy's next point of concentration. Our column, taking with them all
prisoners, animals and captured material, withdrew again to El Arish.
From the time of our occupation of El Arish on the 22nd December, that
town developed apace. Mine-sweeping operations were at once commenced in
the roadstead, a pier was erected, and, on the 24th, the supply ships
from Port Said began unloading stores and supplies. The lie of the land
gives unlimited opportunity to a power having the command of the sea to
supplement his other means of bringing forward supplies by landing
sea-borne goods upon the open beach. Repeatedly, in the subsequent
history of this war, we availed ourselves of this means of supply, as
our army moved northwards in Palestine. The landing of stores at El
Arish, however, was not wholly successful, owing to the strong currents,
a shelving and shifting beach, and heavy surf. In winter, the sea is apt
to be stormy here, and then such landing may become impossible. Supplies
were also hastened to El Arish by camel convoy, and dumps were
accumulated. The railway was pushed on with and, before the end of
January, the railway station at El Arish was completed; during the
following month the railway was pushed further out along the coast
preparatory to another advance.
After the destruction of their post at Rafa, the Turks immediately began
to concentrate their forces near Shellal. West of this place they
prepared a strong defensive position near Weli Sheikh Nuran, with the
object of covering their lines of communication both along the Beersheba
railway and along the Jerusalem-Hebron-Beersheba road. They also
established themselves at Khan Yunus, on the coastal road a few miles to
the east of Rafa. On the 23rd February, a reconnaissance was carried out
against Khan Yunus. The column, arriving at dawn, found the position
strongly held, and, after manoeuvring the enemy out of his front line
of defence and capturing prisoners, withdrew without difficulty.
Continuous pressure maintained by our troops in this neighbourhood,
however, induced the enemy to withdraw the garrison of Khan Yunus, which
place was entered by our cavalry without opposition on the 28th
February. The enemy also evacuated without firing a shot the position
which he had prepared near Weli Sheikh Nuran.
Our troops had crossed the desert with success attending them at every
stage. And now at last they had set foot in the Promised Land. Many of
them must have felt, what a soldier was afterwards heard to express,
"This may be the land of promise; it's certainly not the land of
fulfilment." History repeats itself. As the Israelites had much trial
and suffering to endure after reaching this stage of their journey from
Egypt, before they were permitted to "go in and possess the land," so
had our lads many a fierce and bloody battle to fight before they, too,
might set foot within the Holy City.
A few words as to personnel may not be out of place before we leave the
subject of this Desert campaign. Throughout this time the
Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was General Sir
Archibald Murray, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. A reorganization of the force took
place in October, 1917, in consequence of which General Murray moved his
headquarters back from Ismailia to Cairo. At the same time, the new
headquarters of the Eastern Force came into existence at Ismailia under
the command of Lieut.-General Sir Charles Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., under whose direction thus came more immediately the operations
in the eastern desert.
Amongst the troops employed were the Australians and New Zealanders and
several regiments of English Yeomanry, and, included among the infantry,
were the 52nd (Lowland), the 53rd (Welsh and Home Counties), the 54th
(East Anglian) and the 74th (Dismounted Yeomanry) Divisions.
This review of the advance across the desert has of necessity been
superficial. Strictly speaking, the Desert campaign is outside the scope
of this book. But a summarized history of the advance forms a necessary
introduction to our subject. Here, on the threshold of Palestine, we
must leave this army for a short space, while we review some other
operations, and while we take a glance at the nature of the country in
which this army was about to operate.
CHAPTER III
MESOPOTAMIA, THE CAUCASUS, AND THE HEJAZ
Having taken a hurried glance at the campaign in Sinai, which directly
led up to that in Palestine, we will take a yet more hurried glance at
three other campaigns in Asiatic Turkey which had their bearing, direct
or indirect, upon the Palestine operations.
Most important among these was the expedition to Mesopotamia. In 1914,
when Turkey came into the war against us, a British Indian Brigade was
landed at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, the common estuary by which
the Tigris and the Euphrates reach the Persian Gulf. The objects of this
expedition were to secure the oil-fields of Persia in which Britain was
largely interested; to neutralize German ascendancy, which was rapidly
developing in this part of the world through her interests in the
Baghdad Railway; and to embarrass Turkey by attacking her at a point
where facilities of manoeuvre and supply seemed to hold out a
reasonable promise of success.
Throughout 1915 this expedition met with uninterrupted success. The
British Indian forces engaged were increased in number and strength,
and, in spite of appalling conditions of climate, and notwithstanding
more than one narrow escape from disaster, the British flag was pushed
further and further forward into this flat alluvial country. In the
autumn of 1915, we held all the country up to Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates
and to Kut el Amara on the Tigris. Then that ill-fated decision was
arrived at which sent General Townshend, with the inadequate force at
his command, up the Tigris to capture Baghdad. This force went
heroically forward, and, just short of that city, defeated the Turks at
the battle of Ctesiphon. But General Townshend's casualties were heavy,
and his available reinforcements were neither sufficiently numerous nor
at hand. The pick of the Turkish army released by our withdrawal from
Gallipoli, had poured down to reinforce the enemy, and General Townshend
had no alternative but to beat a hasty retreat. Accordingly, he fell
back to Kut el Amara. Partly from inability to get his war-worn forces
further away, and partly from a disinclination to abandon this important
tactical point to the enemy, he consolidated here and prepared to
withstand a siege. The history of that siege will live as one of the
noblest in the annals of the British army. But the stars in their
courses fought against us. Strong enemy positions, inadequate supplies
and transport arrangements, floods, and appalling conditions of country
and weather, proved overwhelming. In spite of the unremitting efforts of
the relieving army, which fought battle after battle without stint of
labour or loss, the garrison of Kut found themselves, at the beginning
of May, 1916, left with no alternative but to capitulate. Almost the
whole of the garrison were removed into Asia Minor, to a captivity which
few were destined to survive. Naturally the Turks were much elated by
this success, following upon their successes in Gallipoli, and were
persuaded that the might of the British arm was nothing which they need
fear.
Leaving a sufficient force to check any further British advance into
Mesopotamia, the Turk withdrew the bulk of his forces to operate against
the Russians and, perhaps wisely, made no great effort to dislodge us
from the territory which we already occupied. The opposing forces sat
down and watched each other for many months in the entrenched positions
below Kut. In March of the following year, 1917, General Maude, on whom
had fallen the command of the British army in Mesopotamia, won a
decisive victory at Kut; and, pursuing the remnants of the routed enemy,
entered Baghdad. The Turks withdrew to the higher country north and
north-east of the city, whither they were pursued. After these
operations, the British were in occupation of the completed section of
the Baghdad railway, which was then open from Baghdad as far north as
Samarra. They also effected a junction with the Russian troops operating
in Persia. In the following September, engagements were fought at Ramadi
and elsewhere on the Euphrates, with the result that the Turkish
garrisons were rounded up, and but few Turkish troops were left to
oppose the British forces in Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, an immediate
advance was not made up to Mosul and the upper territories of
Mesopotamia. Owing to the collapse of Russia, it became necessary for us
to take over some of the country in Persia, which had previously been
occupied by Russian troops, and an expedition was also sent to assist
the Armenians at Baku on the Caspian Sea. Other troops which could be
spared from Mesopotamia were sent round, in the spring of 1918, to take
part in the operations in Palestine, and the forces that remained were
devoted to the garrisoning and consolidation of the territory already
occupied.
A glance at the map of Turkey in Asia will show that the provinces of
Mesopotamia and Syria consist of long narrow strips of fertile country
bordered by desert, and resemble two legs which fork at Aleppo.
As far as Aleppo, troops and supplies from Europe passed over one common
route. From the Turkish point of view, therefore, the campaigns in these
two countries were to some extent interdependent. This enabled the Turks
to concentrate a reserve at Aleppo, ready to be moved down into either
theatre of war as the exigencies of the situation might demand.
Conversely, therefore, a British offensive in Mesopotamia might draw off
troops destined for Palestine, or an offensive in Palestine might
attract troops otherwise intended for operations in Mesopotamia. There
is strong evidence that a Turco-German offensive was contemplated in
Mesopotamia for 1918. In the spring of that year, however, a British
offensive was undertaken in Palestine, which had the immediate effect of
drawing to that country strong Turkish and German reinforcements from
Aleppo. Nothing more was heard of the offensive in Mesopotamia, and, by
the autumn of 1918, there was scarcely a fighting Turk to be found in
that country. Just as our expedition against the Dardanelles, by
engaging the enemy at a vital spot near home, had materially assisted
the defence of Egypt, so did our offensives in Palestine materially
assist the defence of Mesopotamia.
Turning to another corner of the map of Turkey, where Europe and Asia
meet in the mountains of the Caucasus, we see that the Turkish frontier
here marches with that of Russia. In the earlier days of the war, the
Russians carried out an important and successful advance in this
neighbourhood, and, early in 1916, occupied the cities of Trebizond and
Erzerum. Thus, at the time when the campaign in Palestine was embarked
upon, the armies of the allies were closing in upon Eastern Turkey
simultaneously from three directions, the Russian Caucasus army from the
north-east, the British Mesopotamian army from the south-east, and the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force from the south. Strategically, the
situation seemed full of promise. But, in the winter of 1917-18,
followed the disastrous collapse of Russia, and the setting free of many
Turkish soldiers of good quality from all the Russian fronts for service
elsewhere. We had hoped that our offensive in Syria might have been
supported by the co-operation of the Russians. Instead, we felt the
pinch of their defection in the stiffening of enemy resistance on our
front by the transfer of good troops from the Caucasus to Palestine.