From Isolation to Leadership, Revised
J >> John Holladay Latane >> From Isolation to Leadership, RevisedFROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP
REVISED
A Review of American Foreign Policy
BY
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE, PH.D., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE
COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Author of
"The United States and Latin America"
"America as a World Power"
Etc.
GARDEN CITY ------ NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1922
COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1922, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF
TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,
INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN
PREFACE
The first edition of this book appeared in October, 1918, a few weeks
before the signing of the Armistice, when the United States was at the
high tide of its power and influence. In view of the subsequent course
of events, some of my readers may question the propriety of the
original title. In fact, one of my friends has suggested that a more
appropriate title for the new edition would be "From Isolation to
Leadership, and Back." But I do not regard the verdict of 1920 as an
expression of the final judgment of the American people. The world
still waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize and
assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.
The first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes.
Chapter X has been rewritten, and chapters XI and XII have been added.
JOHN H. LATANE.
Baltimore, June 10, 1922.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER
IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE
V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM
IX. THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION
X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
XI. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
INDEX
From Isolation to Leadership
I
ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation are two
phases of American diplomacy so closely related that very few writers
appear to draw any distinction between them. The Monroe Doctrine was
in its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special application
to the American continents, of the right of independent states to
pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention,
domination, or subjugation by other states. President Monroe announced
to the world that this principle would be upheld by the United States
in this hemisphere. The policy of isolation was the outgrowth of
Washington's warning against _permanent_ alliances and Jefferson's
warning against _entangling_ alliances. Both Washington and Jefferson
had in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in their
day, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and
by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned
the interests of the first state or not. Such alliances were usually
of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or
between different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties
between nations. In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently,
if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples
affected. It will be shown later that neither Washington nor Jefferson
intended that the United States should refrain permanently from the
exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the
peace and welfare of the community of nations. Washington did not
object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson
object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects.
Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that
the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend
strictly to its own business.
The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been
fully justified by nearly a century of experience. It has saved South
America from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa
and Asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. The policy
of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americans
as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct
from the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power. The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be
illustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal
in the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on condition
that England would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any
European power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation
of the Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle.
Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional
policy of isolation. Of the two policies, that of avoiding political
alliances is the older. It was announced by Washington under
circumstances that will be considered in a moment.
In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought
foreign alliances. In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the United
States was the treaty of alliance with France, negotiated and ratified
in 1778. The aid which France extended under this treaty to our
revolutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them to
establish the independence of our country. A few years later came the
French Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic followed by
the execution of Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between England and
France. With the arrival in this country of Genet, the minister of the
newly established French Republic, there began a heated debate in the
newspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under the
treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 1778. President
Washington requested the opinions in writing of the members of his
cabinet as to whether Genet should be received and the new government
which had been set up in France recognized, as to whether the treaties
were still binding, and as to whether a proclamation of neutrality
should be issued. Hamilton and Jefferson replied at great length,
taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the question as to the
binding force of the treaties. Hamilton took the view that as the
government of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been negotiated,
had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill their
stipulations and had a perfect right to renounce them. Jefferson took
the correct view that the treaties were with the French nation and that
they were binding under whatever government the French people chose to
set up. This principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrines
of international law, was so ably expounded by Jefferson that his words
are well worth quoting.
"I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source
of all authority in that nation, as free to transact their common
concerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agents
individually, or the organization of them in form or function whenever
they please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authority
of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, and
enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any
change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering
it. Consequently the Treaties between the United States and France
were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but
between the two nations of America and France, and the nations
remaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed their
forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes."
The argument was so heated that Washington was reluctant to press
matters to a definite conclusion. From his subsequent action it
appears that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties were binding,
but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and that
we were under no obligation to aid France in an offensive war such as
she was then waging. He accordingly issued his now famous proclamation
of neutrality, April, 1793. Of this proclamation W. E. Hall, a leading
English authority on international law, writing one hundred years
later, said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes an
epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be no
doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the
obligations then incumbent upon neutrals. But it represented by far
the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were;
and in some points it even went farther than authoritative
international custom has up to the present time advanced. In the main,
however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now
adopted by the community of nations." Washington's proclamation laid
the real foundations of the American policy of isolation.
The very novelty of the rigid neutrality proclaimed by Washington made
the policy a difficult one to pursue. In the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, the
United States was the principal neutral. The problems to which this
situation gave rise were so similar to the problems raised during the
early years of the World War that many of the diplomatic notes prepared
by Jefferson and Madison might, with a few changes of names and dates,
be passed off as the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing.
Washington's administration closed with the clouds of the European war
still hanging heavy on the horizon. Under these circumstances he
delivered his famous Farewell Address in which he said:
"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
_political_ connection as possible. So far as we have already formed
engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us
stop.
"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided
by justice, shall counsel.
"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our
own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in
the toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less
applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the
best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be
unwise to extend them.
"Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies."
It will be observed that Washington warned his countrymen against
_permanent_ alliances. He expressly said that we might "safely trust
to _temporary_ alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Further than
this many of those who are continually quoting Washington's warning
against alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which the
advice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned. In a
succeeding paragraph of the Farewell Address he said:
"With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our
country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to
progress without interruption to that degree of strength and
consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the
command of its own fortunes."
The expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the Farewell
Address, but was given currency by Jefferson. In his first inaugural
address he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulate
his foreign policy in the following terms: "Peace, commerce, and honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."
During the brief interval of peace following the treaty of Amiens in
1801, Napoleon undertook the reestablishment of French power in Santo
Domingo as the first step in the development of a colonial empire which
he determined upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louisiana to
France by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800. Fortunately for
us the ill-fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered the opposition
of half a million negroes and ultimately fell a prey to the ravages of
yellow fever. As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession of Louisiana
to France, he instructed Livingston, his representative at Paris, to
open negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida,
stating that the acquisition of New Orleans by a powerful nation like
France would inevitably lead to friction and conflict. "The day that
France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to
restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of
two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the
ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for
which our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formed
and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her
settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, which
shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she
may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in
sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and
American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It
is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as
necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its
necessary effect."
Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he was
instructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination of
the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the
meantime enter into conferences with the British Government, through
their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us
in peace until Congress meets." Jefferson had already informed the
British minister at Washington that if France should, by closing the
mouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they would
throw away the scabbard." Monroe and Livingston were now instructed,
in case they should become convinced that France meditated hostilities
against the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and to
stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the
consent of the other. Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities and
his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal
Declaration of Independence was ready and willing in this emergency to
form an alliance with England. The unexpected cession of the entire
province of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplated
alliance with England unnecessary.
The United States was no more successful in its effort to remain
neutral during the Napoleonic wars than it was during the late war,
though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the
struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of
time. Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rights
which they were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairly
bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council. There was
really not much more reason why we should have fought England than
France, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more
effectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was
accompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into the
British service, we finally declared war against her. No effort was
made, however, to form an alliance or even to cooeperate with Napoleon.
The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while we
gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on Lake
Erie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy
Canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national
capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas.
Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratifying to our pride, took
place two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had,
consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war.
II
FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
The international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine was
the most unusual in some respects that modern history records. The
European alliance which had been organized in 1813 for the purpose of
bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to dominate the
affairs of Europe until 1823. This alliance, which met at the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818,
at Troppau in 1820, at Laybach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822,
undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to a
world government that had ever been tried. While this alliance
publicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of
peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its
real object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress every
attempt at the establishment of representative government. As long as
England remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraining
influence, for England was the only one of the allies which professed
to have a representative system of government. As Castlereagh was
setting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was
then prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feel
that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible,
and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy
which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government."
The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was
soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed one
another in 1820. In March the Spanish army turned against the
government of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration of the
constitution of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere approved
and sustained by the people and the king was forced to proclaim the
constitution and to promise to uphold it. The Spanish revolution was
followed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in August
by a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year witnessed the
outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of
the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the
right of self-government. The great powers at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. At
Troppau and Laybach measures were taken for the suppression of the
revolutionary movements in Italy. An Austrian army entered Naples in
March, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had been
inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The
revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a
detachment of the Austrian army. England held aloof from all
participation in the conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though her
ambassador to Austria was present to watch the proceedings.
The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822,
at Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular Spain
came up for consideration. At this congress all five powers of the
alliance were represented. France was especially concerned about the
condition of affairs in Spain, and England sent Wellington out of
self-defense. The Congress of Verona was devoted largely to a
discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use
all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in
Spain. When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step
and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress.
The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November
22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the
Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been signed at Paris in 1815 by
Austria, Russia, and Prussia. This last mentioned treaty sprang from
the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Baroness
Kruedener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant.
No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been
without influence upon the politics of Europe. The text of the treaty
of Verona was never officially published, but the following articles
soon appeared in the press of Europe and America:
"Article I.--The high contracting powers being convinced that the
system of representative government is equally as incompatible with the
monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people
with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to
use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative
governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent
its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.
"Article II.--As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is
the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights
of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting
parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress
it, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of Europe.
"Article III.--Convinced that the principles of religion contribute
most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which
they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to
be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those
measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their
own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the
authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their
thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit
his constant cooeperation in their views of submitting the nations.
"Article IV.--The situation of Spain and Portugal unite unhappily all
the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference. The
high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an
end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least
compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by
means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions
of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to
the end of the war."
Such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted for
Europe and which they later proposed to extend to America. It was an
attempt to make the world safe for autocracy. Wellington's protest at
Verona marked the final withdrawal of England from the alliance which
had overthrown Napoleon and naturally inclined her toward a
rapprochement with the United States. The aim of the Holy Allies, as
the remaining members of the alliance now called themselves, was to
undo the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon and to restore all the
peoples of Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns.
After the overthrow of the constitutional movements in Piedmont,
Naples, and Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in western
Europe, but the Holy Allies felt that their task was not completed so
long as Spain's revolted colonies in America remained unsubjugated.
These colonies had drifted into practical independence while Napoleon's
brother Joseph was on the throne of Spain. Nelson's great victory at
Trafalgar had left England supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon nor
Joseph had been able to establish any control over Spain's American
colonies. When Ferdinand was restored to his throne in 1814, he
unwisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the old
colonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up with
England and with the United States. The different colonies soon
proclaimed their independence and the wars of liberation ensued. By
1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could never resubjugate them,
and the United States after mature deliberation recognized the new
republics and established diplomatic intercourse with them. England,
although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies of
Spain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take the
final step of recognition.