The Life of George Washington, Vol. 2 (of 5)
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{September 10.}
This opinion was soon changed. The movements of the British general
indicated clearly an intention either to break their line of
communication, or to enclose the whole army in York Island. His
dispositions were alike calculated to favour the one or the other of
those objects. The general, who had continued to employ himself
assiduously in the removal of the military stores to a place of
safety,[43] called a second council to deliberate on the farther
defence of the city, which determined, by a large majority, that it
had become not only prudent, but absolutely necessary to withdraw the
army from New York.
[Footnote 43: He had, on the first appearance of the enemy
in force before New York urged the removal of the women and
children, with their most valuable effects, to a place of
safety.]
{September 12.}
In consequence of this determination, Brigadier General Mercer, who
commanded the flying camp on the Jersey shore, was directed to move up
the North river, to the post opposite fort Washington; and every
effort was used to expedite the removal of the stores.
On the morning of the fifteenth, three ships of war proceeded up the
North river as high as Bloomingdale; a movement which entirely stopped
the farther removal of stores by water. About eleven on the same day,
Sir Henry Clinton, with a division of four thousand men who had
embarked at the head of New Town bay, where they had lain concealed
from the view of the troops posted on York Island, proceeded through
that bay into the East river, which he crossed; and, under cover of
the fire of five men of war, landed at a place called Kipp's bay,
about three miles above New York.
[Sidenote: New York evacuated.]
The works thrown up to oppose a landing at this place, were of
considerable strength, and capable of being defended for some time;
but the troops stationed in them abandoned them without waiting to be
attacked, and fled with precipitation. On the commencement of the
cannonade, General Washington ordered the brigades of Parsons and
Fellowes to the support of the troops posted in the lines, and rode
himself towards the scene of action. The panic of those who had fled
from the works was communicated to the troops ordered to sustain them;
and the Commander-in-chief had the extreme mortification to meet the
whole party retreating in the utmost disorder, totally regardless of
the great efforts made by their generals to stop their disgraceful
flight. Whilst General Washington was exerting himself to rally them,
a small corps of the enemy appeared; and they again broke and fled in
confusion. The only part to be taken was immediately to withdraw the
few remaining troops from New York, and to secure the posts on the
heights. For this latter purpose, the lines were instantly manned; but
no attempt was made to force them. The retreat from New York was
effected with an inconsiderable loss of men, sustained in a skirmish
at Bloomingdale; but all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of
the baggage, provisions, and military stores, much of which might have
been saved had the post at Kipp's bay been properly defended, were
unavoidably abandoned. In this shameful day, one colonel, one captain,
three subalterns, and ten privates were killed: one lieutenant
colonel, one captain, and one hundred and fifty-seven privates were
missing.
The unsoldierly conduct displayed on this occasion was not
attributable to a want of personal courage, but to other causes. The
apprehensions excited by the defeat on Long Island had not yet
subsided; nor had the American troops recovered their confidence
either in themselves or in their commanders. Their situation appeared
to themselves to be perilous; and they had not yet acquired that
temper which teaches the veteran to do his duty wherever he may be
placed; to assure himself that others will do their duty likewise; and
to rely that those, who take into view the situation of the whole,
will not expose him to useless hazard; or neglect those precautions
which the safety and advantage of the whole may require.
Unfortunately, there existed in a great part of the army, several
causes, in addition to the shortness of enlistments and reliance on
militia, which were but too operative in obstructing the progress of
these military sentiments. In New England, whence the supplies of men
had been principally drawn, the zeal excited by the revolution had
taken such a direction, as in a great degree to abolish those
distinctions between the platoon officers and the soldiers, which are
indispensable to the formation of an army suited to all the purposes
of war. It has been already said that these officers, who constitute
an important part of every army, were, in many companies, elected by
the privates. Of consequence, a disposition to associate with them on
the footing of equality, was a recommendation of more weight, and
frequently conduced more to the choice, than individual merit.
Gentlemen of high rank have stated that, in some instances, men were
elected, who agreed to put their pay in a common stock with that of
the soldiers, and divide equally with them. It is not cause of wonder,
that among such officers, the most disgraceful and unmilitary
practices should frequently prevail; and that the privates should not
respect them sufficiently, to acquire habits of obedience and
subordination. This vital defect had been in some degree remedied, in
new modelling the army before Boston; but it still existed to a fatal
extent.
{September 15.}
Having taken possession of New York, General Howe stationed a few
troops in the town; and, with the main body of his army, encamped on
the island near the American lines. His right was at Horen's Hook on
the East river, and his left reached the North river near
Bloomingdale; so that his encampment extended quite across the island,
which is, in this place, scarcely two miles wide; and both his flanks
were covered by his ships.
The strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge, both
sides of which had been carefully fortified. M'Gowan's Pass, and
Morris's Heights were also occupied in considerable force, and
rendered capable of being defended against superior numbers. A strong
detachment was posted in an intrenched camp on the heights of Haerlem,
within about a mile and a half of the British lines.
The present position of the armies favoured the views of the American
General. He wished to habituate his soldiers, by a series of
successful skirmishes, to meet the enemy in the field; and he
persuaded himself that his detachments, knowing a strong intrenched
camp to be immediately in their rear, would engage without
apprehension, would soon display their native courage, and would
speedily regain the confidence they had lost.
Opportunities to make the experiments he wished were soon afforded.
The day after the retreat from New York, the British appeared in
considerable force in the plains between the two camps; and the
General immediately rode to his advanced posts, in order to make in
person such arrangements as this movement might require. Soon after
his arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton of Connecticut, who, at the
head of a corps of rangers, had been skirmishing with this party, came
in, and stated their numbers on conjecture at about three hundred men;
the main body being concealed in a wood.
The General ordered Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, and Major
Leitch with three companies of the third Virginia regiment, which had
joined the army only the preceding day, to gain their rear, while he
amused them with the appearance of making dispositions to attack their
front.
[Sidenote: Skirmish on the heights of Haerlem.]
This plan succeeded. The British ran eagerly down a hill, in order to
possess themselves of some fences and bushes, which presented an
advantageous position against the party expected in front; and a
firing commenced--but at too great a distance to do any execution. In
the mean time, Colonel Knowlton, not being precisely acquainted with
their new position, made his attack rather on their flank than rear;
and a warm action ensued.
In a short time, Major Leitch, who had led the detachment with great
intrepidity, was brought off the ground mortally wounded, having
received three balls through his body; and soon afterwards the gallant
Colonel Knowlton also fell. Not discouraged by the loss of their field
officers, the captains maintained their ground, and continued the
action with great animation. The British were reinforced; and General
Washington ordered some detachments from the adjacent regiments of New
England and Maryland, to the support of the Americans. Thus
reinforced, they made a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of the
wood into the plain, and were pressing him still farther, when the
General, content with the present advantage, called back his troops to
their intrenchments.[44]
[Footnote 44: The author received the account of this
skirmish from the Colonel of the third Virginia Regiment,
and from the Captains commanding the companies that were
engaged.]
In this sharp conflict, the loss of the Americans, in killed and
wounded, did not exceed fifty men. The British lost more than double
that number. But the real importance of the affair was derived from
its operation on the spirits of the whole army. It was the first
success they had obtained during this campaign; and its influence was
very discernible. To give it the more effect, the parole the next day
was Leitch; and the General, in his orders, publicly thanked the
troops under the command of that officer, who had first advanced on
the enemy, and the others who had so resolutely supported them. He
contrasted their conduct with that which had been exhibited the day
before; and the result, he said, evidenced what might be done where
officers and soldiers would exert themselves. Once more, therefore, he
called upon them so to act, as not to disgrace the noble cause in
which they were engaged. He appointed a successor to "the gallant and
brave Colonel Knowlton, who would," he said, "have been an honour to
any country, and who had fallen gloriously, fighting at his post."
In this active part of the campaign, when the utmost stretch of every
faculty was required, to watch and counteract the plans of a skilful
and powerful enemy, the effects of the original errors committed by
the government, in its military establishment, were beginning to be so
seriously felt, as to compel the Commander-in-chief to devote a
portion of his time and attention to the complete removal of the
causes which produced them.
The situation of America was becoming extremely critical. The almost
entire dissolution of the existing army, by the expiration of the time
for which the greater number of the troops had been engaged, was fast
approaching. No steps had been taken to recruit the new regiments
which congress had resolved to raise for the ensuing campaign; and
there was much reason to apprehend, that in the actual state of
things, the terms offered would not hold forth sufficient inducements
to fill them.
{September 24.}
[Sidenote: Letter on the state of the army.]
With so unpromising a prospect before him, the General found himself
pressed by an army, permanent in its establishment, supplied with
every requisite of war, formidable for its discipline and the
experience of its leaders, and superior to him in numbers. These
circumstances, and the impressions they created, will be best
exhibited by an extract from a letter written at the time to congress.
It is in these words: "From the hours allotted to sleep, I will borrow
a few moments to convey my thoughts, on sundry important matters, to
congress. I shall offer them with that sincerity which ought to
characterize a man of candour; and with the freedom which may be used
in giving useful information, without incurring the imputation of
presumption.
"We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our
army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that
occasion last year; the consequences which might have followed the
change, if proper advantages had been taken by the enemy; added to a
knowledge of the present temper and disposition of the troops; reflect
but a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now, and
satisfy me, beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedy
and effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will be
lost.
"It is in vain to expect that any, or more than a trifling part of
this army, will engage again in the service, on the encouragement
offered by congress. When men find that their townsmen and companions
are receiving twenty, thirty, and more dollars, for a few months
service, (which is truly the case,) this can not be expected, without
using compulsion; and to force them into the service would answer no
valuable purpose. When men are irritated, and their passions inflamed,
they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms; but after the first emotions
are over, to expect among such people as compose the bulk of an army,
that they are influenced by any other motives than those of interest,
is to look for what never did, and I fear never will happen; the
congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.
"A soldier, reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged
in, and the inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with
patience, and acknowledges the truth of your observations; but adds,
that it is of no more consequence to him than to others. The officer
makes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will
not support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to serve his
country, when every member of the community is equally benefited and
interested by his labours. The few, therefore, who act upon principles
of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop
in the ocean. It becomes evidently clear, then, that as this contest
is not likely to become the work of a day; as the war must be carried
on systematically; and to do it, you must have good officers; there
is, in my judgment, no other possible means to obtain them, but by
establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your
officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen, and men of character,
to engage; and, until the bulk of your officers are composed of such
persons as are actuated by principles of honour and a spirit of
enterprise, you have little to expect from them. They ought to have
such allowances as will enable them to live like, and support the
character of gentlemen; and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the
low and dirty arts which many of them practise, to filch the public of
more than the difference of pay would amount to, upon an ample
allowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in
your hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic
enjoyments. Why a captain in the continental service should receive no
more than five shillings currency per day, for performing the same
duties that an officer of the same rank in the British service
receives ten shillings sterling for, I never could conceive;
especially, when the latter is provided with every necessary he
requires, upon the best terms, and the former can scarcely procure
them at any rate. There is nothing that gives a man consequence, and
renders him fit for command, like a support that renders him
independent of every body but the state he serves.
"With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them
upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than the
continuance of the war ought they to be engaged; as facts
incontestably prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistments
increase with time. When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I am
persuaded the men might have been got, without a bounty, for the war:
after that, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end
so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence, by
remarking, that to get their militia, in the course of the last year,
many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils
resulting from this, and the destructive consequences which would
unavoidably follow short enlistments, I took the liberty, in a long
letter, (date not now recollected, as my letter book is not here,) to
recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such
reasons for it, as experience has since convinced me, were well
founded. At that time, twenty dollars would, I am persuaded, have
engaged the men for this term: but it will not do to look back--and if
the present opportunity is slipped, I am persuaded that twelve months
more will increase our difficulties four fold. I shall therefore take
the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a good bounty be
immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least a hundred, or a
hundred and fifty acres of land, and a suit of clothes, and a blanket,
to each non-commissioned officer and soldier, as I have good authority
for saying, that however high the men's pay may appear, it is barely
sufficient, in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of
goods, to keep them in clothes, much less to afford support to their
families. If this encouragement, then, is given to the men, and such
pay allowed to the officers, as will induce gentlemen of liberal
character and liberal sentiments to engage; and proper care and
caution be used in the nomination, (having more regard to the
characters of persons than the number of men they can enlist,) we
should, in a little time, have an army able to cope with any that can
be opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of:
but whilst the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise
men; whilst those men consider and treat him as an equal, and in the
character of an officer, regard him no more than a broomstick, being
mixed together as one common herd; no order nor discipline can
prevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is
essentially necessary to due subordination.
"To place any dependence upon militia, is assuredly resting upon a
broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic
life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every
kind of military skill, which, being followed by a want of confidence
in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined,
and appointed--superior in knowledge, and superior in arms--makes them
timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden
change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging,
brings on sickness in many, impatience in all; and such an
unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it
not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves,
but infuses the like spirit into others. Again, men accustomed to
unbounded freedom and no control, can not brook the restraint which is
indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army;
without which, licentiousness, and every kind of disorder,
triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination,
is not the work of a day, a month, or a year; and unhappily for us,
and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been
labouring to establish in the army under my immediate command, is in a
manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been
called together within these few months."
The frequent remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief; the opinions of
all military men; and the severe, but correcting hand of experience,
had at length produced some effect on the government of the
union;--and soon after the defeat on Long Island, congress had
directed the committee composing the board of war, to prepare a plan
of operations for the next succeeding campaign. Their report proposed
a permanent army, to be enlisted for the war, and to be raised by the
several states, in proportion to their ability. A bounty of twenty
dollars was offered to each recruit; and small portions of land to
every officer and soldier.
{October 4.}
The resolutions adopting this report were received by the
Commander-in-chief soon after the transmission of the foregoing
letter. Believing the inducements they held forth for the completion
of the army to be still insufficient, he, in his letter acknowledging
the receipt of them, urged in the most serious terms, the necessity of
raising the pay of the officers, and the bounty offered to recruits.
"Give me leave to say, sir," he observed, "I say it with due deference
and respect, (and my knowledge of the facts, added to the importance
of the cause, and the stake I hold it in, must justify the freedom,)
that your affairs are in a more unpromising way than you seem to
apprehend.
"Your army, as mentioned in my last, is upon the eve of political
dissolution. True it is, you have voted a larger one in lieu of it;
but the season is late, and there is a material difference between
voting battalions, and raising men. In the latter, there are more
difficulties than Congress seem aware of; which makes it my duty (as I
have been informed of the prevailing sentiments of this army) to
inform them, that unless the pay of the officers (especially that of
the field officers) is raised, the chief part of those that are worth
retaining will leave the service at the expiration of the present
term; as the soldiers will also, if some greater encouragement is not
offered them, than twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land."
After urging in strong terms the necessity of a more liberal
compensation to the army, and stating that the British were actually
raising a regiment with a bounty of ten pounds sterling for each
recruit, he added, "when the pay and establishment of an officer once
become objects of interested attention, the sloth, negligence, and
even disobedience of orders, which at this time but too generally
prevail, will be purged off;--but while the service is viewed with
indifference; while the officer conceives that he is rather conferring
than receiving an obligation: there will be a total relaxation of all
order and discipline; and every thing will move heavily on, to the
great detriment of the service, and inexpressible trouble and vexation
of the general.
"The critical situation of our affairs at this time will justify my
saying, that no time is to be lost in making fruitless experiments. An
unavailing trial of a month, to get an army upon the terms proposed,
may render it impracticable to do it at all, and prove fatal to our
cause; as I am not sure whether any rubs in the way of our
enlistments, or unfavourable turn in our affairs, may not prove the
means of the enemy's recruiting men faster than we do."
After stating at large the confusion and delay, inseparable from the
circumstance that the appointments for the new army were to be made by
the states, the letter proceeds, "upon the present plan, I plainly
foresee an intervention of time between the old and new army, which
must be filled with militia, if to be had, with whom no man, who has
any regard for his own reputation, can undertake to be answerable for
consequences. I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures, if we do not
lose the most valuable officers in this army, under the present mode
of appointing them; consequently, if we have an army at all, it will
be composed of materials not only entirely raw, but, if uncommon pains
are not taken, entirely unfit: and I see such a distrust and jealousy
of military power, that the Commander-in-chief has not an opportunity,
even by recommendation, to give the least assurance of reward for the
most essential services.
"In a word, such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears before
me, without one flattering hope, that I am thoroughly convinced,
unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediately
adopted to remedy these evils, the certain and absolute loss of our
liberties will be the inevitable consequence: as one unhappy stroke
will throw a powerful weight into the scale against us, and enable
General Howe to recruit his army, as fast as we shall ours; numbers
being disposed, and many actually doing so already. Some of the most
probable remedies, and such as experience has brought to my more
intimate knowledge, I have taken the liberty to point out; the rest I
beg leave to submit to the consideration of congress.
"I ask pardon for taking up so much of their time with my opinions,
but I should betray that trust which they and my country have reposed
in me, were I to be silent upon matters so extremely interesting."
On receiving this very serious letter, congress passed resolutions
conforming to many of its suggestions. The pay of the officers was
raised, and a suit of clothes allowed annually to each soldier: The
legislatures of the states having troops in the continental service,
either at New York, Ticonderoga, or New Jersey, were requested to
depute committees to those places in order to officer the regiments on
the new establishment: and it was recommended to the committees to
consult the General on the subject of appointments.