The Life of George Washington, Vol. 2 (of 5)
J >> John Marshall >> The Life of George Washington, Vol. 2 (of 5)1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31
[Illustration: Washington's Headquarters at White Plains
_Here, twenty-two miles northeast of New York City, Washington made
his headquarters in October, 1776, and directed the Battle of White
Plains or Chatterton Hill. Opposed to the American forces was a
British army, greatly superior in numbers, under General Howe, whose
delay in attaching the Americans enabled Washington to take up an
unassailable position at North Castle, preparatory to his subsequent
masterly retreat across New Jersey._]
CHAPTER VI.
The British land at Frog's Neck.... The American army
evacuates York Island, except fort Washington.... Both
armies move towards the White Plains.... Battle of the White
Plains.... The British army returns to Kingsbridge....
General Washington crosses the North river.... The lines of
fort Washington carried by the British, and the garrison
made prisoners.... Evacuation of fort Lee.... Weakness of
the American army.... Ineffectual attempts to raise the
militia.... General Washington retreats through Jersey....
General Washington crosses the Delaware.... Danger of
Philadelphia.... Capture of General Lee.... The British go
into winter quarters.... Battle of Trenton.... Of
Princeton.... Firmness of congress.
{1776}
{October 9.}
The armies did not long retain their position on York Island. General
Howe was sensible of the strength of the American camp, and was not
disposed to force it. His plan was to compel General Washington to
abandon it, or to give battle in a situation in which a defeat must be
attended with the total destruction of his army. With this view, after
throwing up entrenchments on M'Gowan's hill for the protection of New
York, he determined to gain the rear of the American camp, by the New
England road, and also to possess himself of the North river above
Kingsbridge. To assure himself of the practicability of acquiring the
command of the river, three frigates passed up it under the fire from
fort Washington, and from the opposite post on the Jersey shore,
afterwards called fort Lee, without sustaining any injury from the
batteries, or being impeded by the chevaux-de-frise which had been
sunk in the channel between those forts.
{Twelfth.}
[Sidenote: The enemy land at Frog's Neck.]
This point being ascertained, he embarked a great part of his army on
board flat bottomed boats, and, passing through Hurl Gate into the
Sound, landed at Frog's Neck, about nine miles from the camp on the
heights of Haerlem.
In consequence of this movement, Washington strengthened the post at
Kingsbridge, and detached some regiments to West Chester for the
purpose of skirmishing with the enemy, so soon as he should march from
the ground he occupied. The road from Frog's Point to Kingsbridge
leads through a strong country, intersected by numerous stone fences,
so as to render it difficult to move artillery, or even infantry, in
compact columns, except along the main road, which had been broken up
in several places. The General, therefore, entertained sanguine hopes
of the event, should a direct attack be made on his camp.
General Howe continued some days waiting for his artillery, military
stores, and reinforcements from Staten Island, which were detained by
unfavourable winds.
{October 16.}
[Sidenote: The American army evacuates York island except Fort
Washington.]
In the mean time, as the habits of thinking in America required that
every important measure should be the result of consultation, and
should receive the approbation of a majority, the propriety of
removing the American army from its present situation was submitted to
a council of the general officers. After much investigation, it was
declared to be impracticable, without a change of position, to keep up
their communication with the country, and avoid being compelled to
fight under great disadvantages, or to surrender themselves prisoners
of war. General Lee, who had just arrived from the south, and whose
experience as well as late success gave great weight to his opinions,
urged the necessity of this movement with much earnestness. It was, at
the same time, determined to hold fort Washington, and to defend it as
long as possible. A resolution of congress of the 11th of October,
desiring General Washington, by every art and expense, to obstruct, if
possible, the navigation of the river, contributed, not
inconsiderably, to this determination.
In pursuance of this opinion of the military council, measures were
taken for moving the army up the North River, so as to extend its
front, or left, towards the White Plains, beyond the British right,
and thus keep open its communication with the country. The right, or
rear division, remained a few days longer about Kingsbridge under the
command of General Lee, for the security of the heavy baggage and
military stores, which, in consequence of the difficulty of obtaining
wagons, could be but slowly removed.
{October 18.}
General Howe, after uniting his forces at Pell's Point, moved forward
his whole army, except four brigades destined for the defence of New
York, through Pelham's manor, towards New Rochelle. Some skirmishes
took place on the march with a part of Glover's brigade, in which the
conduct of the Americans was mentioned with satisfaction by the
Commander-in-chief; and, as General Howe took post at New Rochelle, a
village on the Sound, General Washington occupied the heights between
that place and the North River.
{October 21.}
[Sidenote: Both armies move towards the White Plains.]
At New Rochelle, the British army was joined by the second division of
Germans, under the command of General Knyphausen, and by an incomplete
regiment of cavalry from Ireland; some of whom had been captured on
their passage. Both armies now moved towards the White Plains, a
strong piece of ground already occupied by a detachment of militia.
The main body of the American troops formed a long line of entrenched
camps, extending from twelve to thirteen miles, on the different
heights from Valentine's Hill, near Kingsbridge, to the White Plains,
fronting the British line of march, and the Brunx, which divided the
two armies. The motions of General Howe were anxiously watched, not
only for the purposes of security, and of avoiding a general action,
but in order to seize any occasion which might present itself of
engaging his out-posts with advantage. While the British army lay at
New Rochelle, the position of a corps of American loyalists commanded
by Major Rogers was supposed to furnish such an occasion. He was
advanced, farther eastward, to Mamaraneck, on the Sound, where he was
believed to be covered by the other troops. An attempt was made to
surprise him in the night, by a detachment which should pass between
him and the main body of the British army, and, by a coup de main,
bear off his whole corps. Major Rogers was surprised, and about sixty
of his regiment killed and taken. The loss of the Americans was only
two killed, and eight or ten wounded; among the latter was Major Green
of Virginia, a brave officer, who led the detachment, and who received
a ball through his body.
Not long afterwards, a regiment of Pennsylvania riflemen, under
Colonel Hand, engaged an equal number of Hessian chasseurs, with some
advantage.
The caution of the English general was increased by these evidences of
enterprise in his adversary. His object seems to have been to avoid
skirmishes, and to bring on a general action, if that could be
effected under favourable circumstances; if not, he calculated on
nearly all the advantages of a victory from the approaching
dissolution of the American army. He proceeded therefore slowly. His
march was in close order, his encampments compact, and well guarded
with artillery; and the utmost circumspection was used to leave no
vulnerable point.
{October 25.}
As the sick and baggage reached a place of safety, General Washington
gradually drew in his out-posts, and took possession of the heights on
the east side of the Brunx, fronting the head of the British columns,
at the distance of seven or eight miles from them. The next day, he
was joined by General Lee, who, after securing the sick and the
baggage, had, with considerable address, brought up the rear division
of the army; an operation the more difficult as the deficiency of
teams was such that a large portion of the labour usually performed by
horses or oxen, devolved on men.
General Washington was encamped on high broken ground, with his right
flank on the Brunx. This stream meandered so as also to cover the
front of his right wing, which extended along the road leading towards
New Rochelle, as far as the brow of the hill where his centre was
posted. His left, which formed almost a right angle with his centre,
and was nearly parallel to his right, extended along the hills
northward, so as to keep possession of the commanding ground, and
secure a retreat, should it be necessary, to a still stronger position
in his rear.
On the right of the army, and on the west side of the Brunx, about one
mile from camp, on a road leading from the North River, was a hill, of
which General M'Dougal was ordered to take possession, for the purpose
of covering the right flank. His detachment consisted of about sixteen
hundred men, principally militia; and his communication with the main
army was open, that part of the Brunx being passable without
difficulty.
Intrenchments were thrown up to strengthen the lines.
General Howe, having made arrangements to attack Washington in his
camp, advanced early in the morning in two columns, the right
commanded by Sir Henry Clinton, and the left by General Knyphausen;
and, about ten, his van appeared in full view, on which a cannonade
commenced without much execution on either side.
{October 28.}
[Sidenote: Battle of the White Plains.]
The British right formed behind a rising ground, about a mile in front
of the American camp, and extending from the road leading from
Mamaraneck towards the Brunx, stood opposed to the American centre.
On viewing Washington's situation, Howe, who accompanied Knyphausen,
determined to carry the hill occupied by M'Dougal, as preliminary to
an attack on the centre and right of the American camp. He therefore
directed Colonel Rawle, with a brigade of Hessians, to cross the Brunx
and make a circuit so as to turn M'Dougal's right flank, while
Brigadier General Leslie, with a strong corps of British and Hessian
troops should attack him in front. When Rawle had gained his position,
the detachment commanded by Leslie also crossed the Brunx, and
commenced a vigorous attack.[45] The militia in the front line
immediately fled; but the regulars maintained their ground with great
gallantry. Colonel Smallwood's regiment of Maryland, and Colonel
Reitzimer's of New York, advanced boldly towards the foot of the hill
to meet Leslie, but, after a sharp encounter, were overpowered by
numbers, and compelled to retreat. General Leslie then attacked the
remaining part of M'Dougal's forces, who were soon driven from the
hill, but kept up for some time an irregular fire from the stone walls
about the scene of action. General Putnam, with Real's brigade, was
ordered to support them; but not having arrived till the hill was
lost, the attempt to regain it was deemed unadviseable, and the troops
retreated to the main army.
[Footnote 45: General Howe's letter.]
In this animated engagement, the loss was supposed to be nearly equal.
That of the Americans was between three and four hundred in killed,
wounded, and taken. Colonel Smallwood was among the wounded.
General Washington continued in his lines expecting an assault. But a
considerable part of the day having been exhausted in gaining the hill
which had been occupied by M'Dougal, the meditated attempt on his
intrenchments was postponed until the next morning; and the British
army lay on their arms the following night, in order of battle, on the
ground taken during the day.
{October 30.}
This interval was employed by General Washington in strengthening his
works, removing his sick and baggage, and preparing for the expected
attack by adopting the arrangement of his troops to the existing state
of things. His left maintained its position; but his right was drawn
back to stronger ground. Perceiving this, and being unwilling to leave
any thing to hazard, Howe resolved to postpone farther offensive
operations, until Lord Percy should arrive with four battalions from
New York, and two from Mamaraneck. This reinforcement was received on
the evening of the thirtieth, and preparations were then made to force
the American intrenchments the next morning. In the night, and during
the early part of the succeeding day, a violent rain still farther
postponed the assault.
Having now removed his provisions and heavy baggage to much stronger
ground, and apprehending that the British general, whose left wing
extended along the height, taken from M'Dougal, to his rear, might
turn his camp, and occupy the strong ground to which he designed to
retreat, should an attempt on his lines prove successful, General
Washington changed his position in the night, and withdrew to the
heights of North Castle, about five miles from the White Plains.
{November 1.}
Deeming this position too strong to be attempted with prudence,
General Howe determined to change his plan of operations, and to give
a new direction to his efforts.[46]
[Footnote 46: General Howe's letter.]
While forts Washington and Lee were held by the Americans, his
movements were checked, and York Island insecure. With a view to the
acquisition of these posts, he directed General Knyphausen to take
possession of Kingsbridge, which was defended by a small party of
Americans placed in fort Independence. On his approach, this party
retreated to fort Washington; and Knyphausen encamped between that
place and Kingsbridge.
{November 5.}
[Sidenote: The British army returns to Kingsbridge.]
In the mean time, General Howe retired slowly down the North River.
His designs were immediately penetrated by the American general, who
perceived the necessity of passing a part of his army into Jersey, but
was restrained from immediately leaving the strong ground he occupied
by the apprehension that his adversary might, in that event, return
suddenly and gain his rear. A council of war was called, which
determined unanimously, that, should General Howe continue his march
towards New York, all the troops raised on the west side of the Hudson
should cross that river, to be afterwards followed by those raised in
the eastern part of the continent, leaving three thousand men for the
defence of the Highlands about the North river.
In a letter to congress communicating this movement of the British
army, and this determination of the council, the general said, "I can
not indulge the idea that General Howe, supposing him to be going to
New York, means to close the campaign, and to sit down without
attempting something more. I think it highly probable, and almost
certain, that he will make a descent with part of his troops into the
Jerseys; and, as soon as I am satisfied that the present manoeuvre is
real, and not a feint, I shall use all the means in my power to
forward a part of our force to counteract his designs.
"I expect the enemy will bend their force against fort Washington, and
invest it immediately. From some advices, it is an object that will
attract their earliest attention."
He also addressed a letter to the governor of New Jersey, expressing a
decided opinion that General Howe would not content himself with
investing fort Washington, but would invade the Jerseys; and urging
him to put the militia in the best possible condition to reinforce the
army, and to take the place of the new levies, who could not, he
suggested, be depended on to continue in service one day longer than
the first of December, the time for which they were engaged.
Immediate intelligence of this movement was likewise given to General
Greene, who commanded in the Jerseys; and his attention was
particularly pointed to fort Washington.
As the British army approached Kingsbridge, three ships of war passed
up the North River, notwithstanding the fire from forts Washington and
Lee, and notwithstanding the additional obstructions which had been
placed in the channel.
{November 8.}
On being informed of this, another letter was addressed to General
Greene, stating that this fact was so plain a proof of the inefficacy
of all the obstructions thrown in the river, as to justify a change in
the dispositions which had been made. "If," continued the letter, "we
can not prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessed
of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to
attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit can not be
derived? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to
hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the
spot, I leave it to you to give such orders respecting the evacuation
of the place, as you may think most adviseable; and so far revoke the
orders given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last."
Measures were now taken to cross the North River with the troops which
had been raised on its western side, and General Washington determined
to accompany that division of the army. The eastern regiments remained
on the eastern side of the river, under the command of General Lee,
with orders to join the Commander-in-chief, should the British army
cross the Hudson.
[Sidenote: And General Washington with a part of his army crosses the
North River.]
After visiting the posts about Peekskill, and making all the
arrangements in his power for their defence, General Washington passed
the North River in the rear of the troops designed to act in the
Jerseys, and proceeded to the quarters of General Greene, near fort
Lee.
From too great a confidence[47] in the strength of fort Washington,
and a conviction of its importance, General Greene had not withdrawn
its garrison under the discretionary orders he had received, but still
indulged a hope that the post might be maintained, or, should its
situation become desperate, that means might be found to transport the
troops across the river to the Jersey shore, which was defended by
fort Lee.
[Footnote 47: Extract of a letter from General Greene, dated
September 11th, 1778.
"Remember the effect that the loss of the garrison of fort
Washington had; there were men enough to have defended
themselves against all the army had they not been struck
with a panic; but, being most of them irregular troops, they
lost their confidence when the danger began to grow
pressing, and so fell a prey to their own fears."--_Life of
Greene_, v. 1, p. 121.]
Mount Washington is a high piece of rocky ground, near the North
River, very difficult of ascent, especially towards the north, or
Kingsbridge. The fort was capable of containing about one thousand
men; but the lines and out-works, which were chiefly on the southern
side, towards New York, were drawn quite across the island. The ground
was naturally strong, the approaches difficult, and the
fortifications, though not sufficient to resist heavy artillery, were
believed to be in a condition to resist any attempt to carry them by
storm. The garrison consisted of troops, some of whom were among the
best in the American army; and the command had been given to Colonel
Magaw, a brave and intelligent officer, in whom great confidence was
placed.
{November 13.}
{Fifteenth.}
General Howe, after retiring from the White Plains, encamped at a
small distance from Kingsbridge, on the heights of Fordham; and,
having made the necessary preparations for an assault, summoned the
garrison to surrender, on pain of being put to the sword. Colonel
Magaw replied, that he should defend the place to the last extremity,
and communicated the summons to General Greene at fort Lee, who
transmitted it to the Commander-in-chief, then at Hackensack. He
immediately rode to fort Lee, and, though it was late in the night,
was proceeding to fort Washington, where he expected to find Generals
Putnam and Greene, when, in crossing the river, he met those officers
returning from a visit to that fort. They reported that the garrison
was in high spirits, and would make a good defence; on which he
returned with them to fort Lee.
{November 16.}
Early next morning, Colonel Magaw posted his troops, partly on a
commanding hill north of the fort, partly in the outermost of the
lines drawn across the island on the south of the fort, and partly
between those lines, on the woody and rocky heights fronting Haerlem
River, where the ground being extremely difficult of ascent, the works
were not closed. Colonel Rawlings, of Maryland, commanded on the hill
towards Kingsbridge; Colonel Cadwallader, of Pennsylvania, in the
lines, and Colonel Magaw himself continued in the fort.
The strength of the place had not deterred the British general from
resolving to carry it by storm; and, on receiving the answer of
Colonel Magaw, arrangements were made for a vigorous attack next day.
About ten, the assailants appeared before the works, and moved to the
assault in four different quarters. Their first division consisting of
Hessians and Waldeckers, amounting to about five thousand men, under
the command of General Knyphausen, advanced on the north side of the
fort, against the hill occupied by Colonel Rawlings, who received them
with great gallantry. The second, on the east, consisting of the
British light infantry and guards, was led by Brigadier General
Matthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the grenadiers
and the thirty-third regiment. These troops crossed Haerlem River in
boats, under cover of the artillery planted in the works, which had
been erected on the opposite side of the river, and landed within the
third line of defence which crossed the island. The third division was
conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Stirling, who passed the river higher
up; and the fourth by Lord Percy, accompanied by General Howe in
person. This division was to attack the lines in front, on the south
side.[48]
[Footnote 48: General Howe's letter.]
The attacks on the north and south by General Knyphausen and Lord
Percy, were made about the same instant, on Colonels Rawlings and
Cadwallader, who maintained their ground for a considerable time; but,
while Colonel Cadwallader was engaged in the first line against Lord
Percy, the second and third divisions which had crossed Haerlem River
made good their landing, and dispersed the troops fronting that river,
as well as a detachment sent by Colonel Cadwallader to support them.
Thus being overpowered, and the British advancing between the fort and
the lines, it became necessary to abandon them. In retreating to the
fort, some of the men were intercepted by the division under Colonel
Stirling, and made prisoners.
The resistance on the north was of longer duration. Rawlings
maintained his ground with firmness, and his riflemen did vast
execution. A three gun battery also played on Knyphausen with great
effect. At length, the Hessian columns gained the summit of the hill;
after which, Colonel Rawlings, who perceived the danger which
threatened his rear, retreated under the guns of the fort.
[Sidenote: The lines of Fort Washington carried by the enemy, and the
garrison made prisoners.]
Having carried the lines, and all the strong ground adjoining them,
the British general again summoned Colonel Magaw to surrender. While
the capitulation was in a course of arrangement, General Washington
sent him a billet, requesting him to hold out until the evening, when
means should be attempted to bring off the garrison. But Magaw had
proceeded too far to retreat; and it is probable the place could not
have resisted an assault from so formidable a force as threatened it.
The greatest difficulties had been overcome; the fort was too small to
contain all the men; and their ammunition was nearly exhausted. Under
these circumstances the garrison became prisoners of war.
The loss on this occasion was the greatest the Americans had ever
sustained. The garrison was stated by General Washington at about two
thousand men. Yet, in a report published as from General Howe, the
number of prisoners is said to be two thousand and six hundred,
exclusive of officers. Either General Howe must have included in his
report persons who were not soldiers, or General Washington must have
comprehended the regulars only in his letter. The last conjecture is
most probably correct. The loss of the assailants, according to Mr.
Stedman, amounted to eight hundred men. This loss fell heaviest on the
Germans.
[Sidenote: Evacuation of Fort Lee.]
{November 18.}
On the surrender of fort Washington, it was determined to evacuate
fort Lee; and a removal of the stores was immediately commenced.
Before this operation could be completed, a detachment commanded by
Lord Cornwallis, amounting to about six thousand men, crossed the
North River below Dobb's ferry, and endeavoured, by a rapid march, to
enclose the garrison between the North and Hackensack Rivers. An
immediate retreat from that narrow neck of land had become
indispensable, and was with difficulty effected. All the heavy cannon
at fort Lee, except two twelve-pounders, with a considerable quantity
of provisions and military stores, including three hundred tents, were
lost. After crossing the Hackensack, General Washington posted his
troops along the western bank of that river, but was unable to dispute
its passage at the head of about three thousand effectives, exposed,
without tents, in an inclement season; he was in a level country,
without a single intrenching tool, among people far from being zealous
in the American cause. In other respects this situation was dangerous.
The Passaic, in his rear, after running several miles nearly parallel
to the Hackensack, unites with that river below the ground occupied by
the Americans, who were consequently still exposed to the hazard of
being inclosed between two rivers.