The Life of George Washington, Vol. 2 (of 5)
J >> John Marshall >> The Life of George Washington, Vol. 2 (of 5)Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31
{November 25.}
On receiving this unwelcome intelligence, he applied to General
Washington to change the port of embarkation, and to substitute
Newport, in Rhode Island, or some place on the Sound, for Boston. If
any considerations not foreseen should make this proposal
objectionable, he then solicited this indulgence for himself and his
suite. This request was communicated to congress, in terms favourable
to that part of the application which respected General Burgoyne and
his suite; but the objections to any change in the convention which
might expedite the transportation of the army, were too weighty to be
disregarded; and the General pressed them earnestly on congress. This
precaution was unnecessary. The facility with which the convention
might be violated by the British, and the captured army be united to
that under General Howe, seems to have suggested itself to the
American government, as soon as the first rejoicings were over; and
such was its then existing temper, that the faith and honour of
British officers were believed to be no securities against their
appearing again in the field. Under this impression, a resolution had
passed early in November, directing General Heath to transmit to the
board of war a descriptive list of all persons comprehended in the
convention, "in order that, if any officer, soldier, or other person
of the said army should hereafter be found in arms against these
states in North America, during the present contest, he might be
convicted of the offence, and suffer the punishment in such case
inflicted by the law of nations."
No other notice was taken of the application made by General Burgoyne
to congress through the Commander-in-chief, than to pass a resolution
"that General Washington be directed to inform General Burgoyne that
congress will not receive, nor consider, any proposition for
indulgence, nor for altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga,
unless immediately directed to their own body."
{December.}
Contrary to expectation, a fleet of transports for the reception of
the troops reached Rhode Island, on its way to Boston, in the month of
December. But, before its arrival, the preconceived suspicions of
congress had ripened into conviction several circumstances combined to
produce this result. General Burgoyne, dissatisfied with the
accommodations prepared for his officers in Boston, had, after a
fruitless correspondence with General Heath, addressed a letter to
General Gates, in which he complained of the inconvenient quarters
assigned his officers, as a breach of the articles of the convention.
This complaint was considered by congress as being made for the
purpose of letting in the principle, that the breach of one article of
a treaty discharges the injured party from its obligations.
This suspicion was strengthened by the indiscreet hesitation of
General Burgoyne to permit the resolution requiring a descriptive list
of his troops to be executed. His subsequent relinquishment of the
objection did not remove the impression it had made.
It was also alleged, that the number of transports was not sufficient
to convey the troops to Europe; nor was it believed possible that Sir
William Howe could have laid in, so expeditiously, a sufficient stock
of provisions for the voyage.
These objections to the embarkation of Burgoyne's troops were
strengthened by some trivial infractions of the convention, which, it
was contended, gave congress a strict right to detain them. It was
stipulated that "the arms" should be delivered up; and it appeared
that several cartouch boxes and other military accoutrements, supposed
to be comprehended in the technical term _arms_, had been detained.
This was deemed an infraction of the letter of the compact, which, on
rigid principle, justified the measures afterwards adopted by
congress.
[Sidenote: Congress forbid the embarkation of the British troops taken
at Saratoga.]
The whole subject was referred to a committee who reported all the
circumstances of the case, whereupon congress came to several
resolutions, enumerating the facts already mentioned, the last of
which was in these words: "Resolved, therefore, that the embarkation
of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and the troops under his command, be
suspended, until a distinct and explicit ratification of the
convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of
Great Britain to congress."
These resolutions, together with the report on which they were
founded, were transmitted to the several states, and to General
Washington. Two copies of them were sent to General Heath, with
directions to deliver one of them to General Burgoyne, and with
farther directions, "to order the vessels which may have arrived, or
which shall arrive, for the transportation of the army under
Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to quit, without delay, the port of
Boston."
[Sidenote: Burgoyne permitted to depart.]
On receiving these resolutions, General Burgoyne addressed a letter to
congress, containing papers, on which he founded a defence of his
conduct, and insisted on the embarkation of his army, as stipulated in
the convention; but the committee, to whom these papers were referred,
reported their opinion, after the most attentive consideration of
them, to be, "that nothing therein contained was sufficient to induce
congress to recede from their resolves of the 8th of January last,
respecting the convention of Saratoga." This application was
accompanied by another letter from General Burgoyne, to be delivered
if the army should still be detained, in which, in consideration of
the state of his health, he solicited permission to return to England.
This request was readily granted.
The impression made on the British nation by the capitulation of
Burgoyne, notwithstanding the persevering temper of the king, at
length made its way into the cabinet, and produced resolutions in
favour of pacific measures.
{1778}
{February.}
After the rejection of repeated motions made by the opposition members
tending to the abandonment of the American war, Lord North gave
notice, in the House of Commons, that he had digested a plan of
reconciliation which he designed shortly to lay before the house.
[Sidenote: Plan of reconciliation with America agreed to in
Parliament.]
In conformity with this notice, he moved for leave to bring in,
"first, A bill for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerning
taxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the colonies and
plantations of North America.
"Second. A bill to enable his Majesty to appoint commissioners with
sufficient powers to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of
quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies of
North America."
The first contained a declaration that Parliament will impose no tax
or duty whatever payable within any of the colonies of North America,
except only such duties as it may be expedient to impose for the
purposes of commerce, the net produce of which should always be paid
and applied to and for the use of the colonies in which the same shall
be respectively levied, in like manner as other duties collected under
the authority of their respective legislatures are ordinarily paid and
applied.
The second authorized the appointment of commissioners by the crown,
with power to treat either with the existing governments, or with
individuals, in America; provided that no stipulations which might be
entered into should have any effect until approved in Parliament,
other than is afterward mentioned.
It is then enacted, that the commissioners may have power "to proclaim
a cessation of hostilities in any of the colonies, to suspend the
operation of the non-intercourse law; and farther, to suspend, during
the continuance of the act, so much of all or any of the acts of
Parliament which have passed since the 10th day of February, 1763, as
relates to the colonies.
"To grant pardon to any number or description of persons, and to
appoint a governor in any colony in which his majesty had heretofore
exercised the power of making such appointments."
These bills passed both houses of Parliament with inconsiderable
opposition.
Intelligence of the treaty between the United States and France having
been received by the minister about the time of their being
introduced, copies of them, before they had gone through the requisite
forms, were hurried to America, to be laid before congress and the
public, in the hope and expectation that they might counteract the
effects which it was feared the treaty with France would produce.
{April.}
General Washington received early information of their arrival, and
entertained serious fears of their operation. He was apprehensive that
the publication of a proposition for the restoration of peace on the
terms originally required by America, would greatly increase the
numbers of the disaffected; and immediately forwarded the bills to
congress in a letter suggesting the policy of preventing their
pernicious influence on the public mind by all possible means, and
especially through the medium of the press.
[Sidenote: Communicated to, and rejected by Congress.]
{April 22.}
This letter was referred to a committee, consisting of Messrs. Morris,
Drayton, and Dana, by whom a report was made, investigating the bills
with great acuteness as well as asperity. This report, and the
resolutions upon it, were ordered to be published. Other resolutions
were passed the succeeding day, recommending it to the states to
pardon under such limitations as they might think proper to make, such
of their misguided fellow-citizens as had levied war against the
United States.
This resolution was accompanied by an order directing it to be printed
in English and in German, and requesting General Washington to take
such measures as he should deem most effectual for circulating the
copies among the American recruits in the enemy's army.[101]
[Footnote 101: This request afforded the Commander-in-chief
a fair retort on Major General Tryon. That officer had
addressed a letter to him enclosing the bills brought into
Parliament, and containing, to use the language of General
Washington himself, "the more extraordinary and impertinent
request" that their contents should be communicated through
him to the army. General Washington now acknowledged the
receipt of this letter, and, in return, enclosed to Governor
Tryon copies of the resolution just mentioned, with a
request that he would be instrumental in making them known
to the persons on whom they were to operate.]
During these transactions, the frigate _La Sensible_ arrived with the
important intelligence that treaties of alliance and of commerce, had
been formed between the United States of America and France. The
treaties themselves were brought by Mr. Simeon Deane, the brother of
the American Minister in Paris.
This event had long been anxiously expected, and the delay attending
it had been such as to excite serious apprehension that it would never
take place.
France was still extremely sore under the wounds inflicted during the
war which terminated in 1763. It was impossible to reflect on a treaty
which had wrested from her so fair a part of North America, without
feeling resentments which would seek the first occasion of
gratification.
The growing discontents between Great Britain and her colonies were,
consequently, viewed at a distance with secret satisfaction; but
rather as a circumstance which might have some tendency to weaken and
embarrass a rival, and which was to be encouraged from motives of
general policy, than as one from which any definite advantage was to
be derived. France appears, at that time, to have required, and wished
for, repose. The great exertions of the preceding disastrous war had
so deranged her finances, that the wish to preserve peace seems to
have predominated in her cabinet. The young monarch, who had just
ascended the throne, possessed a pacific unambitious temper, and the
councils of the nation were governed by men alike indisposed to
disturb the general tranquillity. The advice they gave the monarch
was, to aid and encourage the colonies secretly, in order to prevent a
reconciliation with the mother country, and to prepare privately for
hostilities, by improving his finances, and strengthening his marine;
but to avoid every thing which might give occasion for open war. The
system which for a time regulated the cabinet of Versailles, conformed
to this advice. While the utmost attention was paid to the Minister of
Britain, and every measure to satisfy him was openly taken, intimation
was privately given to those of the United States, that these measures
were necessary for the present, but they might be assured of the good
will of the French government.
During the public demonstration of dispositions favourable to England,
means were taken to furnish aids of ammunition and arms, and to
facilitate the negotiation of loans to the United States; and the
owners of American privateers, though forbidden to sell their prizes,
or to procure their condemnation, found means to dispose of them
privately.
Meanwhile, another party was formed in the cabinet, to whose political
system subsequent events gave the ascendency. Its avowed object was to
seize the present moment to revenge past injuries, humble the haughty
rival of France, and dismember her empire.
Matters remained in a fluctuating state until December, 1777.
Privately encouraged, but discountenanced publicly, the prospects of
the American Ministers varied according to the complexion of American
affairs.
Intelligence of the convention of Saratoga reached France early in
December, 1777. The American deputies took that opportunity to press
the treaty which had been under consideration for the preceding twelve
months; and to urge the importance, at this juncture, when Britain
would, most probably, make proposals for an accommodation,[102] of
communicating to congress, precisely, what was to be expected from
France and Spain.
[Footnote 102: Congress, in their first instructions to
their commissioners, directed them to press the immediate
declaration of France in favour of the United States, by
suggesting that a reunion with Great Britain might be the
consequence of delay.--_Secret Journals of Congress_, v. ii.
p. 30.]
They were informed by M. Girard, one of the secretaries of the king's
council of state, that it was determined to acknowledge the
independence of the United States, and to make a treaty with them.
That his Most Christian Majesty was resolved not only to acknowledge,
but to support their independence. That in doing this, he might
probably soon be engaged in a war; yet he should not expect any
compensation from the United States on that account; nor was it
pretended that he acted wholly for their sakes; since, besides his
real good will to them, it was manifestly the interest of France that
the power of England should be diminished by the separation of her
colonies. The only condition he should require would be that the
United States, in no peace to be made, should give up their
independence, and return to their obedience to the British government.
On determining to take this decisive course, the cabinet of Versailles
had despatched a courier to his Catholic majesty with information of
the line of conduct about to be pursued by France. On his return, the
negotiation was taken up in earnest, and a treaty of friendship and
commerce was soon concluded. This was accompanied by a treaty of
alliance eventual and defensive between the two nations, in which it
was declared, that if war should break out between France and England
during the existence of that with the United States, it should be made
a common cause; and that neither of the contracting parties should
conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal
consent of the other, first obtained; and they mutually engaged "not
to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States
shall have been formally, or tacitly assured by the treaty, or
treaties that shall terminate the war."
It was the wish of the ministers of the United States to engage France
immediately in the war; and to make the alliance, not eventual, but
positive. This proposition, however, was rejected.
In a few weeks after the conclusion of these negotiations, the Marquis
de Noailles announced officially to the court of London, the treaty of
friendship and commerce France had formed with the United States. The
British government, considering this notification as a declaration of
war, published a memorial for the purpose of justifying to all Europe
the hostilities it had determined to commence.
Soon after their commencement, the Count de Vergennes received private
intelligence that it was contemplated in the cabinet of London to
offer to the United States an acknowledgment of their independence as
the condition of a separate peace. He immediately communicated this
intelligence to the American ministers, requesting them to lose no
time in stating to congress that, though war was not declared in form,
it had commenced in fact; and that he considered the obligations of
the treaty of alliance as in full force; consequently that neither
party was now at liberty to make a separate peace. Instructions of a
similar import were given to the minister of France in the United
States.
[Sidenote: Information received of treaties of alliance and commerce
being entered into between France and the United States.]
The despatches containing these treaties were received by the
president on Saturday the second of May, after congress had adjourned.
That body was immediately convened, the despatches were opened, and
their joyful contents communicated.
In the exultation of the moment, the treaty of alliance, as well as
that of commerce and friendship was published; a circumstance which,
not without reason, gave umbrage to the cabinet of Versailles; because
that treaty, being only eventual, ought not to have been communicated
to the public but by mutual consent.
From this event, which was the source of universal exultation to the
friends of the revolution, the attention must be directed to one which
was productive of very different sensations.
Among the various improvements which struggling humanity has gradually
engrafted on the belligerent code, none have contributed more to
diminish the calamities of war, than those which meliorate the
condition of prisoners. No obligations will be more respected by the
generous and the brave; nor are there any, the violation of which
could wound the national character more deeply, or expose it to more
lasting or better merited reproach.
In wars between nations nearly equal in power, and possessing rights
acknowledged to be equal, a departure from modern usage in this
respect is almost unknown; and the voice of the civilized world would
be raised against the potentate who could adopt a system calculated to
re-establish the rigours and misery of exploded barbarism. But in
contests between different parts of the same empire, those practices
which mitigate the horrors of war yield, too frequently, to the
calculations of a blind and erring resentment. The party which
supports the ancient state of things, often treats resistance as
rebellion, and captives as traitors. The opposite party, supporting
also by the sword principles believed to be right, will admit of no
departure from established usage, to its prejudice; and may be
expected, if possessing the power, to endeavour, by retaliating
injuries, to compel the observance of a more just and humane system.
But they participate in the fault imputable to their adversaries, by
manifesting a disposition to punish those whom they deem traitors,
with the same severity of which they so loudly and justly complain,
when they are themselves its victims.
General Gage, as Commander-in-chief of the British army, in the
harshness of spirit which had been excited while governor of
Massachusetts, not only threw all his prisoners into a common jail,
but rejected every proposition for an exchange of them. When the
command devolved on Sir William Howe, this absurd system was
abandoned, and an exchange[103] took place to a considerable extent.
But the Americans had not made a sufficient number of prisoners to
relieve all their citizens, and many of them still remained in
confinement. Representations were continually received from these
unfortunate men, describing in strong terms, the severity of their
treatment. They complained of suffering almost the extremity of
famine, that even the supply of provisions allowed them was unsound,
and that they were crowded into prison-ships, where they became the
victims of disease.
[Footnote 103: In the execution of this agreement, the
inconveniences arising from having committed the custody of
prisoners to the several states, was severely felt. In
addition to the delay inseparable from the necessity of
inquiring for them, and collecting them from different
places, they were often sent in without the knowledge of
General Washington; and, in some instances, they passed
unobserved, with permits from a state government, through
his camp, into that of the enemy. These irregularities, and
the remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief, at length,
induced congress to appoint a commissary of prisoners.]
When charged with conduct so unworthy of his character and station,
Sir William Howe positively denied its truth.
It would be unjust to ascribe this excess of inhumanity to an officer
who, though perhaps severe in his temper, did not mingle cruelties in
his general system, which would excite universal indignation in other
wars. It must be admitted that his supplies of provisions were neither
good nor abundant; and that the American soldiers, in their own camp,
were unhealthy. But the excessive mortality prevailing among the
prisoners can be accounted for on no ordinary principles; and the
candid, who were least inclined to criminate without cause, have ever
been persuaded that, if his orders did not produce the distress which
existed, his authority was not interposed with sufficient energy, to
correct the abuses which prevailed.
The capture of General Lee furnished an additional ground of
controversy on the subject of prisoners. As he had been an officer in
the British service, whose resignation had not, perhaps, been received
when he entered into that of America, a disposition was, at first,
manifested to consider him as a deserter, and he was closely confined.
On receiving information of this circumstance, congress directed
General Howe to be assured that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, and five
Hessian field-officers, should be detained, and should experience
precisely the fate of General Lee. These officers were taken into
close custody, and informed that the resolution announced to General
Howe should be strictly enforced.
The sentiments of the Commander-in-chief on the subject of
retaliation, seem to have been less severe than those of congress. So
great was his abhorrence of the cruelties such a practice must
generate, that he was unwilling to adopt it in any case not of
absolute and apparent necessity. Not believing that of General Lee to
be such a case, he remonstrated strongly against these resolutions.
But congress remained inflexible; and the officers designated as the
objects of retaliation, were kept in rigorous confinement until
General Lee was declared to be a prisoner of war.[104]
[Footnote 104: See note No. XIII. at the end of the volume.]
The resolutions of congress respecting the prisoners taken at the
Cedars, were also the source of much embarrassment and chagrin to the
Commander-in-chief. Alleging that the capitulation had been violated
on the part of the enemy, and that the savages had been permitted to
murder some of the prisoners, and to plunder others, they withheld
their sanction from the agreement entered into by General Arnold with
Captain Forster, and refused to allow other prisoners to be returned
in exchange for those liberated under that agreement, until the
murderers should be given up, and compensation made for the baggage
said to have been plundered. As the fact alleged was not clearly
established, Sir William Howe continued to press General Washington on
this subject. Reminding him of the importance of a punctilious
observance of faith, plighted in engagements like that made by General
Arnold, he persisted to hold the Commander-in-chief personally bound
for an honourable compliance with military stipulations entered into
by an officer under his authority.
General Washington, feeling the keenness of the reproach, pressed
congress to change their resolution on this subject; but his
remonstrances were, for a long time, unavailing.
After the sufferings of the prisoners in New York had been extreme,
and great numbers had perished in confinement, the survivors were
liberated for the purpose of being exchanged; but so miserable was
their condition, that many of them died on their way home. For the
dead as well as the living, General Howe claimed a return of
prisoners, while General Washington contended that reasonable
deductions should be made for those who were actually dead, of
diseases under which they laboured when permitted to leave the British
prisons.