The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)
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Although these great exertions to terminate Indian hostility did not
afford complete security to the western frontiers, they were attended
with considerable advantages. The savages, though not subdued, were
intimidated; and their incursions became less formidable, as well as
less frequent.
The summer of 1779 passed away without furnishing any circumstance in
America which could be supposed to have a material influence on the
issue of the war. In Europe, however, an event took place which had
been long anxiously expected, and was believed to be of decisive
importance. Spain at length determined to make one common cause with
France against Great Britain. It was supposed that the two powers
would be able to obtain a complete ascendency at sea; and that their
combined fleets would maintain a superiority on the American coast, as
well as in Europe.
From the first determination of France to take part in the war, it
appears to have been the earnest wish of the cabinet of Versailles to
engage Spain likewise in the contest.
Her resentments against England, her solicitude to diminish the naval
strength of that nation, and her wish to recover Jamaica, Gibraltar,
and the Floridas, urged her to seize the fair occasion now offered of
dismembering the British empire, and accomplishing these favourite
objects. But her dread of the effect which the independence of the
United States might produce on her own colonies, mingled with some
apprehensions of danger from the contest she was about to provoke, had
produced an appearance of irresolution, which rendered her future
course, for a time, uncertain. In this conflict of opposite interests,
the influence of the cabinet of Versailles, and the jealousy of the
naval power of Britain, at length obtained the victory; and his
Catholic Majesty determined to prevent the reannexation of the United
States to their mother country; but to effect this object by
negotiation rather than by the sword.
[Sidenote: Spain offers her mediation to the belligerent powers.]
In pursuance of this pacific system, he offered his mediation to the
belligerent powers. This proposition was readily accepted by France;
but the minister of his Britannic Majesty evaded any explicit
arrangements on the subject, while he continued to make general verbal
declarations of the willingness of his sovereign to give peace to
Europe under the mediation of his Catholic Majesty. In consequence of
these declarations, the Spanish minister proposed a truce for a term
of years, and that a congress of deputies from the belligerent powers
should assemble at Madrid to adjust the terms of a permanent treaty;
into which deputies from the United States were to be admitted, as
the representatives of a sovereign nation. Although an explicit
acknowledgment of their independence was not to be required, it was to
be understood that they should be independent in fact, and should be
completely separated from the British empire.
This negotiation was protracted to a considerable length; and in the
mean time, all the address of the cabinet of London was used to detach
either France or the United States from their alliance with each
other. Notice of it was given to the American government by the
minister of France at Philadelphia, as well as by Mr. Arthur Lee, one
of their agents in Europe; and congress was repeatedly urged by the
former, to furnish those who might be authorized to represent them in
the conferences for a general treaty, with ample powers and
instructions to conclude it. An extraordinary degree of solicitude was
manifested to hasten the full powers, and to moderate the claims of
the United States.
It seems to have been the policy of the cabinet of Versailles to
exclude the American States from a share of the fisheries, and to
limit their western boundary to the settlements then made. Either from
a real apprehension that the war might be protracted should the United
States insist on the acknowledgment of their independence as a
preliminary to any treaty, or from an opinion that such preliminary
acknowledgment would leave the terms of the treaty less under the
control of France, and the American plenipotentiaries more masters of
their own conduct, Monsieur Girard laboured to persuade congress to
recede from that demand. If they could be independent in fact, he
thought the form not worth contending for.[21]
[Footnote 21: The author has seen notes taken by a member of congress,
of communications made by Mr. Girard, when admitted to an audience,
which avow these sentiments. The secret journals of congress sustain
this statement.]
While congress was employed in debating the instructions to their
ministers, the negotiation was brought to a close. As Spain became
prepared for hostilities, the offered mediation was pressed in such
terms as to produce the necessity of either accepting or rejecting it.
This drew from the cabinet of London a declaration that the
independence of the United States was inadmissible; upon which his
Catholic Majesty determined to take part in the war.
[Sidenote: War between Spain and England.]
On the departure of his minister from London without taking leave, the
British government issued letters of marque and reprisal against the
vessels and subjects of the Spanish crown; and a powerful Spanish
fleet, which had been preparing during the negotiation, was expedited,
to co-operate with that of France. Yet the independence of the United
States was not acknowledged, nor was their minister accredited.
Despatches, giving notice of the hostilities meditated by his
Catholic Majesty, were forwarded to Don Galvez, the governor of
Louisiana, who collected a considerable military force at New Orleans,
and reduced the settlements held by the British crown on the
Mississippi, which had not been apprised of the war.
Intelligence of this important event was given to congress while that
body was deliberating on the instructions to their negotiators. It is
not impossible that this information had some influence on those
deliberations; and, rendering the American government less solicitous
about the future conduct of Spain, diminished the motives for making
territorial sacrifices to that power. Their ministers were ordered to
make it a preliminary article to any negotiation, that Great Britain
should agree to treat with the United States, as sovereign, free, and
independent; and that their independence should be expressly assured
and confirmed by the terms of the treaty itself.
That the United States might be enabled to avail themselves without
further delays, of any occasion which might be presented for
terminating the war, Mr. John Adams, who was already in Europe, was
authorized to negotiate a treaty of peace, and a commercial treaty
with Great Britain; and Mr. Jay, at that time president of congress,
was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the court of Madrid, with
instructions to insist on the free navigation of the Mississippi;--a
claim to which Spain objected, and which was discountenanced by
France.
As the campaign drew to a close without affording any solid foundation
for the hope that the war was about to terminate, General Washington
repeated those efforts which he had made so often and so
unsuccessfully, to induce early preparations for the ensuing year. He
submitted to the view of his government a detailed report of the whole
army, which exhibited the alarming fact, that by the last of the
following June, the terms of service of nearly one-half the men under
his command would expire.
It was not the least considerable of the inconveniences attending the
complex system of government then prevailing in the United States,
that measures essential to the safety of the nation were never taken
in season. Thus, when the time for raising the quotas of the
respective states by voluntary enlistment had passed away, and the
necessity of resorting to coercive means had become absolute, those
means were so delayed, and so irregularly put in execution, that the
terms of service of different portions of the army expired almost
every month in the year; and raw troops, ignorant of the first
rudiments of military duty, were introduced in the most critical
moments of a campaign. Had timely and correspondent measures been
taken by the states to raise their respective quotas by a specified
time in the depth of winter, the recruits would have received the
advantage of a few months training before they were brought into
actual service, and the General, that of a certain uninterrupted force
for each campaign. This course of proceeding had been continually
recommended, and the recommendation had been as continually neglected.
[Sidenote: Letter from General Washington to Congress.]
"In the more early stages of the contest," said the Commander-in-chief
to congress, in a letter of the 8th of November, "when men might have
been enlisted for the war, no man, as my whole conduct, and the
uniform tenor of my letters will evince, was ever more opposed to
short enlistments than I was; and while there remained a prospect of
obtaining recruits on a permanent footing in the first instance, as
far as duty and a regard to my station would permit, I urged my
sentiments in favour of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army by
voluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on too
precarious and uncertain a footing to depend on for the exigency of
our affairs, I took the liberty in February, 1778, in a particular
manner, to lay before the committee of arrangement then with the army
at Valley Forge, a plan for an annual draught, as the surest and most
certain, if not the only means left us, of maintaining the army on a
proper and respectable ground. And, more and more confirmed in the
propriety of this opinion by the intervention of a variety of
circumstances, unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom of
urging the plan to the committee of conference in January last; and,
having reviewed it in every point of light, and found it right, at
least the best that has occurred to me, I hope I shall be excused by
congress in offering it to them, and in time for carrying into
execution for the next year; if they should conceive it necessary for
the states to complete their quotas of troops.
"The plan I would propose is, that each state be informed by congress
annually of the _real deficiency_ of its troops, and called upon to
make it up, or such less specific number as congress may think proper,
by a draught. That the men draughted join the army by the first of
January, and serve until the first of January in the succeeding year.
That from the time the draughts join the army, the officers of the
states from which they come, be authorized and directed to use their
endeavours to enlist them for the war, under the bounties granted to
the officers themselves, and to the recruits, by the act of the 23d of
January, 1779, viz: ten dollars to the officer for each recruit, and
two hundred to the recruits themselves. That all state, county, and
town bounties to draughts, if practicable, be entirely abolished, on
account of the uneasiness and disorders they create among the
soldiery, the desertions they produce, and for other reasons which
will readily occur. That on or before the first of October annually,
an abstract, or return, similar to the present one, be transmitted to
congress, to enable them to make their requisitions to each state with
certainty and precision. This I would propose as a general plan to be
pursued; and I am persuaded that this, or one nearly similar to it,
will be found the best now in our power, as it will be attended with
the least expense to the public, will place the service on the footing
of order and certainty, and will be the only one that can advance the
general interest to any great extent."
These representations on the part of the Commander-in-chief were not
more successful than those which had before been made. Although the
best dispositions existed in congress, the proceedings of that body
were unavoidably slow; and the difficulty of effecting a concert of
measures among thirteen sovereign states, was too great to be
surmounted. In consequence of these radical defects in the system
itself, the contributions of men made by the states continued to be
irregular, uncertain, and out of season; and the army could never
acquire that consistency and stability, which would have resulted from
an exact observance of the plan so often recommended.
On receiving information of the disaster which had been sustained by
the allied arms at Savannah, Sir Henry Clinton resumed his plan of
active operations against the southern states. A large embarkation
took place soon after that event had been announced to him, which
sailed from the Hook towards the end of December. The troops were
commanded by himself in person, and the fleet by Admiral Arbuthnot.
The defence of New York and its dependencies were entrusted to General
Knyphausen.
The preparations made in New York for some distant enterprise were
immediately communicated by his faithful intelligencers to General
Washington, who conjectured its object, and hastened the march of the
troops designed to reinforce General Lincoln.
The season for action in a northern climate being over, the General
turned his attention to the distribution of his troops in winter
quarters. Habit had familiarized the American army to the use of huts
constructed by themselves; and both officers and men were content to
pass the winter in a hutted camp. In disposing of the troops,
therefore, until the time for action should return, wood and water, a
healthy situation, convenience for supplies of provisions, stations
which would enable them to cover the country, and to defend particular
positions, were the objects taken into consideration, and were all to
be consulted.
[Sidenote: The American army goes into winter quarters.]
With a view to these various circumstances, the army was thrown into
two great divisions. The northern was to be commanded by General
Heath; and its chief object was the security of West Point, and of the
posts on the North River, as low as King's Ferry. Subordinate to
this, was the protection of the country on the Sound, and down the
Hudson to the neighbourhood of Kingsbridge. The other and principal
division, under the immediate command of General Washington, was put
under cover, late in December, in the neighbourhood of Morristown.
CHAPTER VI.
South Carolina invaded.... The British fleet passes the bar,
and gets possession of the harbour of Charleston.... Opinion
of General Washington on the propriety of defending that
place.... Sir Henry Clinton invests the town.... Tarlton
surprises an American corps at Monk's Corner.... Fort
Moultrie surrendered.... Tarlton defeats Colonel White....
General Lincoln capitulates.... Buford defeated....
Arrangements for the government of South Carolina and
Georgia.... Sir Henry Clinton embarks for New York....
General Gates takes command of the Southern army.... Is
defeated near Camden.... Death of De Kalb.... Success of
General Sumpter.... He is defeated.
[Sidenote: 1780.]
The departure of the French fleet produced a sudden change in the
prospects of the southern states. The sanguine hopes which had been
entertained of the recovery of Georgia, gave place to gloomy and well
founded apprehensions for South Carolina.
The facility with which General Prevost had passed through the state,
and the assurances he had received of the indisposition of a large
portion of the people to defend themselves, disclosed too certainly
the true situation of the country, not to convince all discerning men
that a real attempt at conquest would be made the ensuing year.
General Lincoln perceived the approaching danger, without being able
to provide against it. His power, as a military commander, was too
limited, and his influence on the government of the state too weak, to
draw forth even the means it possessed in time for its protection.
Though the preservation of its metropolis was of vast importance to
the state, no preparations were making to put it in a condition to
stand a siege. The forts on the islands were in ruins, and the works
across the neck remained unfinished. The representations made on this
subject to the governor by General Lincoln were not disregarded; but
from some defect in the existing law, the executive found it
impracticable to obtain labour for these interesting objects.
[Sidenote: January 23.]
Admiral Arbuthnot arrived at Savannah on the 31st of January. One of
his transports, which had been separated from the fleet in a storm,
was brought into Charleston harbour on the 23d of that month; and the
prisoners gave the first certain intelligence that the expedition from
New York was destined against the capital of South Carolina.
[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton invests Charleston.]
Before the middle of February, the fleet entered the harbour, or
inlet, of North Edisto; and landed the troops without opposition on
St. John's Island. A part of the fleet was sent round to blockade the
harbour of Charleston, while the army proceeded slowly and cautiously
from Stono Creek to Wappoo Cut, and through the islands of St. John
and St. James.
This delay, in the event so fatal, but then deemed so propitious to
the American arms, was employed to the utmost advantage in improving
the defence of Charleston. The legislature had enabled the executive
to employ slaves to work on the fortifications; and had passed an act
delegating great powers to the Governor and such of his council as he
could conveniently consult. Under these acts, six hundred slaves were
employed on the works, and vigorous, though not very successful
measures were taken by the executive to assemble the militia of the
country. The fallacious hope was entertained that, if the town could
be rendered defensible, the garrison would be made sufficiently strong
by reinforcements from the north, and by the militia of the state, to
maintain the place and compel Sir Henry Clinton to raise the siege.
The American army being too weak to make any serious opposition to the
progress of the British through the country, the cavalry, with a small
corps of infantry, were directed to hover on their left flank; and the
other troops, consisting of about fourteen hundred regulars fit for
duty, aided by the militia, were drawn into the town, and employed on
the works.
[Sidenote: Colonel Washington defeats Tarlton.]
Understanding that great exertions were making to improve the
fortifications, and that the garrison was gaining strength, Sir Henry
Clinton ordered General Patterson to join him with the troops which
could be spared from Georgia, and directed Lieutenant Colonel
Tarlton, after supplying the horses which had been lost during a very
stormy voyage from New York, to cover his march through South
Carolina. In one of the excursions of that active officer to disperse
the militia who assembled to oppose the progress of Patterson through
the country, his cavalry encountered Lieutenant Colonel Washington,
who commanded the remnant of Baylor's regiment, and were driven back
with some loss; but the want of infantry disabled Washington from
pressing his advantage.
In defending Charleston, the command of the harbour is of great
importance. To preserve this advantage, congress had ordered four
frigates to South Carolina, which, with the marine force belonging to
the state, and two French vessels, were placed under the command of
Commodore Whipple.
General Washington was the more sanguine in the hope of defending the
harbour, because it was understood that the bar was impassable by a
ship of the line, and that even a large frigate could not be brought
over it, without first taking out her guns, or careening her so much
that the crew would be unable to work her.
On sounding within the bar it was discovered that the water was too
shallow for the frigates to act with any effect, and that, in making
the attempt, they would be exposed to the fire of the batteries which
the assailants had erected. Under these circumstances, the officers
of the navy were unanimously of opinion that no successful opposition
could be made at the bar, and that the fleet might act more
advantageously in concert with the fort on Sullivan's Island.
The intention of disputing the passage over the bar being abandoned,
Commodore Whipple moored his squadron in a line with fort Moultrie, in
a narrow passage between Sullivan's Island and the middle ground; and
the British ships, without their guns, passed the bar, and anchored in
five fathom hole.
It being now thought impossible to prevent the fleet from passing fort
Moultrie, and taking such stations in Cooper River as would enable
them to rake the batteries on shore, and to close that communication
between the town and country, the plan of defence was once more
changed, and the armed vessels were carried into the mouth of Cooper
River, and sunk in a line from the town to Shute's folly.
This was the critical moment for evacuating the town. The loss of the
harbour rendered the defence of the place, if not desperate, so
improbable, that the hope to maintain it, could not have been
rationally entertained by a person, who was not deceived by the
expectation of aids much more considerable than were actually
received.
[Sidenote: Opinion of General Washington on the subject of defending
Charleston.]
When this state of things was communicated to General Washington, by
Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, he said in reply, "The impracticability
of defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town and
garrison. At this distance it is impossible to judge for you. I have
the greatest confidence in General Lincoln's prudence; but it really
appears to me, that the propriety of attempting to defend the town,
depended on the probability of defending the bar; and that when this
ceased, the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however,
I suspend a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider what I say
as confidential." Unfortunately, this letter did not arrive in time to
influence the conduct of the besieged.
[Sidenote: April 1.]
Having crossed Ashley River, Sir Henry Clinton moved down the neck,
and, on the night of the first of April, broke ground within eight
hundred yards of the American lines.
The defences of Charleston had been constructed under the direction of
a Mr. Laumay, a French gentleman in the American service; and,
although not calculated to resist a regular siege, were far from being
contemptible.
While the besiegers were employed on their first parallel, the
garrison received a considerable reinforcement. General Woodford, who
had marched from Morristown in December, entered the town with the old
continental troops of the Virginia line, now reduced to seven hundred
effectives. General Hogan, with the line of North Carolina, had
arrived before him. The garrison consisted of rather more than two
thousand regular troops, of about one thousand North Carolina militia,
and of the citizens of Charleston. The exertions of the Governor to
bring in the militia of South Carolina had not succeeded.
[Sidenote: April 9.]
By the 9th of April, Sir Henry Clinton completed his first parallel
extending across the neck, and mounted his guns in battery. His works
formed an oblique line, from six to seven hundred yards distant from
those of the besieged. About the same time, Admiral Arbuthnot passed
Sullivan's Island, under a heavy and well directed fire from fort
Moultrie, then commanded by Colonel Pinckney, and anchored under
James' Island near fort Johnson, just out of gunshot of the batteries
of the town.
Being now in complete possession of the harbour, the British General
and Admiral sent a joint summons to General Lincoln, demanding the
surrender of the town, to which he returned this firm and modest
answer. "Sixty days have elapsed since it has been known that your
intentions against this town were hostile, in which, time has been
afforded to abandon it; but duty and inclination point to the
propriety of supporting it to the last extremity."
On receiving this answer, the besiegers opened their batteries, but
seemed to rely principally on proceeding by sap quite into the
American lines.
About this time, the Governor with half the members of the council,
went into the country, in the hope of collecting a respectable force
in the rear, and on the left flank of the besieging army. The
Lieutenant Governor, and the other members of the council remained in
town.
Hitherto, Sir Henry Clinton had not extended his lines north of
Charleston neck, and the communication of the garrison with the
country north-east of Cooper remained open. The American cavalry,
under the command of General Huger, had passed that river, and was
stationed in the neighbourhood of Monk's corner, about thirty miles
above Charleston. As an additional security to this, the only
remaining communication, two posts of militia were established, one
between the Cooper and the Santee rivers, to which the Governor
repaired in person; and another at a ferry on the Santee, where boats
were to be collected for the purpose of facilitating the passage of
the American army over that river, should it be deemed adviseable to
evacuate the town.