The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)
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[Footnote 29: Journal of Colonel Williams.]
The day after the arrival of Gates at Clermont, he was joined by seven
hundred militia from Virginia, commanded by Brigadier General Stevens,
an officer of considerable merit, who, during the campaigns of 1777
and 1778, had commanded a continental regiment. On the same day, an
express arrived from Colonel Sumpter, with information that an escort
of clothing, ammunition, and other stores for the garrison at Camden,
was on the way from Ninety-Six, and must pass the Wateree at a ferry
about a mile from Camden, which was covered by a small redoubt on the
opposite side of the river. One hundred regular infantry with two
brass field-pieces, were immediately detached to join Colonel Sumpter,
who was ordered to reduce the redoubt, and to intercept the
convoy.[30]
[Footnote 30: Journal of Colonel Williams.]
To attract the attention of the garrison in Camden, and thus
co-operate with the expedition under Sumpter, it was determined in a
council of general officers to put the army in motion that evening,
and to take a post about seven miles from Camden with a deep creek in
front.
The sick, the heavy baggage, and the military stores were ordered
under a guard to Waxhaws,[31] and the army was directed to be in
readiness to march precisely at ten in the evening in the following
order.
[Footnote 31: Colonel Williams says these orders were not executed.]
Colonel Armand's legion composed the van. Porterfield's light
infantry, reinforced by a company of picked men from Stevens's
brigade, covered the right flank of the legion; while Major
Armstrong's light infantry of North Carolina militia, reinforced in
like manner from Caswell's division, covered the left. The Maryland
division, followed by the North Carolina and Virginia militia, with
the artillery, composed the main body and rear guard; and the
volunteer cavalry were equally distributed on the flanks of the
baggage.
In the event of an attack in front by the British cavalry, the
infantry on the flanks were directed to march up, and to continue
their fire on the assailants. It was supposed they would enable
Colonel Armand to resist the shock; and his orders were positive to
maintain his ground against the cavalry, whatever their numbers might
be.[32]
[Footnote 32: Journal of Colonel Williams.]
At the time of communicating these orders to Colonel Otho H. Williams,
the Deputy Adjutant General, Gates, showed him a rough estimate of the
army, making it upwards of seven thousand. Convinced that this
estimate was exaggerated, Colonel Williams availed himself of his
means of information to make an abstract of the whole, which he
presented to the general, and which exhibited exactly three thousand
and fifty-two in the column of present fit for duty, of whom more than
two-thirds were militia. Gates expressed some surprise at the numbers,
but said, "there are enough for our purpose," and directed the orders
to be issued to the army. About ten at night, the line of march was
taken up, and the army had advanced about half way to Camden, when a
firing commenced in front.[33]
[Footnote 33: Journal of Colonel Williams.]
Intelligence of the approach of the American army, and of the
defection of the country between Pedee and the Black River, had been
communicated to Lord Cornwallis, and had induced him to hasten in
person to Camden, which place he reached the day Gates arrived at
Clermont.
The British army did not much exceed two thousand men, of whom about
nineteen hundred were regulars; but, as the whole country was rising,
Lord Cornwallis apprehended that every day would strengthen his enemy,
and therefore determined to attack him in his camp; hoping, by a
prompt execution of this resolution, to surprise him. By one of those
caprices of fortune on which great events often depend, he marched
from Camden to attack Gates in Clermont, at the very hour that Gates
moved from that place towards Camden.[34]
[Footnote 34: Journal of Colonel Williams.]
[Sidenote: August 16.]
About half past two in the morning, the advanced parties of the
hostile armies, to their mutual surprise, met in the woods, and began
to skirmish with each other. Some of Armand's cavalry being wounded
by the first fire, threw the others into disorder, and the whole
recoiled so suddenly that the first Maryland regiment, composing the
front of the column was broken, and the whole line thrown into
consternation. From this first impression, the raw troops never
recovered. The light infantry, however, particularly Porterfield's
corps, behaved so well as to check the advance of the British.
Unfortunately, their gallant commander received a mortal wound, which
compelled him to leave his regiment. Yet a part of it kept its ground;
and, with the aid of the legion infantry, stopped the British van;
upon which order was restored to the American army.
The officers were immediately employed in forming a line of battle in
front. The Maryland division, including the troops of Delaware, were
on the right, the North Carolina militia in the centre, and the
Virginia militia on the left.
In this rencounter some prisoners were made, from one of whom Colonel
Williams drew the information that the British army, consisting of
near three thousand men, commanded by Lord Cornwallis in person, was
in full march five or six hundred yards in front. This intelligence
was immediately communicated to General Gates, who had supposed Lord
Cornwallis to be still in Charleston. The general officers were
assembled in the rear of the line, and this information submitted to
them. After a short silence, Stevens said, "Gentlemen, is it not too
late to do any thing but fight?" No other advice being given, General
Gates, who seems to have been himself disposed to risk a battle,
directed the officers to repair to their respective commands.
The ground on which the army was drawn up was so narrowed by a marsh
on each flank, as to admit of removing the first Maryland brigade, so
as to form a second line about two hundred yards in rear of the first.
The artillery was placed in the centre of the first line, and
Armstrong's light infantry was ordered to cover a small interval
between the flank of the left wing and the marsh.
Frequent skirmishes occurred during the night between the advanced
parties, with scarcely any other effect than to discover the situation
of the armies, evince the intention of the generals, and serve as a
prelude to the events of the succeeding morning.
At dawn of day the British appeared in front, advancing in column.
Lieutenant Colonel Webster commanded on the right, and Lord Rawdon on
the left. The seventy-first regiment composed the reserve. Four field
pieces were attached to the left, and one to the corps de reserve.
Captain Singleton opened some field pieces on the front of the column,
at the distance of about two hundred yards, soon after which the
American left was ordered to commence the action. It was then
perceived that the British right was advancing in line; and as Stevens
led on his brigade in good order, Colonel Williams advanced in front
with a few volunteers, intending by a partial fire to extort that of
the enemy at some distance, and thereby diminish its effect on the
militia. The experiment did not succeed. The British rushed forward
with great impetuosity, firing and huzzaing at the same time; and the
terrified militia, disregarding the exertions of Stevens, who, in the
firm tone of courage, endeavoured to inspire them with confidence in
the bayonets they had just received, threw down their loaded muskets,
fled from the field with the utmost precipitation, and were followed
by the light infantry of Armstrong. The whole North Carolina division,
except one regiment commanded by Colonel Dixon, an old continental
officer, which was posted nearest the continental troops, followed the
shameful example. Other parts of the same brigade, which was commanded
by Gregory, paused for an instant; but the terror of their brethren
was soon communicated to them, and they also threw away their arms,
and sought for safety in flight. Their general, while endeavouring to
rally them, was dangerously wounded.
Tarlton's legion charged them as they broke, and pursued them in their
flight. Gates, in person, assisted by their generals, made several
efforts to rally the militia; but the alarm in their rear still
continuing, they poured on like a torrent, and bore him with them. He
hastened with General Caswell to Clermont, in the hope of stopping a
sufficient number of them at their old encampment, to cover the
retreat of the continental troops; but this hope was entirely
disappointed. Believing the continental troops also to be dispersed,
he gave up all as lost, and retreated with a few friends to Charlotte,
about eighty miles from the field of battle, where he left General
Caswell to assemble the neighbouring militia, and proceeded himself to
Hillsborough, in order to concert some plan of farther defence with
the government.
Entirely deserted by the militia who composed the whole centre and
left wing of the army, the continental troops, with the Baron De Kalb
at their head, were left without orders, under circumstances which
might have justified a retreat. But taking counsel from their courage,
and seeing only the path of duty, they preferred the honourable and
dangerous part of maintaining their position. They were charged by
Lord Rawdon about the time the militia on their left were broken by
Webster; but the charge was received with unexpected firmness. The
bayonet was occasionally resorted to by both parties, and the conflict
was maintained for near three quarters of an hour with equal
obstinacy. During this time, the regiment on the left of the second
Maryland brigade being covered by the reserve, so that it could be
only engaged in front, gained ground and made prisoners.
The reserve, having its left entirely exposed, was flanked by the
British right wing under Webster; who, after detaching a part of his
cavalry and light infantry in pursuit of the flying militia, wheeled
on that brigade, and attacking it in front and round the left flank,
threw it into some disorder. The soldiers were, however, quickly
rallied, and renewed the action with unimpaired spirit. Overpowered by
numbers, they were again broken, and by the exertion of their officers
were again formed, so as still to maintain the combat, and still to
cover the flank of their brethren of the second brigade, who were in a
manner blended with the enemy, and who kept up a desperate conflict in
the hope of yet obtaining the victory.
[Sidenote: Death of De Kalb.]
The fire of the whole British army was now directed against these two
devoted brigades. They had not lost an inch of ground when Lord
Cornwallis, perceiving that they were without cavalry, pushed his
dragoons upon them, and at the same instant, charged them with the
bayonet. These gallant troops were no longer able to keep the field.
They were at length broken; and, as they did not give way until
intermingled with the enemy, they dispersed and fled in confusion.
Before they were reduced to this last extremity, the Baron De Kalb,
who fought on foot with the second Maryland brigade, fell under eleven
wounds. His aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel Du Buysson, received him
in his arms, announced his rank and nation to the surrounding foe, and
begged that they would spare his life. While thus generously exposing
himself to save his friend, he received several wounds, and, with his
general, was taken prisoner. The Baron expired in a few hours, and
spent his last breath in dictating a letter, expressing the warmest
affection for the officers and men of his division, and the most
exalted admiration of their courage and good conduct.[35]
[Footnote 35: Journal of Colonel Williams.]
Never was a victory more complete. Every corps was broken and
dispersed in the woods. The general officers were divided from their
men; and, except Rutherford of the North Carolina militia who was made
a prisoner, reached Charlotte at different times. Colonel Williams,
who witnessed the whole battle, and bore a conspicuous part in it,
concludes his very animated description of it, with the observation,
that "if in this affair the militia fled too soon, the regulars may be
thought almost as blameable for remaining too long on the field;
especially after all hope of victory must have been despaired of." He
censures freely the conduct of the brigadiers, who gave, he says, no
orders whatever to their brigades.
About two hundred wagons, with a great part of the baggage, military
stores, small arms, and all the artillery, fell into the hands of the
conqueror. The loss of men could never be accurately ascertained, as
no returns were received from the militia. Of the North Carolina
division, between three and four hundred were made prisoners, and
between sixty and one hundred were wounded. Of the Virginia militia,
three were wounded on the field; and, as they were the first to fly,
not many were taken.
For the numbers engaged, the loss sustained by the regulars was
considerable. It amounted to between three and four hundred men, of
whom a large portion were officers. The British accounts state the
loss of the American army at eight or nine hundred killed, and about
one thousand prisoners; while their own is said to be only three
hundred and twenty-five, of whom two hundred and forty-five were
wounded. Although many of the militia were killed during the flight,
this account is probably exaggerated. It would seem too, that while
the continental troops kept the field, the loss on both sides, in that
part of the action, must have been nearly equal.
On his retreat, the day of the battle, General Gates received
information of the complete success of Sumpter. That officer had, on
the evening that Lord Cornwallis marched from Camden, reduced the
redoubt on the Wateree, captured the guard, and intercepted the
escort with the stores.
This gleam of light cheered the dark gloom which enveloped his affairs
but for a moment. He was soon informed that this corps also was
defeated, and entirely dispersed.
[Sidenote: August 18.]
On hearing of the disaster which had befallen Gates, Sumpter began to
retreat up the south side of the Wateree. Believing himself out of
danger, he had halted on the twenty-eighth, during the heat of the
day, near the Catawba Ford, to give his harassed troops some repose.
At that place he was overtaken by Tarlton, who had been detached in
pursuit of him on the morning of the 17th, and who, advancing with his
accustomed celerity, entered the American camp so suddenly, as in a
great measure to cut off the men from their arms. Some slight
resistance made from behind the wagons was soon overcome, and the
Americans fled precipitately to the river and woods. Between three and
four hundred of them were killed and wounded; their baggage,
artillery, arms, and ammunition were lost; and the prisoners and
stores they had taken, were recovered. This advantage was gained with
the loss of only nine men killed and six wounded.
Two videttes had been placed by Sumpter, on the road along which
Tarlton had advanced, who fired upon his van and killed one of his
dragoons, upon which they were both sabred. We are informed by
Colonel Tarlton that the inquiries made by Sumpter respecting the two
shots, were answered by an assurance from an officer, just returned
from the advanced sentries, that the militia were firing at cattle.
[Sidenote: August 19.]
Intelligence of this disaster reached Charlotte next day. Generals
Smallwood and Gist were then arrived at that place, and about one
hundred and fifty straggling, dispirited, half famished officers and
soldiers had also dropped in. It was thought adviseable to retreat
immediately to Salisbury. From that place, General Gates directed the
remnant of the troops to march to Hillsborough, where he was
endeavouring to assemble another army, which might enable him yet to
contend for the southern states.
CHAPTER VII.
Distress in the American camp.... Expedition against Staten
Island.... Requisitions on the states.... New scheme of
finance.... Committee of congress deputed to camp....
Resolution to make up depreciation of pay.... Mutiny in the
line of Connecticut.... General Knyphausen enters Jersey....
Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York.... Skirmish at
Springfield.... Exertions to strengthen the army.... Bank
established in Philadelphia.... Contributions of the
ladies.... Farther proceedings of the states.... Arrival of
a French armament in Rhode Island.... Changes in the
quartermaster's department.... Enterprise against New York
abandoned.... Naval superiority of the British.
[Sidenote: 1780.]
While disasters thus crowded on each other in the southern states,
the Commander-in-chief found himself surrounded with difficulties,
which required his utmost exertions to avoid calamities equally
distressing. His urgent requisitions for men to supply the places of
those who were leaving the service, were not complied with, and the
soldiers who remained, could scarcely be preserved from either
perishing with cold and hunger, or dispersing and living on plunder.
General Greene and Colonel Wadsworth, who had, for the preceding year,
been at the head of the quartermaster and commissary departments,
possessed distinguished merit, and had employed assistants of
unquestionable ability and integrity. Yet, for a great part of the
campaign, the rations were frequently reduced, and the army was
rarely supplied with provisions for more than a few days in advance.
Soon after coming into winter quarters, the magazines were exhausted,
and afforded neither meat nor flour to be delivered to the men.
This state of things had been long foreseen; and all the means in the
power of the Commander-in-chief had been used to prevent it. Repeated
representations of the actual famine with which the army was
threatened, had been made to congress, and to the state governments;
but no adequate relief was afforded; and such was the condition of the
finances, so embarrassing the state of affairs, that it was perhaps
attainable only by measures which the governments could not venture to
adopt.
The rapid depreciation of the continental currency, had long been
viewed with apprehensive anxiety by the enlightened friends of the
revolution, and various unsuccessful expedients had been essayed for
the purpose of checking its progress. All perceived that the great
quantity in circulation was the principal cause of the diminution of
its value; and congress had resolved not to exceed two hundred
millions of dollars in their emissions. In the mean time, the utmost
endeavours were used to defer an evil so justly dreaded, and among the
expedients employed, was that of withholding from the public agents,
the money which was necessary for public purposes. This unwise
experiment, while it defeated its own object, threatened the
dissolution of the American army.
The difference between the value of the article at the times of
contract and of payment was soon perceived, and, of course, influenced
its price. But this was the least mischievous consequence of this
mistaken policy. The public agents contracted enormous debts which
they were unable to discharge. Repeated disappointments destroyed
their credit; and, towards the close of the year 1779, they found it
impracticable to obtain supplies for the subsistence of the army.
From these causes, the contracts entered into could not be
co-extensive with the public wants; and many of those which were made
were not complied with.
In this critical state of things, an entire revolution was made in the
commissary department. Such was the prejudice against the system
adopted by Great Britain, for supplying by contract, that it had been
usual to allow, as a compensation to the commissary, a stipulated
commission on all the monies expended on public account. After some
time, this allowance was supposed to be an inducement to purchase at
high prices; and an arrangement was made on the first of January, by
which the commissary general was to receive a fixed nominal salary in
the paper currency, and was permitted to appoint assistants whose
compensations were also fixed, and who were to defray, out of those
compensations, all the expenses attending the transactions of the
business. The practice of allowing them rations and forage was
discontinued.
This new system was unfortunately so modified as to increase the
embarrassments of the department. It was found difficult to obtain
assistants and agents for the compensation allowed; and those who were
willing to be employed, were unequal to the duties assigned them.
For several days, the soldiers were reduced to half allowance, and
sometimes to less. At length, affairs came to the crisis which had
long been threatened; and, early in January, a letter was received
from Colonel Wadsworth, informing the general that it was absolutely
out of his power to supply the army longer with meat, as he was
without money, and had totally exhausted his credit. About the same
time, the assistant commissary, residing in camp, gave notice that his
stock of provisions was on the point of being expended, and that he
had no immediate prospect of a farther supply.
This state of things compelled the Commander-in-chief to adopt
efficacious measures, to relieve the immediate and pressing wants of
his soldiers. He required from each county in the state of Jersey, a
quantity of meat and flour proportioned to its resources, to be raised
and forwarded to the army within a limited time, not exceeding six
days. In a circular letter addressed to the magistrates, he stated the
pressing wants of the army, and the necessity of resorting to coercion
should his requisition fail.
To the honour of the magistrates and people of New Jersey, although
their country was much exhausted, the supplies required were instantly
furnished, and a temporary relief obtained.
The patient and uncomplaining fortitude with which the soldiers bore
their sufferings, was strong evidence of their patriotism, and could
not fail to make a deep impression on their general. But while their
virtues excited his sensibilities, he expressed his fears very freely
to congress, that they might be too severely tried.
The unusual severity of the winter, seemed to furnish an opportunity
for active enterprise, which the Commander-in-chief observed, without
being able to improve. The garrison of New York and its immediate
dependencies, was supposed to be reduced to ten or eleven thousand
effectives; and the security heretofore derived from its insular
situation no longer existed. The ice was so strong that the whole
army, with its train of wagons and artillery, might pass over without
danger. This circumstance afforded a glorious occasion for striking a
blow, which, if successful, would most probably terminate the war.
The effort would seem not to have exceeded the strength of America,
could that strength have been exerted in proper season; but the
government possessed neither sufficient energy nor concentration of
power to call it forth; and this opportunity passed away, as many
which present themselves in the course of human affairs, must pass
away, if those who should take advantage of them, only begin to
deliberate about making preparations in the season for action.
The force under the immediate command of General Washington, was
decidedly inferior to that in New York; and so far was he from having
reason to expect immediate reinforcements, that congress had not
agreed on making a requisition for them. In addition to this
feebleness in point of numbers, the soldiers were not half clothed;
provisions for immediate use could be obtained only by contributions
from the people; the quartermaster's department was unable to put an
army in motion; and the military chest did not contain a dollar.
Under the pressure of this combination of discouraging circumstances,
the active mind of Washington still looked forward to the possibility
of deriving some advantage from the exposed situation of his
adversary.
The troops on Staten Island were computed at one thousand or twelve
hundred men; and the firm bridge of ice now uniting that island to
the Jersey shore, seemed to furnish an opportunity for bearing off
this corps. General Washington determined to make the attempt with two
thousand five hundred men, to be commanded by Major General Lord
Stirling. The more distant troops moved down on sleds; and, to favour
a surprise, the opinion was inculcated that they only constituted a
relief for the detachment already on the lines.
[Sidenote: January.]
On the night of the 14th of January, Lord Stirling moved over from De
Hart's point; and, detaching Lieutenant Colonel Willet to Decker's
house, where Buskirk's regiment was stationed, proceeded himself to
the watering place, where the main body was posted. Notwithstanding
the precautions which had been taken, the alarm had been given at each
post, and the troops had saved themselves in their works; so that only
a few prisoners were made. Contrary to the intelligence previously
received, the communication with New York was still open; and the
works appeared too strong to justify the hazard of attempting to carry
them by assault.