The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)

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[Sidenote: January 17.]

The object of the expedition being unattainable, Lord Stirling
commenced his retreat, which was effected with inconsiderable loss. A
body of cavalry, which charged his rear, was repulsed; but, from the
intenseness of the cold, and the defectiveness of his means to protect
his men from it, some of them were frost bitten, and a few stragglers
were made prisoners.

The excessive cold continuing, the rivers were soon afterwards
completely blocked up. Even arms of the sea were passable on the ice;
and the islands about the mouth of the Hudson, presented the
appearance of one whole and unbroken continent. This state of things
produced a great degree of suffering among all classes in New York.
The supplies usually received by water failed totally, and a great
scarcity of provisions and of fuel was the consequence. To increase
this scarcity, the American troops on the lines were so disposed as to
interrupt the communication between the country and the town; and
these arrangements produced a partisan war, in which the advantage was
rather on the side of the British.

In one of the most important of these skirmishes, Captain Roberts, of
Massachusetts, with fourteen of his men, were killed on the spot;
seventeen were wounded, of whom three died in a few days; and
Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, of Massachusetts, who commanded the
party, two captains, four subalterns, and ninety non-commissioned
officers and privates were made prisoners.

The emission of the full sum of two hundred millions of dollars in
continental bills of credit, which congress had solemnly resolved not
to exceed, had been completed in November, 1779, and the money was
expended. The requisitions on the states to replenish the treasury by
taxes were not fully complied with; and, had they even been strictly
observed, would not have produced a sum equal to the public
expenditure. It was therefore necessary to devise other measures for
the prosecution of the war. During the distresses which brought the
army to the brink of dissolution, these measures were under
consideration. So early as December, 1779, congress had determined to
change the mode of supplying the army from purchases to requisitions
of specific articles on the several states. As preliminary to this
system, commissioners were appointed to make the estimates, and to
introduce every practicable reform in the expenditures. This subject
was under deliberation until the 25th of February, when sundry
resolutions were passed, apportioning on the states their respective
quotas of provisions, spirits, and forage, for the ensuing campaign.
The value of the several articles was estimated in specie; and
assurances were given that accounts between the states should be
regularly kept, and finally settled in Spanish milled dollars.

For the purpose of inducing and facilitating a compliance with these
requisitions, congress also resolved, "that any state which shall have
taken the necessary measures for furnishing its quota, and have given
notice thereof to congress, shall be authorized to prohibit any
continental quartermaster or commissary from purchasing within its
limits."

These resolutions, constituting the basis of a new system on which the
future subsistence of the army was essentially to depend, were too
deeply interesting not to receive the anxious attention of the
Commander-in-chief. With regret, he communicated to congress the
radical defects he perceived in their arrangements, with his
apprehensions that this untried scheme would fail in practice.

His judgment, and the judgment of all men engaged in high and
responsible situations, was decidedly in favour of conducting the war
on a national rather than on a state system. But, independent of this
radical objection, economy had been so much more consulted than the
probable necessities of the army, that, in almost every article, the
estimate had fallen far short of the demand to be reasonably expected.

The total omission to provide means for supplying occasional
deficiencies from the surplus resources of any particular state, was
an error of still greater magnitude. It was obvious that the demand in
any state which should become the theatre of war, would be much
greater than its quota; and experience had shown that the carriage of
specific articles from distant places was always difficult and
expensive, and sometimes impracticable. Yet no means were adopted to
supply such extraordinary demand, whatever might be the resources of
the country. A still more radical objection to the system was the
principle, enabling any state which should take means to comply with
the requisition, and should notify those means to the government of
the United States, to prohibit the continental agents from making any
purchases within its territory. Among the states which adopted the
proposition of congress was New Jersey, in which the largest division
of the army was stationed. Its legislature passed an act prohibiting
the purchase of provisions within its jurisdiction by the staff of the
continental line, under severe penalties; and refused to authorize its
own agents to provide for any emergency however pressing. It was an
additional objection to these requisitions, that they specified no
periods of the year within which certain portions of the articles
demanded should be raised, and consequently might be complied with,
although the army should be left destitute of every necessary for a
considerable part of the campaign.

These suggestions, however, with others less material to the military
operations, did not receive the attention which was due to their
importance. A disposition in the members of congress, growing
inevitably out of the organization of the government, to consult the
will of their respective states, and to prefer that will to any other
object, had discovered itself at an early period, and had gained
strength with time. The state of the national treasury was calculated
to promote this disposition. It was empty, and could be replenished
only by taxes, which congress had not the power to impose; or by new
emissions of bills of credit, which the government had pledged the
public faith not to make, and which would rest for their redemption
only on that faith, which would be violated in the very act of their
emission. Under these circumstances, it required a degree of energy
seldom found, to struggle with surrounding difficulties for the
preservation of a general system, and to resist the temptation to
throw the nation at the feet of the states, in whom the vital
principle of power, the right to levy taxes, was exclusively vested.
While the continental currency preserved its value, this essential
defect of the constitution was, in some measure, concealed. The
facility with which money was obtained from the press, was a temporary
substitute for the command of the resources of the country. But when
this expedient failed, it was scarcely possible to advance a single
step, but under the guidance of the respective states.

[Sidenote: Financial regulations.]

Whatever might be the future effect of this system, it was
impracticable to bring it into immediate operation. The legislatures
of the several states, by whom it was to be adopted, and carried into
execution, were, many of them, not then in session; and were to meet
at different times through the ensuing spring. It was consequently to
be expected that great part of the summer would pass away before the
supplies to be raised by the measure, could be brought into use. In
the mean time, and until a new scheme of finance, which accompanied
the requisition of specific articles, should be tried, there was no
regular provision for the army. Bills to the amount of L100,000
sterling, payable at six months' sight, were drawn on Mr. Jay, and
others to the same amount, on Mr. Laurens, who were empowered to
negotiate loans in Europe. These bills were sold in small sums on
pressing occasions; and the loan offices remained open for the purpose
of borrowing from individuals.

This new scheme of finance was a second essay to substitute credit
unsupported by solid funds, and resting solely on the public faith,
for money.

The vast quantity of bills unavoidably emitted before the
establishment of regular governments possessing sufficient energy to
enforce the collection of taxes, or to provide for their redemption,
and before the governments of Europe were sufficiently confident of
their stability to afford them aid or credit, was assigned by congress
as the principal cause of that depreciation which had taken place in
the continental currency. The United States were now, they said, under
different circumstances. Their independence was secure; their civil
governments were established and vigorous; and the spirit of their
citizens ardent for exertion. The government being thus rendered
competent to the object, it was necessary to reduce the quantity of
paper in circulation, and to appropriate funds that should ensure the
punctual redemption of the bills.

For these purposes, the several states were required to continue to
bring into the continental treasury, monthly, from February to April
inclusive, their full quotas of fifteen millions of dollars. In
complying with this requisition, one Spanish milled dollar was to be
received in lieu of forty dollars of the paper currency.

The bills so brought in were not to be reissued, but destroyed; and
other bills, not to exceed one dollar for every twenty received in
discharge of taxes, were to be emitted.

These bills were to be redeemable within six years, and were to bear
an interest of five _per centum per annum_, to be paid at the time of
their redemption in specie, or, at the election of the holder,
annually, in bills of exchange drawn by the United States on their
commissioners in Europe, at four shillings and six pence sterling for
each dollar. They were to be issued in ascertained proportions on the
funds of the several states, with a collateral security on the part of
the government, to pay the quota of any particular state, which the
events of the war might render incapable of complying with its own
engagements. The bills were to be deposited in the continental
loan-offices of the several states, and were to be signed only as the
money then in circulation should be brought in by taxes or otherwise.
After being signed, six-tenths of them were to be delivered to the
states on whose funds they were to be issued, and the remaining
four-tenths to be retained for the use of the continent.

The operation of this scheme of finance was necessarily suspended by
the same causes which suspended that for requiring specific articles.
It depended on the sanction and co-operation of the several state
legislatures, many of which were yet to convene.

As it would be impracticable to maintain the value of the money about
to be emitted, should the states continue to issue bills of credit,
they were earnestly requested to suspend future emissions, and to call
the current paper out of circulation. But the time for this measure
was not yet arrived, and many of the states continued the use of the
press till late in the following year.

The establishment of the army for the ensuing campaign was fixed at
thirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven men, and the measures for
recruiting it were founded on the state system, which was become
entirely predominant.

The few intelligent statesmen who could combine practical good sense
with patriotism, perceived the dangerous inefficacy of a system which
openly abandoned the national character, and proceeded on the
principle that the American confederacy was no more than an alliance
of independent nations.

That great delays would be experienced, that the different parts of
the plan would be acted on too unequally and too uncertainly to
furnish a solid basis for military calculations, that the system would
be totally deranged in its execution, were mischiefs foreseen and
lamented by many, as resulting inevitably from a course of measures to
which the government of the Union was under the painful necessity of
submitting.

"Certain I am," said the Commander-in-chief, in a confidential letter
to a member of the national legislature, "that unless congress speaks
in a more decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the
several states, competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume
them as matter of right, and they and the states respectively act with
more energy than they hitherto have done, our cause is lost. We can no
longer drudge on in the old way. By ill-timing the adoption of
measures; by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable
jealousies; we incur enormous expenses, and derive no benefit from
them. One state will comply with a requisition from congress; another
neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ in
the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are all
working up hill; and, while such a system as the present one, or
rather want of one, prevails, we ever shall be unable to apply our
strength or resources to any advantage.

"This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of congress; but it
is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long
thinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one head
gradually changing into thirteen; I see one army branching into
thirteen; and, instead of looking up to congress as the supreme
controlling power of the United States, consider themselves as
dependent on their respective states. In a word, I see the power of
congress declining too fast for the respect which is due to them as
the great representative body of America, and am fearful of the
consequences."

But whatever might be his objections to the proposed system, General
Washington was unremitting in his endeavours to render the plan
perfect in detail, and to give to its execution all the aid which his
situation and influence enabled him to afford.

The distresses of the army for food, which had found temporary relief
in the particular exertions of the magistrates and people of New
Jersey, soon returned; and it became once more necessary, even after
the magazines had been in some degree replenished, to recur to the
same persons for assistance. The supplies of forage had failed, and a
great proportion of the horses had perished, or been rendered unfit
for use. Neither funds nor credit were possessed for the purchase of
others, and the quarter-master-general found himself unable to
transport provisions from remote magazines into camp. This
circumstance reduced the Commander-in-chief to the painful necessity
of calling on the patriotism of private citizens, under the penalty of
a military impressment, should a voluntary contribution be refused,
for those means of conveyance which the government could not supply.

The want of food was not the only difficulty to be surmounted. Others
of a serious nature presented themselves. The pay of an officer was
reduced by the depreciation of the currency, to such a miserable
pittance as to be unequal to the supply of the most moderate demands.
The pay of a major general would no longer hire an express rider, and
that of a captain would not purchase the shoes in which he marched.
The American officers were not rich; and many of them had expended
their _little all_ in the service. If they had exhausted their private
funds, or if they possessed none, they could rely only on the state to
which they belonged for such clothing as the state might be willing or
able to furnish. These supplies were so insufficient and unequal, as
to produce extreme dissatisfaction. In the lines of some of the
states, the officers gave notice in a body, of their determination to
resign on a given day, if some decent and certain provision should not
be made for them. The remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief produced
an offer to serve as volunteers until their successors should be
appointed; and, on the rejection of this proposition, they were with
difficulty induced to remain in service.

Under these complicated embarrassments, it required all that
enthusiastic patriotism which pre-eminently distinguishes the soldier
of principle; all that ardent attachment to the cause of their country
which originally brought them into the field, and which their
sufferings could not diminish; all the influence of the
Commander-in-chief, whom they almost adored; to retain in the service
men who felt themselves neglected, and who believed themselves to be
the objects of the jealousy of their country, rather than of its
gratitude.

Among the privates, causes of disgust grew out of the very composition
of the army, which increased the dissatisfaction produced by their
multiplied wants.

The first effort made to enlist troops for the war had, in some
degree, succeeded. While these men found themselves obliged to
continue in service without compensation, and often without the common
necessaries of life, they perceived the vacant ranks in their
regiments filled up by men who were to continue only for a few months,
and who received bounties for that short service, from individuals or
from the states, which were of great real value, and which appeared to
soldiers not acquainted with the actual state of depreciation, to be
immense. They could not fail to compare situations, and to repine at
engagements which deprived them of advantages which they saw in
possession of others. Many were induced to contest those
engagements;[36] many to desert a service in which they experienced
such irritating inequalities; and all felt with the more poignant
indignation, those distressing failures in the commissary department,
which so frequently recurred.

[Footnote 36: In some instances, the civil power of the state in which
such soldiers happened to be, attempted to interfere and to discharge
even those belonging to the lines of other states, who asserted their
right to be discharged. It was with some difficulty the general could
arrest this dangerous interposition.]

[Sidenote: Committee of Congress deputed to camp.]

In consequence of the strong representations made to congress on these
various causes of disquiet, a committee of three members repaired to
camp for the purpose of consulting with the Commander-in-chief on such
arrangements as the means in possession of the government would enable
it to make, and the present state of the army might require. In
representing the condition of the troops, they said, "That the army
was unpaid for five months; that it seldom had more than six days'
provisions in advance, and was on several occasions, for several
successive days, without meat; that the army was destitute of forage;
that the medical department had neither tea, chocolate, wine, nor
spirituous liquors of any kind; that every department of the army was
without money, and had not even the shadow of credit left; that the
patience of the soldiers, borne down by the pressure of complicated
sufferings, was on the point of being exhausted."

To relieve this gloomy state of things by transfusing into it a ray of
hope for the future, a resolution was passed, declaring that congress
would make good to the line of the army, and to the independent corps
thereof, the deficiency of their original pay, which had been
occasioned by the depreciation of the continental currency; and that
the money or other articles heretofore received, should be considered
as advanced on account, to be comprehended in the settlement to be
finally made. The benefits of this resolution were confined to those
who were then in actual service, or should thereafter come into it,
and who were engaged for the war or for three years.

This resolution was published in general orders, and had considerable
influence on the army, but not sufficient to remove the various causes
of dissatisfaction which existed, and were continually multiplying.
The engagement to make good the depreciation of their pay, was an act
of justice too long withheld; and no promise for the future, could
supply the place of present comfortable subsistence. No hope was
given that their condition, in this respect, would be improved. For a
considerable time, the troops received only from one-half to
one-eighth of a ration of meat; and, at length, were several days
without a single pound of that necessary article.

This long course of suffering had unavoidably produced some relaxation
of discipline, and had gradually soured the minds of the soldiers to
such a degree, that their discontents broke out into actual mutiny.

[Sidenote: May 25.]

On the 25th of May, two regiments belonging to Connecticut paraded
under arms with a declared resolution to return home, or to obtain
subsistence at the point of the bayonet. The soldiers of the other
regiments, though not actually joining the mutineers, showed no
disposition to suppress the mutiny. By great exertions on the part of
the officers, aided by the appearance of a neighbouring brigade of
Pennsylvania, then commanded by Colonel Stewart, the leaders were
secured, and the two regiments brought back to their duty. Some
sentiments, however, were disclosed by the soldiers, in answer to the
remonstrances of their officers, of a serious and alarming nature.
Their pay was now five months in arrear, and the depreciation of the
money, they said, was such, that it would be worth nothing when
received. When reminded of the late resolution of congress for making
good the loss sustained by depreciation, of the reputation acquired by
their past good conduct, and of the value of the object for which
they were contending; they answered that their sufferings were too
great to be longer supported; that they wanted present relief; and
must have some present substantial recompense for their services. A
paper was found in the brigade, which appeared to have been brought by
some emissary from New York, stimulating the troops to the abandonment
of the cause in which they were engaged.

[Sidenote: June 6.]

[Sidenote: General Knyphausen enters Jersey.]

The discontents of the army, and the complaints excited in the country
by the frequent requisitions on the people of New Jersey, had been
communicated, with such exaggeration, to the officer commanding in New
York, as to induce the opinion that the American soldiers were ready
to desert their standards; and the people of New Jersey to change
their government. To countenance these dispositions, General
Knyphausen embarked at Staten Island, and landed in the night with
about five thousand men at Elizabethtown Point, in New Jersey. Early
next morning he marched towards Springfield, by the way of Connecticut
Farms, but soon perceived that the real temper, both of the country
and the army, had been misunderstood.

On the appearance of the enemy, the militia assembled with alacrity,
and aided the small patrolling parties of continental troops in
harassing him on his march from Elizabethtown to the Connecticut
Farms, a distance of five or six miles, where a halt was made. In a
spirit of revenge, unworthy the general of an army, more in the
character of Tryon who was present, than of Knyphausen who commanded,
this settlement was reduced to ashes.[37]

[Footnote 37: This circumstance would scarcely have deserved notice
had it not been accompanied by one of those melancholy events, which
even war does not authorize, and which made, at the time, a very deep
impression.

Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of the clergyman of the village, had been
induced to remain in her house, under the persuasion that her presence
might protect it from pillage, and that her person could not be
endangered, as Colonel Dayton who commanded the militia determined not
to stop in the settlement. While sitting in the midst of her children,
with a sucking infant in her arms, a soldier came up to the window and
discharged his musket at her. She received the ball in her bosom, and
instantly expired.]

From the Farms, Knyphausen proceeded to Springfield. The Jersey
brigade, commanded by General Maxwell, and the militia of the adjacent
country, took an advantageous position at that place, and seemed
determined to defend it. Knyphausen halted in its neighbourhood, and
remained on his ground until night.

Having received intelligence of this movement, General Washington put
his army in motion early in the same morning that Knyphausen marched
from Elizabethtown Point, and advanced to the Short Hills, in the rear
of Springfield, while the British were in the neighbourhood of that
place. Dispositions were made for an engagement the next morning, but
Knyphausen retired in the night to the place of his disembarkation.

General Washington continued on the hills near Springfield, too weak
to hazard an engagement, but on ground chosen by himself. His
continental troops did not exceed three thousand men. A return of the
whole army under his immediate command, made on the 3d of June,
exhibited in the column, of present, fit for duty, only three thousand
seven hundred and sixty, rank and file. So reduced was that force on
which America relied for independence. "You but too well know," said
General Washington in a letter to a friend, giving an account of this
incursion, "and will regret with me the cause which justifies this
insulting manoeuvre on the part of the enemy. It deeply affects the
honour of the states, a vindication of which could not be attempted in
our present circumstances, without most intimately hazarding their
security; at least so far as it may depend on the preservation of the
army. Their character, their interest, their all that is dear, call
upon them in the most pressing manner, to place the army immediately
on a respectable footing."

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