The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)
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The long continuance of Knyphausen at Elizabethtown, strengthened a
suspicion that Sir Henry Clinton was about to return from South
Carolina, and intended, without disembarking his troops, to proceed up
the Hudson to West Point; and that the movement into Jersey was a
feint designed to cover the real object.
The letters of the Commander-in-chief, addressed about this period, to
those who might be supposed to possess influence in the government of
the Union, or in those of the states, exhibit his conjectures
respecting the designs of his adversary, as well as his apprehensions
from the condition of his own army. To the committee of congress, in
camp, he observed, "General Knyphausen still continues in the Jerseys
with all the force which can be spared from New York, a force greatly
superior to ours. Should Sir Henry join him, their superiority will be
decided, and equal to almost any thing they may think proper to
attempt. The enemy, it is true, are at this time inactive; but their
continuance in their present position proves that they have some
project of importance in contemplation. Perhaps they are only waiting
until the militia grow tired and return home, (which they are doing
every hour,) to prosecute their designs with the less opposition. This
would be a critical moment for us. Perhaps they are waiting the
arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, either to push up the North River
against the Highland posts, or to bend their whole force against this
army. In either case, the most disastrous consequences are to be
apprehended. You, who are well acquainted with our situation, need no
arguments to evince the danger.
"The militia of this state have run to arms, and behaved with an
ardour and spirit of which there are few examples. But perseverance,
in enduring the rigours of military service, is not to be expected
from those who are not by profession obliged to it. The reverse of
this opinion has been a great misfortune in our affairs, and it is
high time we should recover from an error of so pernicious a nature.
We must absolutely have a force of a different composition, or we must
relinquish the contest. In a few days, we may expect to rely almost
entirely on our continental force, and this, from your own
observation, is totally inadequate to our safety. The exigency calls
loudly on the states to carry all the recommendations of the committee
into the most vigorous and immediate execution; but more particularly
that for completing our batteries by a draught with all possible
expedition."
[Sidenote: June 18.]
[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York.]
In this precise state of things, he received intelligence of the
return of Sir Henry Clinton from the conquest of South Carolina.
The regular force in New York and its dependencies was now estimated
at twelve thousand men, great part of whom might be drawn into the
field for any particular purpose, because Sir Henry Clinton could
command about four thousand militia and refugees for garrison duty.
In communicating to congress the appearance of the British fleet off
the Hook, General Washington observed, "a very alarming scene may
shortly open, and it will be happy for us if we shall be able to
steer clear of some serious misfortune in this quarter. I hope the
period has not yet arrived, which will convince the different states
by fatal experience, that some of them have mistaken the true
situation of this country. I flatter myself, however, that we may
still retrieve our affairs if we have but a just sense of them, and
are actuated by a spirit of liberal policy and exertion equal to the
emergency. Could we once see this spirit generally prevailing, I
should not despair of a prosperous issue of the campaign. But there is
no time to be lost. The danger is imminent and pressing; the obstacles
to be surmounted are great and numerous; and our efforts must be
instant, unreserved, and universal."
On the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, the design of acting offensively
in the Jerseys was resumed; but, to divide the American army,
demonstrations were made of an intention to seize West Point. To be in
readiness for either object, General Greene was left at Springfield
with two brigades of continental troops, and with the Jersey militia;
while, with the greater part of his army, General Washington proceeded
slowly towards Pompton, watching attentively the movements of the
British, and apparently unwilling to separate himself too far from
Greene. He had not marched farther than Rockaway, eleven miles beyond
Morristown, when the British army advanced from Elizabethtown towards
Springfield in great force. General Washington detached a brigade to
hang on their right flank, and returned with the residue of his army
five or six miles, in order to be in a situation to support Greene.
[Sidenote: June.]
[Sidenote: Skirmish at Springfield.]
Early in the morning of the 23d, the British army moved in two
columns, with great rapidity, towards Springfield. Major Lee was
advanced on the Vauxhall road, which was taken by the right column;
and Colonel Dayton on the direct road, which was taken by the left.
Both these corps made every possible exertion to check the advancing
enemy, while General Greene concentrated his little army at
Springfield. Scarcely had he made his dispositions, when the British
front appeared, and a cannonade commenced between their van and the
American artillery which defended a bridge over Rahway, a small river
running east of the town, which was guarded by Colonel Angel with less
than two hundred men. Colonel Shreve was posted at a second bridge,
also over a branch of the Rahway, in order to cover the retreat of
Angel from the first. Major Lee with his dragoons and the piquets
under Captain Walker, supported by Colonel Ogden, was directed to
defend a bridge on the Vauxhall road. The residue of the continental
troops were drawn up on high ground, in the rear of the town, with the
militia on their flanks.
The right column of the British advanced on Lee, who disputed the
passage of the bridge until a considerable body of the enemy forded
the river above him, and gained the point of a hill which endangered
his position. At this instant, their left attacked Colonel Angel, who
defended himself with persevering gallantry. The conflict was sharp,
and was maintained for about half an hour, when, compelled by superior
numbers to give way, he retired in good order, and brought off his
wounded. His retreat was covered by Colonel Shreve, who, after Angel
had passed him, was ordered by General Greene to join his brigade. The
English then took possession of the town and reduced it to ashes.
The obstinate resistance which had been encountered; the gallantry and
discipline displayed by the continental troops who had been engaged;
the strength of Greene's position; the firm countenance maintained by
his troops, small detachments of whom kept up a continual skirmishing
with a view to save a part of the town; all contributed to deter Sir
Henry Clinton from a farther prosecution of his original plan. He
withdrew that afternoon to Elizabethtown; and, in the following night,
passed over to Staten Island. It is probable that the caution
manifested during this expedition is to be ascribed to the
intelligence that a formidable fleet and army from France was daily
expected on the coast.
When the Marquis de Lafayette obtained permission to visit his native
country, he retained, with his rank in the American army, that zeal
for the interests of the United States, which the affectionate
attentions he had received, and the enthusiasm of a soldier in the
cause of those for whom he had made his first campaigns, were
calculated to inspire in a young and generous mind, in favour of an
infant people, struggling for liberty and self-government with the
hereditary rival of his nation.
He was received at the court of Versailles with every mark of favour
and distinction;[38] and all his influence was employed in impressing
on the cabinet, the importance and policy of granting succours to the
United States.
[Footnote 38: After he had visited the ministers, an arrest of eight
days, during which he resided with his relation the Marshal de
Noailles, was imposed on him for the sake of form and in honour of the
royal authority, which he had disregarded by proceeding to America.
After the expiration of this term he presented himself to the King,
who graciously said he pardoned his disobedience, in consideration of
his good conduct and of his services.--_Letter from Gen. Lafayette._]
[Sidenote: Lafayette brings intelligence of aid from France.]
[Sidenote: Exertions of Congress and of the Commander-in-chief to
strengthen the army.]
Having succeeded in this favourite object, and finding no probability
of active employment on the continent of Europe, he obtained
permission to return to America. He arrived late in April at Boston,
and hastened to head quarters; whence he proceeded to the seat of
Government with the information that his most Christian Majesty had
consented to employ a considerable land and naval armament in the
United States, for the ensuing campaign. This intelligence gave a new
impulse both to congress and the state legislatures. The states from
New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive were required to pay, within
thirty days, ten millions of dollars, part of their quotas which
became due on the first of March; and specie bills to the amount of
fifty thousand dollars were drawn on Messieurs Franklin and Jay. These
sums were sacredly appropriated to the objects of bringing the army
into the field, and forwarding their supplies.
The defects in the requisition system, which had been suggested by
General Washington, were corrected; and the committee in camp, at the
head of which was the late General Schuyler, was empowered, at the
request of the Commander-in-chief, to take such measures as were in
the power of congress, for drawing out the resources of the nation.
To give effect to these resolutions, the several state legislatures
from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive, were requested to invest the
Executives, or some other persons, with powers sufficiently ample to
comply with such applications as might be made to them by the
committee in camp, and a circular letter was addressed to the state
governments, urging them to second the efforts of Congress.
Letters equally stimulating were written by the committee from camp;
and the well earned influence of the Commander-in-chief was also
employed to induce an exertion proportioned to the crisis. In addition
to those incentives which might operate on ardent minds, he
endeavoured, by a temperate review of the situation and resources of
the belligerent powers, to convince the judgment that America would
have real cause to fear the issue of the contest, should she neglect
to improve the advantage to be afforded by the succours expected from
France.[39]
[Footnote 39: See note No. III. at the end of the volume.]
Under the impressions produced by these representations, the state
legislatures, generally, passed the laws which were required; but the
energy displayed in their passage was not maintained in their
execution. In general, the assemblies followed the example of
congress, and apportioned on the several counties or towns within the
state, the quota to be furnished by each. This division of the state
was again to be subdivided into classes, each of which was to furnish
a man by contributions or taxes imposed upon itself.
[Sidenote: Tardy proceedings of the states.]
These operations were slow and unproductive.
It was not on the state sovereignties only that beneficial effects
were produced by a candid statement of public affairs, several
patriotic individuals contributed largely from their private funds to
the aid of the public. The merchants, and other citizens of
Philadelphia, with a zeal guided by that sound discretion which turns
expenditure to the best account, established a bank, for the support
of which they subscribed L315,000, Pennsylvania money, to be paid, if
required, in specie, the principal object of which was to supply the
army with provisions and rum. By the plan of this bank, its members
were to derive no emolument whatever from the institution. For
advancing their credit and their money, they required only that
congress should pledge the faith of the Union to reimburse the costs
and charges of the transaction in a reasonable time, and should give
such assistance to its execution as might be in their power.
The ladies of Philadelphia too gave a splendid example of patriotism,
by large donations for the immediate relief of the suffering army.
This example was extensively followed;[40] but it is not by the
contributions of the generous that a war can or ought to be
maintained. The purse of the nation alone can supply the expenditures
of a nation; and, when all are interested in a contest, all ought to
contribute to its support. Taxes, and taxes only, can furnish for the
prosecution of a national war, means which are just in themselves, or
competent to the object. Notwithstanding these donations, the
distresses of the army, for clothing especially, still continued; and
were the more severely felt when a co-operation with French troops was
expected. So late as the 20th of June, General Washington informed
congress, that he still laboured under the painful and humiliating
embarrassment of having no shirts for the soldiers, many of whom were
destitute of that necessary article. "For the troops to be without
clothing at any time," he added, "is highly injurious to the service,
and distressing to our feelings; but the want will be more peculiarly
mortifying when they come to act with those of our allies. If it be
possible, I have no doubt, immediate measures will be taken to relieve
their distress.
[Footnote 40: This instance of patriotism on the part of our fair and
amiable countrywomen, is far from being single. Their conduct
throughout the war was uniform. They shared with cheerfulness and
gaiety, the privations and sufferings to which the distress of the
times exposed their country. In every stage of this severe trial, they
displayed virtues which have not been always attributed to their sex,
but which it is believed they will, on every occasion calculated to
unfold them, be found to possess. With a ready acquiescence, with a
firmness always cheerful, and a constancy never lamenting the
sacrifices which were made, they not only yielded up all the
elegancies, delicacies, and even conveniences to be furnished by
wealth and commerce, relying on their farms and on domestic industry
for every article of food and raiment, but, consenting to share the
produce of their own labour, they gave up without regret, a
considerable portion of the covering designed for their own families,
to supply the wants of the distressed soldiers; and heroically
suppressed the involuntary sigh which the departure of their brothers,
their sons, and their husbands, for the camp, rended from their
bosoms.]
"It is also most sincerely wished, that there could be some supplies
of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose
condition is still miserable. This is, in some instances, the case
with the whole lines of the states. It would be well for their own
sakes, and for the public good, if they could be furnished. They will
not be able, when our friends come to co-operate with us, to go on a
common routine of duty; and if they should, they must, from their
appearance, be held in low estimation."
This picture presents in strong colours, the real patriotism of the
American army. One heroic effort, though it may dazzle the mind with
its splendour, is an exertion most men are capable of making; but
continued patient suffering and unremitting perseverance, in a service
promising no personal emolument, and exposing the officer unceasingly,
not only to wants of every kind, but to those circumstances of
humiliation which seem to degrade him in the eyes of others,
demonstrate a fortitude of mind, a strength of virtue, and a firmness
of principle, which ought never to be forgotten.
As the several legislative acts for bringing the army into the field,
did not pass until the months of June and July, General Washington
remained uninformed of the force on which he might rely, and was
consequently unable to form any certain plan of operations.
This suspense was the more cruelly embarrassing, as, in the event of
an attempt upon New York, it was of the utmost importance that the
French fleet should, on its arrival, take possession of the harbour,
which was then weakly defended. But, should this measure be followed
by a failure to furnish the requisite support, it would not only be
ineffectual; but, in a very possible state of things, might sacrifice
the fleet itself.
Should it be ascertained that the states were either unable or
unwilling to make the exertions necessary for the siege of New York,
other objects presented themselves against which the allied arms might
be turned to advantage. To avoid the disgrace and danger of attempting
what could not be effected, and the reproach of neglecting any
attainable object, were equally desirable, and equally required a
correct knowledge of the measures which would be taken by the states.
In a letter to congress communicating his anxiety on this interesting
subject, and his total want of information respecting it, General
Washington observed, "The season is come when we have every reason to
expect the arrival of the fleet, and yet, for want of this point of
primary consequence, it is impossible for me to form a system of
co-operation. I have no basis to act upon; and, of course, were this
generous succour of our ally now to arrive, I should find myself in
the most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general and
the admiral, from the relation in which I stand, as soon as they
approach our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to be
pursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; but
circumstanced as I am, I can not even give them conjectures. From
these considerations, I have suggested to the committee, by a letter I
had the honour of addressing them yesterday, the indispensable
necessity of their writing again to the states, urging them to give
immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken and
of the result. The interest of the states, the honour and reputation
of our councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies, all
require that I should, without delay, be enabled to ascertain and
inform them, what we can or can not undertake. There is a point which
ought now to be determined, on the success of which all our future
operations may depend, on which, for want of knowing our prospects, I
can make no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and army of our
allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not seconded by
us, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall be compelled to
suspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our hopes."
The tardy proceedings of the states were not less perplexing to
congress than to the Commander-in-chief. To the minister of his most
Christian Majesty, who had in the preceding January communicated the
probability of receiving succour from France, that body, without
calculating accurately the means of complying with its engagements,
had pledged itself unequivocally for effectual co-operation. The
minister was assured, that the United States had expectations on which
they could rely with confidence, of bringing into the field, for the
next campaign, an army of twenty-five thousand men; and that such
numbers of militia might be added to this continental force, as would
render it competent to any enterprise against the posts occupied by
the British within the United States.
Assurances were also given that ample supplies of provisions for the
combined armies should be laid up in magazines under the direction of
congress. The French minister addressed congress on this subject about
the time that General Washington expressed so strongly, the necessity
of knowing with certainty, on what reinforcements he was to calculate.
Thus pressed by their general and their ally, congress renewed their
urgent requisitions on the states, and desired the several governments
to correspond weekly with the committee at head quarters, on the
progress made in complying with them.
In the mean time, General Washington meditated unceasingly on the
course to be pursued in the various contingencies which might happen;
and endeavoured to prepare for any plan of operations which
circumstances might render adviseable. The arrival of Sir Henry
Clinton diminished the variety of aspects in which the relative
situation of the two armies was to be contemplated, and rendered the
success of an attempt on New York more doubtful. It was now thought
adviseable that the armament from France, instead of sailing directly
to the Hook, should proceed in the first instance to Rhode Island;
where, after disembarking the troops, and providing for the sick, it
might wait until a definitive plan of operations should be concerted.
[Sidenote: July 13.]
[Sidenote: Arrival of a French armament in Rhode Island.]
On the 13th of July, while the result of the measures adopted by the
several states remained uncertain, the French fleet entered the
harbour of Newport, and letters were soon afterwards received from the
Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Tunay, the officers commanding
the land and naval forces, transmitting to General Washington an
account of their arrival, of their strength, their expectations, and
their orders.
The troops designed to serve in the United States had assembled, early
in the year, at Brest; but the transports at that place having been
chiefly employed for an armament destined for the West Indies; and the
ports from which it had been intended to draw others, being blockaded,
only the first division, consisting of five thousand men, had arrived
at Newport; but letters from France contained assurances that the
second division of the army might soon be expected.
To obviate those difficulties which had occurred on former occasions
respecting rank, the orders given to Lieutenant General Count de
Rochambeau, which were inclosed in his first letter, placed him
entirely under the command of General Washington. The French troops
were to be considered as auxiliaries, and were, according to the
usages of war, to cede the post of honour to the Americans.[41]
[Footnote 41: These orders were given at the instance of General
Lafayette.--_Correspondence with General Lafayette._]
Convinced that cordial harmony between the allied forces was essential
to their success, both generals cultivated carefully the friendly
dispositions felt by the troops towards each other. Warm professions
of reciprocal respect, esteem, and confidence, were interchanged
between them; and each endeavoured to impress on the other, and on all
the military and civil departments, the conviction that the two
nations, and two armies, were united by the ties of interest and
affection. On this occasion, General Washington recommended to his
officers, as a symbol of friendship and affection for their allies, to
engraft on the American cockade, which was black, a white relief, that
being the colour of the French cockade.
Late as was the arrival of the French troops, they found the Americans
unprepared for active and offensive operations. Not even at that time
were the numbers ascertained which would be furnished by the states.
Yet it was necessary for General Washington to communicate a plan of
the campaign to the Count de Rochambeau.
The season was already so far advanced that preparations for the
operations contemplated eventually, on the arrival of the second
division of the French fleet, must be immediately made, or there
would not be time, though every circumstance should prove favourable,
to execute the design against New York. Such a state of things so ill
comported with the engagements of congress, and with the interests of
the nation, that, trusting to his being enabled, by the measures
already taken by the states, to comply with what was incumbent on him
to perform, he determined to hazard much rather than forego the
advantages to be derived from the aids afforded by France. In
communicating this resolution to congress, he said--"Pressed on all
sides by a choice of difficulties in a moment which required decision,
I have adopted that line of conduct which comported with the dignity
and faith of congress, the reputation of these states, and the honour
of our arms. I have sent on definitive proposals of co-operation to
the French general and admiral. Neither the period of the season, nor
a regard to decency, would permit delay. The die is cast, and it
remains with the states either to fulfil their engagements, preserve
their credit, and support their independence, or to involve us in
disgrace and defeat. Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the
committee, I shall proceed on the supposition that they will,
ultimately, consult their own interest and honour and not suffer us to
fail for the want of means which it is evidently in their power to
afford. What has been done, and is doing, by some of the states,
confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in the
country. Of the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangement
for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground to doubt. If we
fail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments, I trust
the responsibility will fall where it ought; and that I shall stand
justified to congress, my country, and the world."