The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)
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The frankness and magnanimity with which Andre had conducted himself
from the time of his appearance in his real character, had made a
very favourable impression on all those with whom he had held any
intercourse. From this cause he experienced every mark of indulgent
attention which was compatible with his situation; and, from a sense
of justice as well as of delicacy, was informed, on the opening of the
examination, that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatory
which might embarrass his own feelings. But, as if only desirous to
rescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more than
death, he confessed every thing material to his own condemnation, but
would divulge nothing which might involve others.
[Sidenote: Trial and execution of Major Andre.]
The board reported the essential facts which had appeared, with their
opinion that Major Andre was a spy, and ought to suffer death. The
execution of this sentence was ordered to take place on the day
succeeding that on which it was pronounced.
Superior to the terrors of death, but dreading disgrace, Andre was
deeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war decree
to persons in his situation. He wished to die like a soldier, not as a
criminal. To obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this respect, he
addressed a letter[45] to General Washington, replete with the
feelings of a man of sentiment and honour. But the occasion required
that the example should make its full impression, and this request
could not be granted. He encountered his fate with composure and
dignity; and his whole conduct interested the feelings of all who
witnessed it.
[Footnote 45: See note No. IV. at the end of the volume.]
The general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of war
compelled them to pronounce; and never perhaps did the
Commander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of
duty and policy. The sympathy excited among the American officers by
his fate, was as universal as it is unusual on such occasions; and
proclaims alike the merit of him who suffered, and the humanity of
those who inflicted the punishment.
Great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom Andre was
particularly dear, first, to have him considered as protected by a
flag of truce, and afterwards, as a prisoner of war.
Even Arnold had the hardihood to interpose. After giving a certificate
of facts tending, as he supposed, to exculpate the prisoner,
exhausting his powers of reasoning on the case, and appealing to the
humanity of the American general, he sought to intimidate that
officer, by stating the situation of many of the most distinguished
individuals of South Carolina, who had forfeited their lives, but had
hitherto been spared through the clemency of the British general. This
clemency, he said, could no longer be extended to them should Major
Andre suffer.
It may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold could have no
influence on Washington. He conveyed Mrs. Arnold to her husband in New
York,[46] and also transmitted his clothes and baggage, for which he
had written; but, in every other respect, his letters, which were
unanswered, were also unnoticed.
[Footnote 46: General Lafayette mentions a circumstance not previously
known to the author, which serves to illustrate the character of
Washington, and to mark the delicacy of his feelings towards even the
offending part of that sex which is entitled to all the consolation
and protection man can afford it.
The night after Arnold's escape, when his letter respecting Andre was
received, the general directed one of his aids to wait on Mrs. Arnold,
who was convulsed with grief, and inform her that he had done every
thing which depended on him to arrest her husband, but that, not
having succeeded, it gave him pleasure to inform her that her husband
was safe. It is also honourable to the American character, that during
the effervescence of the moment, Mrs. Arnold was permitted to go to
Philadelphia, to take possession of her effects, and to proceed to New
York under the protection of a flag, without receiving the slightest
insult.]
The mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited in every
bosom for the unfortunate Andre, seemed to increase the detestation in
which Arnold was held. "Andre," said General Washington in a private
letter, "has met his fate with that fortitude which was to be expected
from an accomplished man and a gallant officer; but I am mistaken if
_at this time_ Arnold is undergoing the torments of a mental hell. He
wants feeling. From some traits[47] of his character which have
lately come to my knowledge, he seems to have been so hardened in
crime, so lost to all sense of honour and shame, that, while his
faculties still enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there will
be no time for remorse."
[Footnote 47: This allusion is thus explained in a private letter from
Colonel Hamilton--"This man (Arnold) is in every sense despicable. In
addition to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his command
in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has unfolded,
the history of his command at West Point is a history of little as
well as great villanies. He practised every dirty act of peculation,
and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers to defraud the
public."]
From motives of policy, or of respect for his engagements, Sir Henry
Clinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier general in
the British service, which he preserved throughout the war. Yet it is
impossible that rank could have rescued him from the contempt and
detestation in which the generous, the honourable, and the brave,
could not cease to hold him. It was impossible for men of this
description to bury the recollection of his being a traitor, a sordid
traitor, first the slave of his rage, then purchased with gold, and
finally secured at the expense of the blood of one of the most
accomplished officers in the British army.
His representations of the discontent of the country and of the army
concurring with reports from other quarters, had excited the hope that
the loyalists and the dissatisfied, allured by British gold, and the
prospect of rank in the British service, would flock to his standard,
and form a corps at whose head he might again display his accustomed
intrepidity. With this hope he published an address to the inhabitants
of America, in which he laboured to palliate his own guilt, and to
increase their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things.
This appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation addressed "To
the officers and soldiers of the continental army, who have the real
interests of their country at heart, and who are determined to be no
longer the tools and dupes of congress or of France."
The object of this proclamation was to induce the officers and
soldiers to desert the cause they had embraced from principle, by
holding up to them the very flattering offers of the British general,
and contrasting the substantial emoluments of the British service with
their present deplorable condition. He attempted to cover this
dishonourable proposition with a decent garb, by representing the base
step he invited them to take, as the only measure which could restore
peace, real liberty, and happiness, to their country.
These inducements did not produce their intended effect. Although the
temper of the army might be irritated by real suffering, and by the
supposed neglect of government, no diminution of patriotism had been
produced. Through all the hardships, irritations, and vicissitudes of
the war, Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officer
who abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest, and
turned his sword upon his former companions in arms.
When the probable consequences of this plot, had it been successful,
were considered, and the combination of apparent accidents by which it
was discovered and defeated, was recollected, all were filled with
awful astonishment; and the devout perceived in the transaction, the
hand of Providence guiding America to independence.
The thanks of congress were voted to the three militia men[48] who had
rendered this invaluable service; and a silver medal, with an
inscription expressive of their fidelity and patriotism, was directed
to be presented to each of them. In addition to this flattering
testimonial of their worth, and as a farther evidence of national
gratitude, a resolution was passed granting to each, two hundred
dollars per annum during life, to be paid in specie or an equivalent
in current money.
[Footnote 48: Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, and
Isaac Vanwert.]
The efforts of General Washington to obtain a permanent military
force, or its best substitute, a regular system for filling the vacant
ranks with draughts who should join the army on the first day of
January in each year, were still continued. Notwithstanding the
embarrassments with which congress was surrounded, it is not easy to
find adequate reasons for the neglect of representations so
interesting, and of recommendations apparently so essential to the
safety of the United States.
[Sidenote: Parties in Congress.]
Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated
congress. One entered fully into the views of the Commander-in-chief.
The other, jealous of the army, and apprehensive of its hostility to
liberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to give
stability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were to
serve during the war. They seemed to dread the danger from the enemy
to which its fluctuations would expose them, less than the danger
which might be apprehended for the civil authority from its permanent
character. They caught with avidity at every intelligence which
encouraged the flattering hope of a speedy peace,[49] but entered
reluctantly into measures founded on the supposition that the war
might be of long duration. Perfectly acquainted with the extent of the
jealousies entertained on this subject, although, to use his own
expressions to a friend, "Heaven knows how unjustly," General
Washington had foreborne to press the necessity of regular and timely
reinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his own
judgment directed. But the experience of every campaign furnished such
strong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuing
to rely on temporary expedients, and the uncertainty of collecting a
force to co-operate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarly
embarrassing, that he at length resolved to conquer the delicacy by
which he had been in some degree restrained, and to open himself fully
on the subject which he deemed more essential than any other to the
success of the war.
[Footnote 49: The following extract from a private letter of General
Washington to a member of congress, shows how sensible he was of the
mischief produced by this temper. "The satisfaction I have in any
successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, is
always allayed by the fear that it will lull us into security.
Supineness, and a disposition to flatter ourselves, seem to make parts
of our national character. When we receive a check and are not quite
undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and when we do
gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive, and expect the war
immediately to end. The history of the war is a history of false hopes
and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! This
winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing
scene than we have yet experienced, to the southward. I have little
doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton
will detach to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far from
being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts."]
[Sidenote: August.]
In August, while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement to the
Chevalier de Tunay as would give him the command of the American seas,
and while uncertain whether the campaign might not pass away without
giving a single advantage promised at its opening, he transmitted a
letter to congress, fully and freely imparting his sentiments on the
state of things.
[Sidenote: Letter of General Washington on American affairs.]
As this letter contains an exact statement of American affairs,
according to the view taken of them by General Washington, and a
faithful picture of the consequences of the ruinous policy which had
been pursued, drawn by the man best acquainted with them, copious
extracts from it will, at least, be excused.
After examining the sources of supplies for the campaign, he proceeds
to say--"But while we are meditating offensive operations which may
not be undertaken at all, or, being undertaken, may fail, I am
persuaded congress are not inattentive to the present state of the
army, and will view in the same light with me the necessity of
providing in time against a period (the first of January) when one
half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army that
will remain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, to
abandon the service, without the hope which has hitherto supported
them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and
certainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something
more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth of which every
spectator of the distresses of the army can not help being convinced.
Those at a distance may speculate differently; but on the spot an
opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale,
would be chimerical.
"The honourable the committee of congress, who have seen and heard for
themselves, will add their testimony to mine; and the wisdom and
justice of congress can not fail to give it the most serious
attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs can
maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the
temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an
alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating
condition of seeing the cause of America, in America, upheld by
foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all our
confidence, and all our gratitude; but it is neither for the honour of
America, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the work
entirely to them."
He then reviewed the resources of Great Britain; and, after showing
her ability still to prosecute the war, added--"The inference from
these reflections is, that we can not count upon a speedy end of the
war; and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself
with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give
consistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to this
will be immediately to devise a plan and put it in execution, for
providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of
the year; and for subsisting and for making a reasonable allowance to
the officers and soldiers.
"The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and such
as will execute itself. Experience has shown that a peremptory draught
will be the only effectual one. If a draught for the war or for three
years can be effected, it ought to be made on every account; a shorter
period than a year is inadmissible.
"To one who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short
enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond
description; and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a
change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met
with in the military line, are to be attributed to this cause.
"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the
continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of
discipline, we never should have to retreat with a handful of men
across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which
nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should
not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with
sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary
guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only
thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the
necessity of fighting at Brandywine with an unequal number of raw
troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a
victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less
than half the force of the enemy, destitute of every thing in a
situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New
York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of
these states, while the principal part of their force was detached for
the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this
spring so weak as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to
protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good
countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not
have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy,
indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the
mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them, pass
unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able
to afford; to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the
inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same
cause."
After presenting in detail the embarrassments under which the civil
departments of the army also had laboured, in consequence of the
expensiveness and waste inseparable from its temporary character, he
proceeded to observe--"There is every reason to believe, that the war
has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, made
the successes of the enemy greater. The fluctuation of the army kept
alive their hopes; and at every period of a dissolution of a
considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some
decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy
could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have
listened to terms long since. If the army is left in its present
situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the
enemy; if it is put in a respectable one, it must have a contrary
effect; and nothing I believe will tend more to give us peace the
ensuing winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation.
An army on foot, not only for another campaign, but for several
campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable
us to insist upon favourable terms in forcible language. An army
insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces, would be
the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a
little longer. It is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good
peace is to be well prepared for war.
"I can not forbear returning in this place to the necessity of a more
ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this head
have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are many
symptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to unite
both officers and men in a general refusal of the money, and some
corps now actually decline receiving it. Every method has been taken
to counteract it, because such a combination in the army would be a
severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist that
the accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods,
and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not
be satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good.
"I have often said, and I beg leave to repeat it, the half pay
provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can be
adopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not done, the
army (already so much reduced in officers by daily resignations as not
to have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it) must either cease
to exist at the end of the campaign, or will exhibit an example of
more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance, than has
perhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm.
"The dissolution of the army is an event that can not be regarded with
indifference. It would bring accumulated distress upon us; it would
throw the people of America into a general consternation; it would
discredit our cause throughout the world; it would shock our allies.
To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary. The loss
of the veteran soldiers could not be replaced. To attempt to carry on
the war with militia against disciplined troops, will be to attempt
what the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce
to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to congress, to
dwell on observations of this kind in a letter to them."
[Sidenote: Proceedings of Congress respecting the army.]
At length the committee presented their report, reorganizing the
regiments, reducing their number, and apportioning on the several
states their respective numbers to complete the establishment. This
report, being approved by congress, was transmitted to the
Commander-in-chief for his consideration. By this arrangement, the
states were required to recruit their quotas for the war, and to
bring them into the field by the first of January; but, if in any
state, it should be found impracticable to raise the men for the war
by the first day of December, it was recommended to such state to
supply the deficiency with men engaged to serve for not less than one
year.
In compliance with the request of congress, General Washington
submitted his objections to the plan, in a long and respectful letter.
He recommended that legionary corps should be substituted in the place
of regiments entirely of cavalry. He thought it more adviseable that
the infantry attached to the cavalry should compose a part of the
corps permanently, than that it should be drawn occasionally from the
regiments of foot.
The reduction in the number of regiments appeared to him a subject of
great delicacy. The last reduction, he said, had occasioned many to
quit the service, independent of those who were discontinued; and had
left durable seeds of discontent among those who remained. The general
topic of declamation was, that it was as hard as dishonourable, for
men who had made every sacrifice to the service, to be turned out of
it, at the pleasure of those in power, without an adequate
compensation. In the maturity to which their uneasiness had now risen
from a continuance of misery, they would be still more impatient under
an attempt of a similar nature.
It was not, he said, the intention of his remarks to discourage a
reform, but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill effects
which might otherwise attend it, by making an ample provision both for
the officers who should remain in the service, and for those who
should be reduced. This should be the basis of the plan; and without
it, the most mischievous consequences were to be apprehended. He was
aware of the difficulty of making a present provision sufficiently
ample to give satisfaction; but this only proved the expediency of
making one for the future, and brought him to that which he had so
frequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic, and
the most effectual, that could be devised; this was half pay for life.
Supported by the prospect of a permanent provision, the officers would
be tied to the service, and would submit to many momentary privations,
and to those inconveniences, which the situation of public affairs
rendered unavoidable. If the objection drawn from the principle that
the measure was incompatible with the genius of the government should
be thought insurmountable, he would propose a substitute, less
eligible in his opinion, but which would answer the purpose. It was to
make the present half pay for seven years, whole pay for the same
period. He also recommended that depreciation on the pay received,
should be made up to the officers who should be reduced.
No objection occurred to the measure now recommended, but the expense
it would occasion. In his judgment, whatever would give consistency to
the military establishment, would be ultimately favourable to economy.
It was not easy to be conceived, except by those who had witnessed it,
what an additional waste and increased consumption of every thing, and
consequently what an increase of expense, resulted from laxness of
discipline in an army; and where officers thought they did a favour by
holding their commissions, and the men were continually fluctuating,
to maintain discipline was impossible. Nothing could be more obvious
to him than that a sound military establishment and real economy were
the same. That the purposes of war would be greatly promoted by it was
too clear to admit of argument. He objected also to the mode of
effecting the reduction. This was by leaving it to the several states
to select the officers who should remain in service. He regretted that
congress had not thought proper to retain the reduction and
incorporation of the regiments under their own discretion. He
regretted that it should be left to the states, not only because it
was an adherence to the state system, which in the arrangements of the
army, he disapproved; but because also he feared it would introduce
much confusion and discontent in a business which ought to be
conducted with the greatest circumspection. He feared also that
professing to _select_ the officers to be retained in service would
give disgust both to those who should be discontinued, and to those
who should remain. The former would be sent away under the public
stigma of inferior merit, and the latter would feel no pleasure in a
present preference, when they reflected that, at some future period,
they might experience a similar fate.