The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)
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On determining to enter on the duties of his office, Mr. Morris laid
before congress the plan of a national bank, whose notes were to be
receivable from the respective states as specie, into the treasury of
the United States. Congress gave its full approbation to this
beneficial institution; and passed an ordinance for its incorporation.
Important as was this measure to the future operations of the army, a
contract entered into with the state of Pennsylvania was of still more
immediate utility.
After furnishing flour to relieve the wants of the moment on his
private credit, Mr. Morris proposed to take on himself the task of
complying with all the specific requisitions made on Pennsylvania, and
to rely for reimbursement on the taxes imposed by law, to be
collected under his direction. This proposition being accepted, the
contract was made; and supplies which the government found itself
unable to furnish, were raised by an individual.
[Sidenote: Count Rochambeau marches to the North River.]
As the French troops approached the North River, intelligence was
received that a large detachment from New York had made an incursion
into Jersey, under appearances indicating an intention not to return
immediately. This being thought a favourable moment for gaining the
posts on the north end of York Island, a plan was formed for seizing
them by a _coup de main_. General Washington fixed on the night of the
second of July for making the attempt; it being supposed that the
Count de Rochambeau might join the American army at Kingsbridge by
that time. An aid-de-camp was therefore despatched to meet that
officer with letters explaining the enterprise, and requesting him to
meet the Commander-in-chief at the time and place appointed.
With the proposed attack on these works, an attempt to cut off some
light troops stationed on the outside of Kingsbridge at Morrissania,
under the command of Colonel Delaney, was to be combined. This part of
the plan was to be executed by the Duke de Lauzun, to whose legion
Sheldon's dragoons, and a small body of continental troops dispersed
on the lines, under the command of General Waterbury, were to be
added.
On the part of the Americans, all that could contribute to the success
of this enterprise was done. A strong detachment commanded by General
Lincoln, which fell down the river in boats with muffled oars, reached
its ground undiscovered on the night of the first of July; and the
army, conducted by General Washington, marched to Valentine's hill.
The next day, Lincoln perceived that the detachment had returned from
Jersey, that the British were encamped in great force on the north end
of the island, and that a ship of war watched the landing place. These
unexpected obstacles having defeated the design upon the works, he
proceeded to execute his eventual orders of co-operation with the Duke
de Lauzun. These were, after landing above Spiken Devil Creek, to
march to the high ground in front of Kingsbridge, and there conceal
his detachment, until the attack on Delaney's corps should commence.
The Duke de Lauzun did not arrive, and the return of day betrayed
Lincoln. A British corps advanced upon him; on hearing which, General
Washington put his troops in motion, and, on his approach, the British
troops retired into the island.
Both parts of the plan having thus failed, the army retreated to
Dobbs' ferry, where it was joined by the Count de Rochambeau on the
sixth of July.
The thanks of the Commander-in-chief were given to that officer in
general orders, for the unremitting zeal with which he had proceeded
to form his so long wished for junction with the American army; and he
was requested to convey to the officers and soldiers under his
command, the grateful sense which the general entertained of the
cheerfulness with which they had performed so long and laborious a
march at so hot a season.
The utmost exertions were made for the grand enterprise against New
York. But as the execution of any plan that could be formed, depended
on events which were uncertain, the Commander-in-chief directed his
attention to other objects, to be pursued if that which was most
desirable should prove unattainable. Should the siege of New York
become unadviseable, his views were turned to Virginia, the Carolinas,
and Georgia.
[Sidenote: Intelligence from the Count de Grasse.]
Early in August, the apprehension that he should be unable to
accomplish his favourite object, began to influence his conduct.
Letters from the Marquis de Lafayette announced that a large portion
of the troops in Virginia were embarked, and that their destination
was believed to be New York. This intelligence induced him to turn his
attention more seriously to the south; but, to conceal from Sir Henry
Clinton this eventual change of plan, his arrangements were made
secretly, and the preparations for acting against New York were
continued. A reinforcement from Europe of near three thousand men,
induced Sir Henry Clinton to countermand the orders he had given to
Lord Cornwallis to detach a part of the army in Virginia to his aid;
and also to direct that nobleman to take a strong position on the
Chesapeake, from which he might execute the designs meditated against
the states lying on that bay, so soon as the storm which threatened
the British power for the moment, should blow over. In a few days
after the arrival of this reinforcement, the Count de Barras gave
General Washington the interesting information, that De Grasse was to
have sailed from Cape Francis for the Chesapeake, on the third of
August, with from twenty-five to twenty-nine ships of the line, having
on board three thousand two hundred soldiers; and that he had made
engagements with the officers commanding the land and naval forces of
Spain in the West Indies, to return to those seas by the middle of
October.
This intelligence manifested the necessity of determining immediately,
and positively, on the object against which the combined forces should
be directed. The shortness of the time appropriated by De Grasse for
his continuance on the American coast, the apparent unwillingness of
the naval officers to attempt to force a passage into the harbour of
New York, and the failure of the states to comply with the
requisitions which had been made on them for men, decided in favour of
operations to the south; and Lafayette was requested to make such a
disposition of his army as should be best calculated to prevent Lord
Cornwallis from saving himself by a sudden march to Charleston.[81]
[Footnote 81: In pursuance of these orders, Wayne was detached to the
south side of James River, under the pretext of reinforcing Greene,
but was ordered to maintain a position which would enable him to
intercept and oppose the march of Lord Cornwallis, should he attempt
to force his way to Charleston. Lafayette was on the alert to
co-operate with Wayne in the event of such a movement.--_Cor. with
Lafayette._]
Conformably to the intelligence communicated by the Count de Barras,
the Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake late in August with
twenty-eight ships of the line and several frigates. At Cape Henry he
found an officer despatched by Lafayette with full intelligence of the
situation of the armies in Virginia. Lord Cornwallis had collected his
whole force at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, which he was fortifying
assiduously; and the Marquis had taken a position on James River.
In consequence of this information, four ships of the line and several
frigates were detached to block up the mouth of York River, and convey
the land forces brought from the West Indies, under the command of the
Marquis de St. Simon, up the James to join Lafayette, who, on
receiving this reinforcement, took post at Williamsburg. In the mean
time, the fleet lay at anchor just within the capes. On the 25th of
August the Count de Barras[82] sailed from Newport for the Chesapeake.
[Footnote 82: This admiral was the senior of De Grasse, to whom the
command of the expedition had been entrusted, and was therefore
authorized by the minister of marine, to cruise on the coast of
Newfoundland while his ships should join the grand fleet. He preferred
serving under his junior officer.--_Cor. of Lafayette._]
Rodney was apprized of the destination of De Grasse, but seems not to
have suspected that the whole fleet would sail for the continent of
America. Supposing therefore that a part of his squadron would be
sufficient to maintain an equality of naval force in the American
seas, he detached Sir Samuel Hood to the continent with only fourteen
sail of the line. That officer arrived at Sandy Hook on the
twenty-eighth of August.
Admiral Greaves, who had succeeded Arbuthnot in the command of the
fleet on the American station, lay in the harbour of New York with
seven ships of the line, only five of which were fit for service. On
the day that Hood appeared and gave information that De Grasse was
probably on the coast, intelligence was also received that De Barras
had sailed from Newport.
The ships fit for sea were ordered out of the harbour; and Greaves,
with the whole fleet, consisting of nineteen sail of the line,
proceeded in quest of the French.
Not suspecting the strength of De Grasse, he hoped to fall in with one
or the other of their squadrons, and to fight it separately.
Early in the morning of the 5th of September, while the French fleet
lay at anchor just within the Chesapeake, the British squadron was
descried. Orders were immediately given by De Grasse to form the line,
and put to sea. About four in the afternoon, the action commenced
between the headmost ships, and continued until sunset. Several ships
were much damaged, but neither admiral could claim the victory. For
five successive days the hostile fleets continued within view of each
other. After which, De Grasse returned to his former station within
the capes. At his anchorage ground he found De Barras with the
squadron from Newport, and fourteen transports laden with heavy
artillery, and military stores proper for carrying on a siege. The
British admiral approaching the capes, found the entrance of the
Chesapeake defended by a force with which he was unable to contend,
and therefore bore away for New York.
[Sidenote: Plan of operations against Lord Cornwallis.]
[Sidenote: The combined armies march for the Chesapeake.]
General Washington had determined to entrust the defence of the Hudson
to General Heath, and to command the southern expedition in person.
All the French, and a detachment amounting to upwards of two thousand
men from the continental army, were destined for this service. On the
19th of August, Hazen's regiment and the Jersey line, were directed
to pass the Hudson at Dobbs' ferry, and take a position between
Springfield and Chatham, where they were to cover some bake-houses to
be constructed in the neighbourhood, for the purpose of veiling the
real designs of the American chief, and of exciting fears for Staten
Island. On the same day, the whole army was put in motion; and on the
twenty-fifth the passage of the river was completed.
[Sidenote: September 6.]
To conceal as long as possible the real object of this movement, the
march of the army was continued until the thirty-first, in such a
direction as to keep up fears for New York; and a considerable degree
of address was used to countenance the opinion that the real design
was against that place. The letters which had been intercepted by Sir
Henry Clinton favoured this deception; and so strong was the
impression they made that, even after it became necessary for the
combined army to leave the route leading down the Hudson, he is stated
to have retained his fears for New York, and not to have suspected the
real object of his adversary until he had approached the Delaware;[83]
and it had become too late to obstruct the progress of the allied army
towards Virginia. He then resolved to make every exertion in his power
to relieve Lord Cornwallis, and in the mean time to act offensively
in the north. An expedition was planned against New London, in
Connecticut, and a strong detachment, under the command of General
Arnold, was embarked on board a fleet of transports, which landed
early in the morning of the 6th of September on both sides the
harbour, about three miles from the town.
[Footnote 83: The first indication given by Sir Henry Clinton of
suspecting the southern expedition, is in his letter to Lord
Cornwallis of the 2nd of September, in which he says, "By intelligence
I have this day received, it would seem that Washington is moving
southward."]
New London is a seaport town on the west side of the Thames. A fort
called fort Trumbull, and a redoubt had been constructed just below
it, on the same side of the river; and opposite to it, on Groton hill,
was fort Griswold, a strong square fortification, but not fully
manned. General Arnold, who commanded in person the troops that landed
on the western side of the harbour, advanced immediately against the
posts on that side. These being untenable, were evacuated on his
approach; and he took possession of them with inconsiderable loss. To
prevent the escape of the vessels up the river, Lieutenant Colonel
Eyre, who commanded the division which landed on the Groton side of
the harbour, had been ordered to storm fort Griswold, which had been
represented to Arnold as too incomplete to make any serious
resistance. But the place being of some strength, and the approach to
it difficult, Colonel Ledyard, who commanded it with a garrison of one
hundred and sixty men, determined to defend it. On his refusing to
surrender, the British assaulted it on three sides, and overcoming the
difficulties opposed to them, made a lodgement on the ditch and
fraized work, and entered the embrasures with charged bayonets.
Further resistance being hopeless, the action ceased on the part of
the Americans, and Colonel Ledyard delivered his sword to the
commanding officer of the assailants. Irritated by the obstinacy of
the defence, and the loss sustained in the assault, the British
officer on whom the command had devolved, tarnished the glory of
victory by the inhuman use he made of it. Instead of respecting, with
the generous spirit of a soldier, the gallantry which he had subdued,
he indulged the vindictive feelings which had been roused by the
slaughter of his troops. In the account given of this affair by
Governor Trumbull to General Washington, he says, "The sword presented
by Colonel Ledyard was immediately plunged into his bosom, and the
carnage was kept up until the greater part of the garrison was killed
or wounded."
In this fierce assault, Colonel Eyre was killed, and Major Montgomery,
the second in command, also fell, as he entered the American works.
The total loss of the assailants was not much less than two hundred
men.
The town of New London, and the stores contained in it, were consumed
by fire. To escape the odium which invariably attends the wanton
destruction of private property, this fire was attributed to accident;
but all the American accounts unite in declaring it to have been
intentional.
[Sidenote: September 6.]
The march of General Washington was not arrested by this excursion
into New England. Having made the arrangements for the transportation
of his army down the Chesapeake, he proceeded in person to Virginia,
attended by the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Chatelleux;
and, on the 14th of September, reached Williamsburg[84] accompanied by
Rochambeau, Chatelleux, Knox, and Du Portail, he immediately repaired
to the fleet, and a plan of co-operation was adjusted on board the
Ville de Paris, conforming to his wish in every respect, except that
the Count de Grasse declined complying with a proposition to station
some of his ships in the river above Yorktown, thinking it too
hazardous.
[Footnote 84: While the American troops were encamped at Williamsburg
and the French fleet lay in the bay, the Count de Grasse,
circumscribed in point of time, and therefore, unwilling to await the
arrival of the army from the north, urged Lafayette to attack the
British in Yorktown; offering to aid him not only with all the marines
of the fleet, but with as many seamen as he should require. The
Marquis de St. Simon, an officer of great experience, united himself
with the admiral in pressing this measure. He stated that, the works
of Cornwallis being incomplete, Yorktown and Gloucester might, in all
probability, be carried by storm, if attacked by superior numbers. The
temptation was great for a young general scarcely twenty-four years of
age. A full excuse for the attempt was found in the declaration of De
Grasse, that he could not wait for the arrival of the troops from the
north. Success would have given unrivaled brilliancy to the reputation
of Lafayette, but would necessarily have cost much blood. Lafayette
refused to sacrifice the soldiers which were confided to him to his
personal glory, and persuaded De Grasse to await the arrival of
Washington and Rochambeau, when the capture of Cornwallis would be
certainly made without the waste of human life.--_Cor. with
Lafayette._]
While the close investment of the British army was delayed, only until
the troops from the north should arrive, serious apprehensions were
excited that the brilliant results confidently anticipated from the
superiority of the land and naval forces of the allies, would be put
in imminent hazard.
Information was received that a reinforcement of six ships of the line
under Admiral Digby had reached New York. Confident that the British
fleet, thus augmented, would attempt every thing for the relief of
Lord Cornwallis, De Grasse expected to be attacked by a force not much
inferior to his own. Thinking his station within the Chesapeake
unfavourable for a naval combat, he designed to change it, and
communicated to General Washington his intention to leave a few
frigates to block up the mouths of James and York Rivers, and to put
to sea with his fleet in quest of the British. If they should not have
left the harbour of New York, he purposed to block them up in that
place; supposing that his operations in that quarter would be of more
service to the common cause, than his remaining in the bay, an idle
spectator of the siege of York.
The Commander-in-chief was much alarmed at this communication. Should
the admiral put to sea, the winds and many accidents might prevent
his return to the Chesapeake. During his absence, a temporary naval
superiority might be acquired by the British in those waters, and the
army of Lord Cornwallis might be placed in perfect security. The
movement would expose to the caprice of fortune, an object of vast
importance, which was now reduced almost to certainty. The admiral was
therefore entreated to preserve his station.
Fortunately, the wishes of the general prevailed, and the admiral
consented to relinquish those plans of active enterprise which his
thirst for military glory had suggested, and to maintain a station
which the American general deemed so conducive to the interests of the
allies.
[Sidenote: September 25.]
On the 25th of September, the last division of the allied troops
arrived in James River, and were disembarked at the landing near
Williamsburg; soon after which, the preparations for the siege were
completed.
[Sidenote: Yorktown invested.]
York is a small village on the south side of the river which bears
that name, where the long peninsula between the York and the James, is
only eight miles wide. In this broad and bold river, a ship of the
line may ride in safety. Its southern banks are high, and, on the
opposite shore, is Gloucester Point, a piece of land projecting deep
into the river, and narrowing it, at that place, to the space of one
mile. Both these posts were occupied by Lord Cornwallis. The
communication between them was commanded by his batteries, and by some
ships of war which lay under his guns.
The main body of his army was encamped on the open grounds about
Yorktown, within a range of outer redoubts and field works, calculated
to command the peninsula, and impede the approach of the assailants;
and Lieutenant Colonel Dundass, with a small detachment consisting of
six or seven hundred men, held the post at Gloucester Point. He was
afterwards reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton.
The legion of Lauzun, and a brigade of militia under General Weedon,
the whole commanded by the French General de Choise, were directed to
watch the enemy on the side of Gloucester; and, on the twenty-eighth,
the grand combined army moved down on the south side of the river, by
different roads, towards Yorktown. About noon, the heads of the
columns reached the ground assigned them respectively; and, after
driving in the piquets and some cavalry, encamped for the evening. The
next day, the right wing, consisting of Americans, extended farther to
the right, and occupied the ground east of Beverdam creek; while the
left wing, consisting of French, was stationed on the west side of
that stream. In the course of the night, Lord Cornwallis withdrew from
his outer lines; and the works he had evacuated were, the next day,
occupied by the besieging army, which now invested the town completely
on that side.
Two thousand men were stationed on the Gloucester side for the purpose
of keeping up a rigorous blockade. On approaching the lines, a sharp
skirmish took place which terminated unfavourably for the British;
after which they remained under cover of their works, making no
attempt to interrupt the blockade.
[Sidenote: October 6.]
[Sidenote: October.]
On the night of the sixth of October, until which time the besieging
army was incessantly employed in disembarking their heavy artillery
and military stores, and drawing them to camp, the first parallel was
commenced within six hundred yards of the British lines. This
operation was conducted with so much silence, that it appears not to
have been perceived until the return of daylight disclosed it to the
garrison; by which time the trenches were in such forwardness as to
cover the men. By the evening of the ninth, several batteries and
redoubts were completed, and the effect of their fire was soon
perceived. New batteries were opened the next day, and the fire became
so heavy that the besieged withdrew their cannon from the embrasures,
and scarcely returned a shot. The shells and red hot balls from the
batteries of the allied army reached the ships in the harbour, and, in
the evening, set fire to the Charon of forty-four guns, and to three
large transports, which were entirely consumed. Reciprocal esteem, and
a spirit of emulation between the French and Americans, being
carefully cultivated by the Commander-in-chief, the siege was carried
on with great rapidity. The second parallel was opened, on the night
of the eleventh, within three hundred yards of the British lines. The
three succeeding days were devoted to the completion of this parallel,
during which the fire of the garrison, which had opened several new
embrasures, became more destructive than at any previous time. The men
in the trenches were particularly annoyed by two redoubts advanced
three hundred yards in front of the British works, which flanked the
second parallel of the besiegers. Preparations were made, on the
fourteenth, to carry them both by storm. The attack of one was
committed to the Americans, and of the other to the French. The
Marquis de Lafayette commanded the American detachment, and the Baron
de Viominel the French. Towards the close of the day, the two
detachments marched with equal firmness to the assault. Colonel
Hamilton, who had commanded a battalion of light infantry throughout
this campaign, led the advanced corps of the Americans; and Colonel
Laurens turned the redoubt at the head of eighty men, in order to take
the garrison in reverse, and intercept their retreat. The troops
rushed to the charge without firing a gun and without giving the
sappers time to remove the abattis and palisades. Passing over them,
they assaulted the works with irresistible impetuosity on all sides at
the same time, and entered them with such rapidity that their loss was
inconsiderable.[85] This redoubt was defended by Major Campbell, with
some inferior officers, and forty-five privates. The major, a captain,
a subaltern, and seventeen privates, were made prisoners, and eight
privates were killed while the assailants were entering the works.
[Footnote 85: One sergeant and eight privates were killed; and one
lieutenant colonel, four captains, one subaltern, one sergeant, and
twenty-five rank and file, were wounded.
The irritation produced by the recent carnage in fort Griswold had not
so far subdued the humanity of the American character as to induce
retaliation. Not a man was killed except in action. "Incapable," said
Colonel Hamilton in his report, "of imitating examples of barbarity,
and forgetting recent provocation, the soldiery spared every man that
ceased to resist." Mr. Gordon, in his History of the American War,
states the orders given by Lafayette, with the approbation of
Washington, to have directed that every man in the redoubt, after its
surrender, should be put to the sword. These sanguinary orders, so
repugnant to the character of the Commander-in-chief and of Lafayette,
were never given. There is no trace of them among the papers of
General Washington; and Colonel Hamilton, who took a part in the
enterprise, which assures his perfect knowledge of every material
occurrence, has publicly contradicted the statement. It has been also
contradicted by Lafayette.]