The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 (of 5)
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It had been supposed probable that England would abandon the farther
prosecution of the war on the continent of North America, in which
case the government would have a respectable force at its disposal,
the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attention
of the Commander-in-chief. He had contemplated an expedition against
the British posts in Upper Canada as a measure which might be
eventually eligible, and which might employ the arms of the United
States to advantage, if their troops might safely be withdrawn from
the sea board. He had, however, considered every object of this sort
as contingent. Having estimated the difficulties to be encountered in
such an enterprise, he had found them so considerable as to hesitate
on the extent which might safely be given to the expedition, admitting
the United States to be evacuated by the British armies.
In this state of mind, he received the magnificent plan already
prepared by congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability
of executing that part of it which was to be undertaken by the United
States, should the British armies continue in their country; and with
the serious mischief which would result to the common cause, as well
from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other
objects to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising, as from the
ill impression which would be made on the court and nation by the
total failure of the American government to execute its part of a plan
originating with itself; a failure which would, most probably,
sacrifice the troops and ships employed by France.
On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in the
different parts of the world, the former appeared to him to maintain a
decided superiority, and consequently to possess the power of shutting
up the ships of the latter which might be trusted into the St.
Lawrence. To suppose that the British government would not avail
itself of this superiority on such an occasion, would be to impute to
it a blind infatuation, or ignorance of the plans of its adversary,
which could not be safely assumed in calculations of such serious
import.
[Sidenote: General Washington urges reasons against the plan.]
A plan too, consisting of so many parts, to be prosecuted both from
Europe and America, by land and by water; which, to be successful,
required such a harmonious co-operation of the whole, such a perfect
coincidence of events, appeared to him to be exposed to too many
accidents, to risk upon it interests of such high value.
[Illustration: George Washington
_From the portrait by John Trumbull_
_Colonel Trumbull, whose portraits of Washington, Hamilton, Jay,
Adams, George Clinton and other Revolutionary contemporaries form a
notable gallery, was General Washington's aide-de-camp at the outbreak
of the War for Independence, and during its progress became a pupil of
Benjamin West, in London. The news of Andre's execution fastened upon
him the suspicion of being a spy, and he spent eight months in an
English prison. Returning to America he painted this and other
portraits of Washington, as well as a number of historical pictures,
including the "Resignation of Washington at Annapolis," which hangs in
the Capitol at Washington._]
In a long and serious letter to congress, he apologized for not
obeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon it
to the Marquis; and, entering into a full investigation of all its
parts, demonstrated the mischiefs, and the dangers, with which it was
replete. This letter was referred to a committee, whose report admits
the force of the reasons urged by the Commander-in-chief against the
expedition, and their own conviction that nothing important could be
attempted unless the British armies should be withdrawn from the
United States; and that, even in that event, the present plan was far
too complex.
Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favourite and
flattering projects on which they have long meditated; and the
committee, in their report, proceeded to state the opinion that the
posts held by the British in the United States would probably be
evacuated before the active part of the ensuing campaign; and that,
therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.
This report concludes with recommending "that the general should be
directed to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that subject; and
also to write to the minister of these states at the court of
Versailles very fully, to the end that eventual measures may be taken,
in case an armament should be sent from France to Quebec, for
co-operating therewith, to the utmost degree, which the finances and
resources of these states will admit."
This report also was approved by congress, and transmitted to the
Commander-in-chief; who felt himself greatly embarrassed by it. While
his objections to the project retained all their force, he found
himself required to open a correspondence for the purposes of
soliciting the concurrence of France in an expedition he disapproved,
and of promising a co-operation he believed to be impracticable. In
reply to this communication, he said, "The earnest desire I have
strictly to comply in every instance, with the views and instructions
of congress, can not but make me feel the greatest uneasiness, when I
find myself in circumstances of hesitation or doubt, with respect to
their directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice and
candour of that honourable body, emboldens me to communicate, without
reserve, the difficulties which occur in the execution of their
present order; and the indulgence I have experienced on every former
occasion, induces me to imagine that the liberty I now take will not
meet with disapprobation."
After reviewing the report of the committee, and stating his
objections to the plan, and the difficulties he felt in performing the
duty assigned to him, he added, "But if congress still think it
necessary for me to proceed in the business, I must request their more
definitive and explicit instructions, and that they will permit me,
previous to transmitting the intended despatches, to submit them to
their determination.
"I could wish to lay before congress more minutely the state of the
army, the condition of our supplies, and the requisites necessary for
carrying into execution an undertaking that may involve the most
serious events. If congress think this can be done more satisfactorily
in a personal conference, I hope to have the army in such a situation
before I can receive their answer, as to afford me an opportunity of
giving my attendance."
[Sidenote: Induces Congress to abandon it.]
Congress acceded to his request of a personal interview; and, on his
arrival in Philadelphia, a committee was appointed to confer with him,
as well on this particular subject as on the general state of the army
and of the country.
The result of these conferences was, that the expedition against
Canada was entirely, though reluctantly,[15] given up, and every
arrangement recommended by the Commander-in-chief, received the
attention to which his judgment and experience gave all his opinions
the fairest claim.
[Footnote 15: See note No. II. at the end of the volume.]
CHAPTER IV.
Divisions in Congress.... Letters of General Washington on
the state of public affairs.... Invasion of Georgia....
General Howe defeated by Colonel Campbell.... Savannah
taken.... Sunbury surrenders.... Georgia reduced.... General
Lincoln takes command of the Southern army.... Major
Gardiner defeated by General Moultrie.... Insurrection of
the Tories in South Carolina.... They are defeated by
Colonel Pickens.... Ash surprised and defeated.... Moultrie
retreats.... Prevost marches to Charleston.... Lincoln
attacks the British at Stono Ferry unsuccessfully....
Invasion of Virginia.
[Sidenote: 1779]
After the relinquishment of that extensive plan of conquest which
had been meditated against Canada, no other object seemed to call
forth the energies of the nation, and a general languor appeared to
diffuse itself through all the civil departments. The alliance with
France was believed to secure independence; and a confidence that
Britain could no longer prosecute the war with any hope of success--a
confidence encouraged by communications from Europe--prevented those
exertions which were practicable, but which it was painful to make.
This temper was seen and deplored by the Commander-in-chief, who
incessantly combated the opinion that Britain was about to relinquish
the contest, and insisted that great and vigorous exertions on the
part of the United States were still necessary to bring the war to a
successful termination.
It being no longer practicable to engage soldiers by voluntary
enlistment, and government not daring to force men into the service
for three years, or during the war, the vacant ranks were scantily
supplied with drafts for nine, twelve, and eighteen months. A great
proportion of the troops were discharged in the course of each year;
and, except that the old officers remained, almost a new army was to
be formed for every campaign.
Although the Commander-in-chief pressed congress and the state
governments continually and urgently, to take timely measures for
supplying the places of those who were leaving the service, the means
adopted were so slow and ineffectual in their operation, that the
season for action never found the preparations completed; and the
necessity of struggling against superior numbers was perpetual.
The pleasing delusion that the war was over, to which the public mind
delighted to surrender itself, made no impression on the judgment of
Washington. Viewing objects through a more correct medium, he
perceived that Great Britain had yet much to hope, and America much to
fear, from a continuance of hostilities. He feared that the impression
which the divisions, and apparent inertness of the United States had
made on the British commissioners, would be communicated to their
government; and this consideration increased his anxiety in favour of
early and vigorous preparations for the next campaign. Yet it was not
until the 23d of January that congress passed the resolution,
authorizing the Commander-in-chief to re-enlist the army, nor, until
the 9th of March, that the requisition was made on the several states
for their quotas. The bounty offered by the first resolution being
found insufficient, the government was again under the necessity of
resorting to the states. Thus, at a season when the men ought to have
been in camp, the measures for raising them were still to be adopted.
About this period, several circumstances conspired to foment those
pernicious divisions and factions in congress, which, in times of
greater apparent danger, patriotism would have suppressed.
[Sidenote: Divisions in congress.]
The ministers of the United States, in Europe, had reciprocally
criminated each other, and some of them had been recalled. Their
friends in congress supported their respective interests with
considerable animation; and, at length, Mr. Deane published a
manifesto, in which he arraigned at the bar of the public, the conduct
not only of those concerned in foreign negotiations, but of the
members of Congress themselves.
The irritation excited by these and other contests was not a little
increased by the appearance, in a New York paper, of an extract from
a letter written by Mr. Laurens, the president of congress, to
Governor Huiston, of Georgia, which, during the invasion of that
state, was found among his papers. In this letter, Mr. Laurens had
unbosomed himself with the unsuspecting confidence of a person
communicating to a friend the inmost operations of his mind. In a
gloomy moment, he had expressed himself with a degree of severity,
which even his own opinion, when not under the immediate influence of
chagrin, would not entirely justify, and had reflected on the
integrity and patriotism of members, without particularizing the
individuals he designed to censure.
These altercations added much to the alarm with which General
Washington viewed that security which had insinuated itself into the
public mind; and his endeavours were unremitting to impress the same
apprehensions on those who were supposed capable of removing the
delusion. In his confidential letters to gentlemen of the most
influence in the several states, he represented in strong terms the
dangers which yet threatened the country, and earnestly exhorted them
to a continuance of those sacrifices and exertions which he still
deemed essential to the happy termination of the war. The dissensions
in congress; the removal of individuals of the highest influence and
character from the councils of the nation to offices in the respective
states; the depreciation of the currency; the destructive spirit of
speculation which the imaginary gain produced by this depreciation had
diffused throughout the Union; a general laxity of principles; and an
unwillingness to encounter personal inconvenience for the attainment
of the great object, in pursuit of which so much blood and treasure
had been expended; were the rocks on which, he apprehended, the state
vessel might yet split, and to which he endeavoured, incessantly, to
point the attention of those whose weight of political character
enable them to guide the helm.
[Sidenote: Letters from General Washington on the state of public
affairs.]
"I am particularly desirous of a free communication of sentiments with
you at this time," says the General in a letter written to a gentleman
of splendid political talents, "because I view things very
differently, I fear, from what people in general do, who seem to think
the contest at an end, and that to make money, and get places, are the
only things now remaining to be done. I have seen without despondency,
even for a moment, the hours which America has styled her gloomy ones;
but I have beheld no day since the commencement of hostilities, when I
have thought her liberties in such imminent danger as at present.
Friends and foes seem now to combine to pull down the goodly fabric we
have hitherto been raising at the expense of so much time, blood, and
treasure."
After censuring with some freedom the prevailing opinions of the day,
he added, "To me it appears no unjust simile to compare the affairs
of this great continent to the mechanism of a clock, each state
representing some one or other of the smaller parts of it, which they
are endeavouring to put in fine order, without considering how useless
and unavailing their labour is, unless the great wheel, or spring,
which is to set the whole in motion, is also well attended to, and
kept in good order. I allude to no particular state, nor do I mean to
cast reflections upon any one of them, nor ought I, it may be said, to
do so on their representatives; but, as it is a fact too notorious to
be concealed, that congress is rent by party; that much business of a
trifling nature and personal concernment, withdraws their attention
from matters of great national moment at this critical period; when it
is also known that idleness and dissipation take place of close
attention and application, no man who wishes well to the liberties of
this country, and desires to see its rights established, can avoid
crying out--where are our men of abilities? Why do they not come forth
to save their country? Let this voice, my dear sir, call upon you,
Jefferson, and others. Do not, from a mistaken opinion that we are to
sit down under our vine and our own fig-tree, let our hitherto noble
struggle end in ignominy. Believe me when I tell you there is danger
of it. I have pretty good reasons for thinking that administration, a
little while ago, had resolved to give the matter up, and negotiate a
peace with us upon almost any terms; but I shall be much mistaken if
they do not now, from the present state of our currency, dissensions,
and other circumstances, push matters to the utmost extremity. Nothing
I am sure will prevent it but the intervention of Spain, and their
disappointed hope from Russia."
The circumstances in the situation and temper of America, which made
so deep an impression on the Commander-in-chief, operated with equal
force on the British commissioners, and induced them to think that, by
continuing the war, more favourable terms than were now demanded might
be obtained. They seem to have taken up the opinion that the mass of
the people, fatigued and worn out by the complicated calamities of the
struggle, sincerely desired an accommodation on the terms proposed by
Great Britain; and that the increasing difficulties resulting from the
failure of public credit, would induce them to desert congress, or
compel that body to accede to those terms. These opinions, when
communicated to the government, most probably contributed to protract
the war.
The narrative of military transactions will now be resumed.
The British arms had heretofore been chiefly directed against the
northern and middle states. The strongest parts of the American
continent were pressed by their whole force; and, with the exception
of the attempt on Sullivan's island in 1776, no serious design had
yet been manifested to make an impression in the south. Entertaining
the most confident hopes of recovering all the colonies, the British
government had not prosecuted the war with a view to partial conquest.
But the loss of the army commanded by Burgoyne, the alliance of
America with France, and the unexpected obstinacy with which the
contest was maintained, had diminished their confidence; and, when the
pacific propositions made in 1778 were rejected, the resolution seems
to have been taken to change, materially, the object of their military
operations; and, maintaining possession of the islands of New York, to
direct their arms against the southern states, on which, it was
believed, a considerable impression might be made.
It was not unreasonable to suppose that the influence of this
impression might extend northward; but, however this might be, the
actual conquest and possession of several states would, when
negotiations for a general peace should take place, give a complexion
to those negotiations, and afford plausible ground for insisting to
retain territory already acquired. The most active and interesting
operations therefore of the succeeding campaigns, were in the southern
states.
Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who sailed from the Hook about the last
of November, 1778, escorted by a small squadron commanded by
Commodore Hyde Parker, reached the isle of Tybee, near the Savannah,
on the 23d of December; and, in a few days, the fleet and the
transports passed the bar, and anchored in the river.
The command of the southern army, composed of the troops of South
Carolina and Georgia, had been committed to Major General Robert Howe,
who, in the course of the preceding summer, had invaded East
Florida.[16] The diseases incident to the climate made such ravages
among his raw soldiers, that, though he had scarcely seen an enemy, he
found himself compelled to hasten out of the country with considerable
loss. After this disastrous enterprise, his army, consisting of
between six and seven hundred continental troops, aided by a few
hundred militia, had encamped in the neighbourhood of the town of
Savannah, situated on the southern bank of the river bearing that
name. The country about the mouth of the river is one tract of deep
marsh, intersected by creeks and cuts of water, impassable for troops
at any time of the tide, except over causeways extending through the
sunken ground.
[Footnote 16: So early as January, 1776, congress had recommended the
reduction of St. Augustine to the southern colonies.--_Secret Journals
of Congress, page 38._]
[Sidenote: Invasion of Georgia.]
Without much opposition, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell effected a
landing on the 29th, about three miles below the town; upon which Howe
formed his line of battle. His left was secured by the river; and
along the whole extent of his front was a morass which stretched to
his right, and was believed by him to be impassable for such a
distance, as effectually to secure that wing.
After reconnoitring the country, Colonel Campbell advanced on the
great road leading to Savannah; and, about three in the afternoon,
appeared in sight of the American army. While making dispositions to
dislodge it, he accidentally fell in with a negro, who informed him of
a private path leading through the swamp, round the right of the
American lines to their rear. Determining to avail himself of this
path, he detached a column under Sir James Baird, which entered the
morass unperceived by Howe.
[Sidenote: General Howe defeated by the British under Colonel
Campbell, who takes possession of Savannah.]
As soon as Sir James emerged from the swamp, he attacked and dispersed
a body of Georgia militia, which gave the first notice to the American
general of the danger which threatened his rear. At the same instant,
the British troops in his front were put in motion, and their
artillery began to play upon him. A retreat was immediately ordered;
and the continental troops were under the necessity of running across
a plain, in front of the corps which had been led into their rear by
Sir James Baird, who attacked their flanks with great impetuosity, and
considerable effect. The few who escaped, retreated up the Savannah;
and, crossing that river at Zubly's ferry, took refuge in South
Carolina.
The victory was complete, and decisive in its consequences. About one
hundred Americans were either killed in the field, or drowned in
attempting to escape through a deep swamp. Thirty-eight officers, and
four hundred and fifteen privates, were taken. Forty-eight pieces of
cannon, twenty-three mortars, the fort with all its military-stores, a
large quantity of provisions collected for the use of the army, and
the capital of Georgia, fell into the hands of the conqueror. These
advantages were obtained at the expense of only seven killed, and
nineteen wounded.
No military force now remained in Georgia, except the garrison of
Sunbury, whose retreat to South Carolina was cut off. All the lower
part of that state was occupied by the British, who adopted measures
to secure the conquest they had made. The inhabitants were treated
with a lenity as wise as it was humane. Their property was spared, and
their persons protected. To make the best use of victory, and of the
impression produced by the moderation of the victors, a proclamation
was issued, inviting the inhabitants to repair to the British
standard, and offering protection to those who would return to their
allegiance.
The effect of these measures did not disappoint those who adopted
them. The inhabitants flocked in great numbers to the royal standard;
military corps for the protection of the country were formed; and
posts were established for a considerable distance up the river.
[Sidenote: Sunbury surrenders to General Prevost.]
The northern frontier of Georgia being supposed to be settled into a
state of quiet, Colonel Campbell turned his attention towards Sunbury,
and was about to proceed against that place, when he received
intelligence that it had surrendered to General Prevost.
[Sidenote: The State of Georgia reduced.]
Sir Henry Clinton had ordered that officer to co-operate from East
Florida, with Colonel Campbell. On hearing that the troops from the
north were off the coast, he entered the southern frontier of Georgia,
and invested Sunbury, which, after a slight resistance, surrendered at
discretion. Having placed a garrison in the fort, he proceeded to
Savannah, took command of the army, and detached Colonel Campbell with
eight hundred regulars and a few provincials to Augusta, which fell
without resistance, and thus the whole state of Georgia was reduced.
While the expedition conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell was
preparing at New York, congress was meditating the conquest of East
Florida.
[Sidenote: General Lincoln takes the command of the southern army.]
The delegates of South Carolina and Georgia, anxious that a general of
more experience than Howe should command in the southern department,
had earnestly pressed that he should be recalled, and that General
Lincoln, whose military reputation was high, should be appointed to
succeed him. In compliance with their solicitations, Howe was ordered
in September, 1778, to repair to the head quarters of General
Washington, and Lincoln was directed to proceed immediately to
Charleston, in South Carolina, in order to take command in the
southern department. In pursuance of this resolution, General Lincoln
repaired to Charleston, where he found the military affairs of the
country in a state of utter derangement. Congress had established no
continental military chest in the southern department. This omission
produced a dependence on the government of the state for supplies to
move the army on any emergency, and consequent subjection of the
troops in continental service to its control. The militia, though
taken into continental service, considered themselves as subject only
to the military code of the state. These regulations threatened to
embarrass all military operations, and to embroil the general with the
civil government.