The Life of George Washington, Vol. 4 (of 5)

J >> John Marshall >> The Life of George Washington, Vol. 4 (of 5)

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30

The next day, at one in the afternoon, was named for the interview.
The Count commenced the conversation with declarations of his personal
regard for America, the manifestations of which, he said, had been
early and uniform. His nation too was well disposed to be upon terms
of amity with the United States: but at his public reception, there
were occurrences which he thought indicative of coolness in the
secretary of foreign affairs, who had, he feared, while in Europe,
imbibed prejudices not only against Spain, but against France also. If
this conjecture should be right, the present head of that department
could not be an agreeable organ of intercourse with the President. He
then took a view of the modern usages of European courts, which, he
said, favoured the practice he recommended of permitting foreign
ministers to make their communications directly to the chief of the
executive. "He then presented a letter," says the President in his
private journal, "which he termed confidential, and to be considered
as addressed to me in my private character, which was too strongly
marked with an intention, as well as a wish, to have no person between
the Minister and President, in the transaction of business between the
two nations."

In reply to these observations, the President gave the most explicit
assurances that, judging from his own feelings, and from the public
sentiment, there existed in America a reciprocal disposition to be on
the best terms with France. That whatever former difficulties might
have occurred, he was persuaded the secretary of foreign affairs had
offered no intentional disrespect, either to the minister, or to his
nation. Without undertaking to know the private opinions of Mr. Jay,
he would declare that he had never heard that officer express,
directly or indirectly, any sentiment unfavourable to either.

Reason and usage, he added, must direct the mode of treating national
and official business. If rules had been established, they must be
conformed to. If they were yet to be framed, it was hoped that they
would be convenient and proper. So far as ease could be made to
comport with regularity, and with necessary forms, it ought to be
consulted; but custom, and the dignity of office, were not to be
disregarded. The conversation continued upwards of an hour, but no
change was made in the resolution of the President.

The subjects which pressed for immediate attention on the first
legislature assembled under the new government, were numerous and
important. Much was to be created, and much to be reformed.

The subject of revenue, as constituting the vital spring without which
the action of government could not long be continued, was taken up in
the house of representatives, as soon as it could be introduced. The
qualification of the members was succeeded by a motion for the house
to resolve itself into a committee of the whole on the state of the
union; and in that committee, a resolution was moved by Mr. Madison,
declaring the opinion that certain duties ought to be levied on goods,
wares, and merchandise, imported into the United States; and on the
tonnage of vessels.

As it was deemed important to complete a temporary system in time to
embrace the spring importations, Mr. Madison presented the scheme of
impost which had been recommended by the former congress, and had
already received the approbation of a majority of the states; to which
he added a general proposition for a duty on tonnage. By this scheme
specific duties were imposed on certain enumerated articles; and an
ad-valorem duty on those not enumerated. Mr. Fitzsimmons, of
Pennsylvania, moved an amendment, enlarging the catalogue of
enumerated articles.

[Sidenote: Debates on the impost and tonnage bills.]

Mr. Madison having consented to subjoin the amendment proposed by Mr.
Fitzsimmons to the original resolution, it was received by the
committee; but in proceeding to fill up the blanks with the sum
taxable on each article, it was soon perceived that gentlemen had
viewed the subject in very different lights. The tax on many articles
was believed to press more heavily on some states than on others; and
apprehensions were expressed that, in the form of protecting duties,
the industry of one part of the union would be encouraged by premiums
charged on the labour of another part. On the discrimination between
the duty on the tonnage of foreign and American bottoms, a great
degree of sensibility was discovered. The citizens of the United
States not owning a sufficient number of vessels to export all the
produce of the country, it was said that the increased tonnage on
foreign bottoms operated as a tax on agriculture, and a premium to
navigation. This discrimination, it was therefore contended, ought to
be very small.

In answer to these arguments, Mr. Madison said, "If it is expedient
for America to have vessels employed in commerce at all, it will be
proper that she have enough to answer all the purposes intended; to
form a school for seamen; to lay the foundation of a navy: and to be
able to support itself against the interference of foreigners. I do
not think there is much weight in the observations that the duty we
are about to lay in favour of American vessels is a burden on the
community, and particularly oppressive to some parts. But if there
were, it may be a burden of that kind which will ultimately save us
from one that is greater.

"I consider an acquisition of maritime strength essential to this
country; should we ever be so unfortunate as to be engaged in war,
what but this can defend our towns and cities upon the sea coast? Or
what but this can enable us to repel an invading enemy? Those parts
which are said to bear an undue proportion of the burden of the
additional duty on foreign shipping, are those which will be most
exposed to the operations of a predatory war, and will require the
greatest exertions of the union in their defence. If therefore some
little sacrifice be made by them to obtain this important object, they
will be peculiarly rewarded for it in the hour of danger. Granting a
preference to our own navigation will insensibly bring it forward to
that perfection so essential to American safety; and though it may
produce some little inequality at first, it will soon ascertain its
level, and become uniform throughout the union."

But no part of the system was discussed with more animation than that
which proposed to make discriminations in favour of those nations with
whom the United States had formed commercial treaties. In the debate
on this subject, opinions and feelings with respect to foreign powers
were disclosed, which, strengthening with circumstances, afterwards
agitated the whole American continent.

While the resolutions on which the bills were to be framed were under
debate, Mr. Benson rose to inquire on what principle the proposed
discriminations between foreign nations was founded? "It was certainly
proper," he said, "to comply with existing treaties. But those
treaties stipulated no such preference. Congress then was at liberty
to consult the interests of the United States. If those interests
would be promoted by the measure, he should be willing to adopt it,
but he wished its policy to be shown."

The resolutions, as reported, were supported by Mr. Madison, Mr.
Baldwin, Mr. Fitzsimmons, Mr. Clymer, Mr. Page, and Mr. Jackson.

They relied much upon the public sentiment which had, they said, been
unequivocally expressed through the several state legislatures and
otherwise, against placing foreign nations generally, on a footing
with the allies of the United States. So strong was this sentiment,
that to its operation the existing constitution was principally to be
ascribed. They thought it important to prove to those nations who had
declined forming commercial treaties with them, that the United States
possessed and would exercise the power of retaliating any regulations
unfavourable to their trade, and they insisted strongly on the
advantages of America in a war of commercial regulation, should this
measure produce one.

The disposition France had lately shown to relax with regard to the
United States, the rigid policy by which her counsels had generally
been guided, ought to be cultivated. The evidence of this disposition
was an edict by which American built ships purchased by French
subjects became naturalized. There was reason to believe that the
person charged with the affairs of the United States at that court,
had made some favourable impressions, which the conduct of the
American government ought not to efface.

With great earnestness it was urged, that from artificial or
adventitious causes, the commerce between the United States and Great
Britain had exceeded its natural boundary. It was wise to give such
political advantages to other nations as would enable them to acquire
their due share of the direct trade. It was also wise to impart some
benefits to nations that had formed commercial treaties with the
United States, and thereby to impress on those powers which had
hitherto neglected to form such treaties, the idea that some
advantages were to be gained by a reciprocity of friendship.

That France had claims on the gratitude of the American people which
ought not to be overlooked, was an additional argument in favour of
the principle for which they contended.

The discrimination was opposed by Mr. Benson, Mr. Lawrence, Mr.
Wadsworth, and Mr. Sherman.

They did not admit that the public sentiment had been unequivocally
expressed; nor did they admit that such benefits had flowed from
commercial treaties as to justify a sacrifice of interest to obtain
them. There was a commercial treaty with France; but neither that
treaty, nor the favours shown to that nation, had produced any
correspondent advantages. The license to sell ships could not be of
this description, since it was well known that the merchants of the
United States did not own vessels enough for the transportation of the
produce of the country, and only two, as was believed, had been sold
since the license had been granted. The trade with Great Britain,
viewed in all its parts, was upon a footing as beneficial to the
United States as that with France.

That the latter power had claims upon the gratitude of America was
admitted, but that these claims would justify premiums for the
encouragement of French commerce and navigation, to be drawn from the
pockets of the American people, was not conceded. The state of the
revenue, it was said, would not admit of these experiments.

The observation founded on the extensiveness of the trade between the
United States and Great Britain was answered by saying, that this was
not a subject proper for legislative interposition. It was one of
which the merchants were the best judges. They would consult their
interest as individuals; and this was a case in which the interest of
the nation and of individuals was the same.

At length, the bills passed the house of representatives, and were
carried to the senate, where they were amended by expunging the
discrimination made in favour of the tonnage and distilled spirits of
those nations which had formed commercial treaties with the United
States.

These amendments were disagreed to; and each house insisting on its
opinion, a conference took place, after which the point was
reluctantly yielded by the house of representatives. The proceedings
of the senate being at that time conducted with closed doors, the
course of reasoning on which this important principle was rejected can
not be stated.

This debate on the impost and tonnage bills was succeeded by one on a
subject which was believed to involve principles of still greater
interest.

[Sidenote: On the President's power of removal from office.]

In organizing the departments of the executive, the question in what
manner the high officers who filled them should be removeable, came on
to be discussed. Believing that the decision of this question would
materially influence the character of the new government, the members
supported their respective opinions with a degree of earnestness
proportioned to the importance they attributed to the measure. In a
committee of the whole house on the bill "to establish an executive
department to be denominated the[42] department of foreign affairs,"
Mr. White moved to strike out the clause which declared the secretary
to be removeable by the President. The power of removal, where no
express provision existed, was, he said, in the nature of things,
incidental to that of appointment. And as the senate was, by the
constitution, associated with the President in making appointments,
that body must, in the same degree, participate in the power of
removing from office.

[Footnote 42: This has since been denominated the department
of state.]

Mr. White was supported by Mr. Smith of South Carolina, Mr. Page, Mr.
Stone, and Mr. Jackson.

Those gentlemen contended that the clause was either unnecessary or
improper. If the constitution gave the power to the President, a
repetition of the grant in an act of congress was nugatory: if the
constitution did not give it, the attempt to confer it by law was
improper. If it belonged conjointly to the President and senate, the
house of representatives should not attempt to abridge the
constitutional prerogative of the other branch of the legislature.
However this might be, they were clearly of opinion that it was not
placed in the President alone. In the power over all the executive
officers which the bill proposed to confer upon the President, the
most alarming dangers to liberty were perceived. It was in the nature
of monarchical prerogative, and would convert them into the mere tools
and creatures of his will. A dependence so servile on one individual,
would deter men of high and honourable minds from engaging in the
public service; and if, contrary to expectation, such men should be
brought into office, they would be reduced to the necessity of
sacrificing every principle of independence to the will of the chief
magistrate, or of exposing themselves to the disgrace of being removed
from office, and that too at a time when it might be no longer in
their power to engage in other pursuits.

Gentlemen they feared were too much dazzled with the splendour of the
virtues which adorned the actual President, to be able to look into
futurity. But the framers of the constitution had not confined their
views to the person who would most probably first fill the
presidential chair. The house of representatives ought to follow their
example, and to contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious
man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes; who might from caprice
remove the most worthy men from office.

[Illustration: View of the Old City or Federal Hall, New York, in 1789

_On the balcony of this building, the site of which is now occupied by
the United States Sub-Treasury, at the corner of Broad and Wall
Streets, George Washington took the oath of office as First President
of the United States, April 30, 1789. In the near distance, at the
intersection of Wall and Broadway, may be seen the original Trinity
Church structure which was completed in 1697. It was replaced by the
present edifice in 1846. President Washington, who was an
Episcopalian, did not attend Trinity, but maintained a pew in St.
Paul's Chapel, Broadway and Vesey Street, which remains as it was when
he worshipped there._]

By the friends of the original bill, the amendment was opposed with
arguments of great force drawn from the constitution and from general
convenience. On several parts of the constitution, and especially on
that which vests the executive power in the President, they relied
confidently to support the position, that, in conformity with that
instrument, the power in question could reside only with the chief
magistrate: no power, it was said, could be more completely executive
in its nature than that of removal from office.

But if it was a case on which the constitution was silent, the
clearest principles of political expediency required that neither
branch of the legislature should participate in it.

The danger that a President could ever be found who would remove good
men from office, was treated as imaginary. It was not by the splendour
attached to the character of the present chief magistrate alone that
this opinion was to be defended. It was founded on the structure of
the office. The man in whose favour a majority of the people of this
continent would unite, had probability at least in favour of his
principles; in addition to which, the public odium that would
inevitably attach to such conduct, would be an effectual security
against it.

After an ardent discussion which consumed several days, the committee
divided: and the amendment was negatived by a majority of thirty-four
to twenty. The opinion thus expressed by the house of representatives
did not explicitly convey their sense of the constitution. Indeed the
express grant of the power to the President, rather implied a right in
the legislature to give or withhold it at their discretion. To obviate
any misunderstanding of the principle on which the question had been
'decided, Mr. Benson moved in the house, when the report of the
committee of the whole was taken up, to amend the second clause in the
bill so as clearly to imply the power of removal to be solely in the
President. He gave notice that if he should succeed in this, he would
move to strike out the words which had been the subject of debate. If
those words continued, he said the power of removal by the President
might hereafter appear to be exercised by virtue of a legislative
grant only, and consequently be subjected to legislative instability;
when he was well satisfied in his own mind, that it was by fair
construction, fixed in the constitution. The motion was seconded by
Mr. Madison, and both amendments were adopted. As the bill passed into
a law, it has ever been considered as a full expression of the sense
of the legislature on this important part of the American
constitution.

[Sidenote: On the policy of the secretary of the treasury reporting
plans for the management of the revenue.]

The bill to establish the treasury department, contained a clause
making it the duty of the secretary "to digest and report plans for
the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the support of
public credit."

Mr. Page moved to strike out these words, observing, that to permit
the secretary to go further than to prepare estimates would be a
dangerous innovation on the constitutional privilege of that house. It
would create an undue influence within those walls, because members
might be led by the deference commonly paid to men of abilities, who
gave an opinion in a case they have thoroughly considered, to support
the plan of the minister even against their own judgment. Nor would
the mischief stop there. A precedent would be established which might
be extended until ministers of the government should be admitted on
that floor, to explain and support the plans they had digested and
reported, thereby laying a foundation for an aristocracy, or a
detestable monarchy.

Mr. Tucker seconded the motion of Mr. Page, and observed, that the
authority contained in the bill to prepare and report plans would
create an interference of the executive with the legislative powers,
and would abridge the particular privilege of that house to originate
all bills for raising a revenue. How could the business originate in
that house, if it was reported to them by the minister of finance? All
the information that could be required might be called for without
adopting a clause that might undermine the authority of the house, and
the security of the people. The constitution has pointed out the
proper method of communication between the executive and legislative
departments. It is made the duty of the President to give from time to
time information to congress of the state of the union, and to
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient. If revenue plans are to be prepared and
reported to congress, he is the proper person to perform this service.
He is responsible to the people for what he recommends, and will be
more cautious than any other person to whom a less degree of
responsibility was attached.

He hoped the house was not already weary of executing and sustaining
the powers vested in them by the constitution; and yet the adoption of
this clause would argue that they thought themselves less adequate
than an individual, to determine what burdens their constituents were
able to bear. This was not answering the high expectation that had
been formed of their exertions for the general good, or of their
vigilance in guarding their own and the people's rights.

The arguments of Mr. Page and Mr. Tucker were enforced and enlarged by
Mr. Livermore and Mr. Gerry. The latter gentleman said, "that he had
no objection to obtaining information, but he could not help observing
the great degree of importance gentlemen were giving to this and the
other executive officers. If the doctrine of having prime and great
ministers of state was once well established, he did not doubt but he
should soon see them distinguished by a green or red ribbon, insignia
of court favour and patronage."

It was contended that the plans of the secretary, being digested,
would be received entire. Members would be informed that each part was
necessary to the whole, and that nothing could be touched without
injuring the system. Establish this doctrine, and congress would
become a useless burden.

The amendment was opposed by Mr. Benson, Mr. Goodhue, Mr. Ames, Mr.
Sedgewick, Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Madison, Mr. Stone, Mr.
Sherman, and Mr. Baldwin. It was insisted that to prepare and report
plans for the improvement of the revenue, and support of public
credit, constituted the most important service which could be rendered
by the officer who should be placed at the head of the department of
finance. When the circumstances under which the members of that house
were assembled, and the various objects for which they were convened
were considered, it was no imputation upon them to suppose that they
might receive useful information from a person whose peculiar duty it
was to direct his attention to systems of finance, and who would be in
some measure selected on account of his fitness for that object. It
was denied that the privileges of the house would be infringed by the
measure. The plans of the secretary could not be termed bills, nor
would they even be reported in that form. They would only constitute
information which would be valuable, and which could not be received
in a more eligible mode. "Certainly," said Mr. Goodhue, "we carry our
dignity to the extreme, when we refuse to receive information from any
but ourselves."

"If we consider the present situation of our finances," said Mr. Ames,
"owing to a variety of causes, we shall no doubt perceive a great
though unavoidable confusion throughout the whole scene. It presents
to the imagination a deep, dark, and dreary chaos, impossible to be
reduced to order, unless the mind of the architect be clear and
capacious, and his power commensurate to the object. He must not be
the flitting creature of the day; he must have time given him
competent to the successful exercise of his authority. It is with the
intention of letting a little sunshine into the business, that the
present arrangement is proposed."

It was not admitted that the plans of the secretary would possess an
influence to which their intrinsic value would not give them a just
claim. There would always be sufficient intelligence in that house to
detect, and independence to expose any oppressive or injurious scheme
which might be prepared for them. Nor would a plan openly and
officially reported possess more influence on the mind of any member,
than if given privately at the secretary's office.

Mr. Madison said, the words of the bill were precisely those used by
the former congress on two occasions. The same power had been annexed
to the office of superintendent of the finances; and he had never
heard that any inconvenience had been experienced from the regulation.
Perhaps if the power had been more fully and more frequently
exercised, it might have contributed more to the public good. "There
is," continued this gentleman, "a small probability, though it is but
small, that an officer may derive weight from this circumstance, and
have some degree of influence upon the deliberations of the
legislature. But compare the danger likely to result from this cause,
with the danger and inconvenience of not having well formed and
digested plans, and we shall find infinitely more to apprehend from
the latter. Inconsistent, unproductive, and expensive schemes, will
produce greater injury to our constituents, than is to be apprehended
from any undue influence which the well digested plans of a well
informed officer can have. From a bad administration of the
government, more detriment will arise than from any other source. Want
of information has occasioned much inconvenience, and many unnecessary
burdens in some of the state governments. Let it be our care to avoid
those rocks and shoals in our political voyage which have injured, and
nearly proved fatal to many of our contemporary navigators."

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30