The Life of George Washington, Vol. 4 (of 5)
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Under circumstances thus arduous, raw troops may be expected to
exhibit that inequality which is found in human nature. While some of
the American soldiers performed their duty with the utmost resolution,
others seemed dismayed and terrified. Of this conduct the officers
were, as usual, the victims. With a fearlessness which the occasion
required, they exposed themselves to the most imminent dangers; and,
in their efforts to change the face of affairs, fell in great numbers.
For several days, the Commander-in-chief had been afflicted with a
severe disease, under which he still laboured, and which must have
greatly affected him; but, though unable to display that activity
which would have been useful in this severe conflict, neither the
feebleness of his body, nor the peril of his situation, could prevent
his delivering his orders with judgment and with self possession.[57]
[Footnote 57: The following extract from the official letter
of the Commander-in-chief is inserted, as showing both his
own situation and his opinion of the behaviour of his
troops. "I have nothing, sir, to lay to the charge of the
troops but their want of discipline, which, from the short
time they had been in service, it was impossible they should
have acquired; and which rendered it very difficult when
they were thrown into confusion, to reduce them again to
order; and is one reason why the loss has fallen so heavily
upon the officers who did every thing in their power to
effect it. Neither were my own exertions wanting; but worn
down with illness, and suffering under a painful disease,
unable either to mount, or dismount a horse without
assistance, they were not so great as they otherwise would,
or perhaps ought to have been."]
It was soon perceived that the American fire could produce, on a
concealed enemy, no considerable effect; and that the only hope of
victory was placed in the bayonet. At the head of the second regiment,
which formed the left of the left wing, Lieutenant Colonel Darke made
an impetuous charge upon the enemy, forced them from their ground with
some loss, and drove them about four hundred yards. He was followed by
that whole wing; but the want of a sufficient number of riflemen to
press this advantage, deprived him of the benefit which ought to have
been derived from this effort; and, as soon as he gave over the
pursuit, the Indians renewed their attack. In the mean time General
Butler was mortally wounded, the left of the right wing was broken,
the artillerists almost to a man killed, the guns seized, and the camp
penetrated by the enemy. With his own regiment, and with the
battalions commanded by Majors Butler[58] and Clarke, Darke was
ordered again to charge with the bayonet. These orders were executed
with intrepidity and momentary success. The Indians were driven out of
the camp, and the artillery recovered. But while they were pressed in
one point by the bravest of the American troops, their fire was kept
up from every other with fatal effect. Several times particular corps
charged them, always with partial success, but no universal effort
could be made, and in every charge a great loss of officers was
sustained, the consequences of which were severely felt. Instead of
keeping their ranks, and executing the orders which were given, a
great proportion of the soldiers flocked together in crowds, and were
shot down without resistance. To save the remnant of his army was all
that remained to be done; and, about half past nine in the morning,
General St. Clair ordered Lieutenant Colonel Darke with the second
regiment, to charge a body of Indians who had intercepted their
retreat, and to gain the road. Major Clarke with his battalion was
directed to cover the rear. These orders were executed, and a
disorderly flight commenced. The pursuit was kept up about four miles,
when, fortunately for the surviving Americans, that avidity for
plunder which is a ruling passion among savages, called back the
victorious Indians to the ramp, where the spoils of their vanquished
foes were to be divided. The routed troops continued their flight to
fort Jefferson, a distance of about thirty miles, throwing away their
arms on the road. At this place they met Major Hamtranck with the
first regiment; and a council of war was called to deliberate on the
course to be pursued. As this regiment was far from restoring the
strength of the morning, it was determined not to attempt to retrieve
the fortune of the day: and, leaving the wounded at fort Jefferson,
the army continued its retreat to fort Washington.
[Footnote 58: Although his leg had been broken by a ball,
Major Butler, mounted on horseback, led his battalion to the
charge.]
In this disastrous battle, the loss on the part of the Americans was
very great when compared with the numbers engaged. Thirty-eight
commissioned officers were killed upon the field, and five hundred and
ninety-three non-commissioned officers and privates were slain and
missing. Twenty-one commissioned officers, several of whom afterwards
died of their wounds, and two hundred and forty-two non-commissioned
officers and privates were wounded. Among the dead was the brave and
much lamented General Butler. This gallant officer had served through
the war of the revolution; and had, on more than one occasion,
distinguished himself in a remarkable manner. In the list of those who
shared his fate, were the names of many other excellent officers who
had participated in all the toils, the dangers, and the glory, of that
long conflict which terminated in the independence of their country.
At the head of the list of wounded were Lieutenant Colonels Gibson and
Darke, Major Butler, and Adjutant General Sargent, all of whom were
veteran officers of great merit, who displayed their accustomed
bravery on this unfortunate day. General St. Clair, in his official
letter, observed: "the loss the public has sustained by the fall of so
many officers, particularly of General Butler and Major Ferguson, can
not be too much regretted; but it is a circumstance that will
alleviate the misfortune in some measure, that all of them fell most
gallantly doing their duty."
From the weight of the fire, and the circumstance of his being
attacked nearly at the same time in front and rear, General St. Clair
was of opinion that he was overpowered by numbers. The intelligence
afterwards collected would make the Indian force to consist of from
one thousand to fifteen hundred warriors. Of their loss, no estimate
could be made; the probability is, that it bore no proportion to that
sustained by the American army.
Nothing could be more unexpected than this severe disaster. The public
had confidently anticipated a successful campaign, and could not
believe, that the general who had been unfortunate, had not been
culpable.
{1792}
The Commander-in-chief requested with earnestness that a court martial
should sit on his conduct; but this request could not be granted,
because the army did not furnish a sufficient number of officers of a
grade to form a court for his trial on military principles. Late in
the session, a committee of the house of representatives was appointed
to inquire into the cause of the failure of the expedition, whose
report, in explicit terms, exculpated the Commander-in-chief. This
inquiry, however, was instituted rather for the purpose of
investigating the conduct of civil than of military officers; and was
not conducted by military men. More satisfactory testimony in favour
of St. Clair is furnished by the circumstance, that he still retained
the undiminished esteem and good opinion of the President.
The Indian war now assumed a still more serious aspect. There was
reason to fear that the hostile tribes would derive a great accession
of strength from the impression which their success would make upon
their neighbours; and the reputation of the government was deeply
concerned in retrieving the fortune of its arms, and affording
protection to its citizens. The President, therefore, lost no time in
causing the estimates for a competent force to be prepared and laid
before congress. In conformity with a report made by the secretary of
war, a bill was brought into the house of representatives, directing
three additional regiments of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry to
be raised, to serve for three years, if not sooner discharged. The
whole military establishment, if completed, would amount to about five
thousand men. The additional regiments, however, were to be disbanded
as soon as peace should be concluded with the Indians; and the
President was authorized to discharge, or to forbear to raise, any
part of them, "in case events should, in his judgment, render his so
doing consistent with the public safety."
[Sidenote: Opposition to the increase of the army.]
This bill met with great opposition. A motion was made to strike out
the section which authorized an augmentation of force. By those who
argued in favour of the motion, the justice of the war was arraigned,
and the practicability of obtaining peace at a much less expense than
would be incurred in its further prosecution, was urged with
vehemence. An extension of the present frontier was said not to be
desirable, and if the citizens of the United States were recalled
within their proper boundaries, hostilities would cease. At any rate,
it was an idle waste of blood and treasure, to carry the war beyond
the line of forts already established. It was only exposing their arms
to disgrace, betraying their own weakness, and lessening the public
confidence in the government, to send forth armies to be butchered in
the forests, while the British were suffered to keep possession of
posts within the territory of the United States. To this cause was to
be ascribed any disposition which might exist on the part of the
Indians to continue hostilities, and to its removal the efforts of the
government ought to be directed.
But, admitting the war to have been just in its commencement, and its
continuance to be required by the honour and interest of the nation,
yet as an invasion of the Indian country ought not to be attempted,
this augmentation of the military establishment could not be
necessary. Regular troops could only be useful as garrisons for posts
to which the militia might resort for protection or supplies.
Experience had proved that the sudden desultory attacks of the
frontier militia and rangers were productive of more valuable
consequences, than the methodical operations of a regular force. But,
should it even be conceded that invasion and conquest were to be
contemplated, the existing establishment, if completed, would be
sufficiently great; and it was still insisted that, even for the
purposes of conquest, the frontier militia were superior to any
regulars whatever.
The expense of such an army as the bill contemplated was said to be an
object worthy of serious attention; and members were requested to
observe the progress of this business, and to say where it would stop.
At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was
about one hundred thousand dollars; a second was afterwards added,
which swelled the expense to three hundred thousand; and now a
standing force of five thousand one hundred and sixty-eight men is
contemplated, at an annual expense of above a million and a quarter.
They were preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one,
except those who were in the secrets of the cabinet, knew why the war
had been thus carried on for three years.
Against the motion for striking out, it was urged that the justice of
the war could not be questioned by any man who would allow that self
preservation, and indispensable necessity, could furnish sufficient
motives for taking up arms. It was proved by unquestionable documents,
that from the year 1783 to 1790, there had been not less than fifteen
hundred persons, either the inhabitants of Kentucky, or emigrants on
their way to that country, who had been massacred by the savages, or
dragged into captivity; and there was reason to believe that on the
frontiers of Virginia, and of Pennsylvania, the murdered and the
prisoners would furnish a list almost equally numerous.
The conciliatory disposition of the government was stated, and its
repeated efforts to obtain a peace were enumerated. It was
particularly observed that in 1790, when a treaty was proposed at the
Miamis villages, the Indians at first refused to treat;--they next
required thirty days to deliberate;--this request was acceded to; and,
in the interim, offensive operations were expressly prohibited by the
President. Yet, notwithstanding this forbearance on the part of the
whites, not less than one hundred and twenty persons were killed and
captured by the savages, and several prisoners were roasted alive,
during that short period; at the expiration of which, the Indians
refused to give any answer to the proposition which had been made to
them.
But it was now too late to inquire into the justice of the principles
on which the war was originally undertaken. The nation was involved in
it, and could not recede without exposing many innocent persons to be
butchered by the enemy. Should the government determine to discontinue
the war, would the Indians also consent to a cessation of hostilities?
The government could not, without impeachment, both of its justice and
humanity, abandon the inhabitants of the frontiers to the rage of
their savage enemies; and although the excise might be unpopular,
although money might still be wanted, what was the excise, what was
money, when put in competition with the lives of their friends and
brethren? A sufficient force must be raised for their defence, and the
only question was what that force should be.
The calculations of the best informed men were in favour of employing
an army not inferior to that proposed in the bill. When the known
attachment of Indians to war and plunder was adverted to, and the
excitements to that attachment which were furnished by the trophies
acquired in the last two campaigns were considered, no man would
venture to pronounce with confidence how extensive the combination
against the United States might become, or what numbers they would
have to encounter. It certainly behoved them to prepare in time for a
much more vigorous effort than had hitherto been made. The objections
drawn from the increased expense which such an effort would require,
must entirely vanish before the eyes of any man, who looks forward to
the consequences of another unsuccessful campaign. Such a disaster
would eventually involve the nation in much greater expense than that
which is now made the ground of opposition. Better therefore is it, to
make at once a vigorous and effectual exertion to bring the contest to
a close, than to continue gradually draining the treasury, by dragging
on the war, and renewing hostility from year to year.
The supporters of the bill also appealed to experience for the
superiority of regular troops over militia, in accomplishing all the
purposes, even of Indian war; and those arguments were urged in favour
of this theory, which the subject readily suggests.
The motion for striking out the section was lost; and the bill was
carried for the augmentation of force required by the executive.
The treasury was not in a condition to meet the demands upon it, which
the increased expenses of the war would unavoidably occasion; and
sources of additional revenue were to be explored. A select committee
to whom this subject was referred, brought in a resolution directing
the secretary of the treasury to report his opinion to the house on
the best mode of raising those additional supplies which the public
service might require for the current year.
This proposition gave rise to a very animated debate.
It will be recollected that when the act for establishing the treasury
department was under consideration, the clause which rendered it the
duty of the secretary to digest and report plans for the improvement
and management of the revenue, and for the support of public credit,
was earnestly opposed. A large majority, however, was in favour of the
principle; and, after being so modified, as only to admit a report if
required by the house, it was retained in the bill. In complying with
the various resolutions of congress, calling for reports on subjects
connected with his department, the secretary had submitted plans
which, having been profoundly considered, were well digested, and
accompanied by arguments, the force of which it was difficult to
resist. His measures were generally supported by a majority of
congress; and, while the high credit of the United States was believed
to attest their wisdom, the masterly manner in which his reports were
drawn contributed to raise still higher, that reputation for great
talents which he had long possessed. To the further admission of these
reports, it was determined, on this occasion, to make a vigorous
resistance.
But the opposition was not successful. On taking the question, the
resolution was carried; thirty-one members voting in its favour, and
twenty-seven against it.
[Sidenote: Report of the secretary of the treasury for raising
additional supplies.]
The report[59] made by the secretary in pursuance of this resolution,
recommended certain augmentations of the duties on imports; and was
immediately referred to the consideration of a committee of the whole
house. Resolutions were then passed which were to form the basis of a
bill; and which adopted, not only the principles, but, with the
exception of a few unimportant alterations, the minute details of the
report.
[Footnote 59: See note, No. VI. at the end of the volume.]
Before the question was taken on the bill, a motion was made to limit
its duration, the vote upon which strongly marked the progress of
opinion in the house respecting those systems of finance which were
believed to have established the credit of the United States.
The secretary of the treasury had deemed it indispensable to the
creation of public credit, that the appropriations of funds for the
payment of the interest, and the gradual redemption of the principal
of the national debt, should be not only sufficient, but permanent
also. A party was found in the first congress who opposed this
principle; and were in favour of retaining a full power over the
subject in each branch of the legislature, by making annual
appropriations. The arguments which had failed in congress appear to
have been more successfully employed with the people. Among the
multiplied vices which were ascribed to the funding system, it was
charged with introducing a permanent and extensive mortgage of funds,
which was alleged to strengthen unduly the hands of the executive
magistrate, and to be one of the many evidences which existed, of
monarchical propensities in those who administered the government.
The report lately made by the secretary of the treasury, and the bill
founded on that report, contemplated a permanent increase of the
duties on certain specified articles; and a permanent appropriation of
the revenue arising from them, to the purposes of the national debt.
Thirty-one members were in favour of the motion for limiting the
duration of the bill, and only thirty against it. By the rules of the
house, the speaker has a right first to vote as a member; and, if the
numbers should then be equally divided, to decide as speaker. Being
opposed to the limitation, the motion was lost by his voice.
On the eighth of May, after an active and interesting session,
congress adjourned to the first Monday in November.
The asperity which, on more than one occasion, discovered itself in
debate, was a certain index of the growing exasperation of parties;
and the strength of the opposition on those questions which brought
into review the points on which the administration was to be attacked,
denoted the impression which the specific charges brought against
those who conducted public affairs, had made on the minds of the
people, in an extensive division of the continent. It may conduce to a
more perfect understanding of subsequent transactions, to present, in
this place, a sketch of those charges.
[Sidenote: Strictures on the conduct of administration, with a view of
parties.]
It was alleged that the public debt was too great to be paid before
other causes of adding to it would occur. This accumulation of debt
had been artificially produced by the assumption of what was due from
the states. Its immediate effect was to deprive the government of its
power over those easy sources of revenue, which, applied to its
ordinary necessities and exigencies, would have answered them
habitually, and thereby have avoided those burdens on the people which
occasioned such murmurs against taxes, and tax gatherers. As a
consequence of it, although the calls for money had not been greater
than must be expected for the same or equivalent exigencies, yet
congress had been already obliged, not only to strain the impost until
it produced clamour, and would produce evasion, and war on their own
citizens to collect it, but even to resort to an _excise_ law, of
odious character with the people, partial in its operation,
unproductive unless enforced by arbitrary and vexatious means, and
committing the authority of the government in parts where resistance
was most probable, and coercion least practicable.
That the United States, if left free to act at their discretion, might
borrow at two-thirds of the interest contracted to be paid to the
public creditors, and thus discharge themselves from the principal in
two-thirds of the time: but from this they were precluded by the
irredeemable quality of the debt; a quality given for the avowed
purpose of inviting its transfer to foreign countries. This transfer
of the principal when completed would occasion an exportation of three
millions of dollars annually for the interest, a drain of coin without
example, and of the consequences of which no calculation could be
made.
The banishment of coin would be completed by ten millions of paper
money in the form of bank bills, which were then issuing into
circulation. Nor would this be the only mischief resulting from the
institution of the bank. The ten or twelve per cent, annual profit
paid to the lenders of this paper medium would take out of the pockets
of the people, who would have had, without interest, the coin it was
banishing. That all the capital employed in paper speculation is
barren and useless, producing like that on a gaming table no accession
to itself, and is withdrawn from commerce and agriculture, where it
would have produced addition to the common mass. The wealth therefore
heaped upon individuals by the funding and banking systems, would be
productive of general poverty and distress. That in addition to the
encouragement these measures gave to vice and idleness, they had
furnished effectual means of corrupting such a portion of the
legislature as turned the balance between the honest voters. This
corrupt squad, deciding the voice of the legislature, had manifested
their dispositions to get rid of the limitations imposed by the
constitution; limitations on the faith of which the states acceded to
that instrument. They were proceeding rapidly in their plan of
absorbing all power, invading the rights of the states, and converting
the federal into a consolidated government.
That the ultimate object of all this was to prepare the way for a
change from the present republican form of government to that of a
monarchy, of which the English constitution was to be the model. So
many of the friends of monarchy were in the legislature, that aided by
the corrupt squad of paper dealers who were at their devotion, they
made a majority in both houses. The republican party, even when united
with the anti-federalists, continued a minority.
That of all the mischiefs resulting from the system of measures which
was so much reprobated, none was so afflicting, so fatal to every
honest hope, as the corruption of the legislature. As it was the
earliest of these measures, it became the instrument for producing the
rest, and would be the instrument for producing in future, a king,
lords, and commons; or whatever else those who directed it might
choose. Withdrawn such a distance from the eye of their constituents,
they would form the most corrupt government on earth, if the means of
their corruption were not prevented.
These strictures on the conduct of administration were principally
directed against measures which had originated with the secretary of
the treasury, and had afterwards received the sanction of the
legislature. In the southern division of the continent, that officer
was unknown, except to a few military friends, and to those who had
engaged in the legislative or executive departments of the former or
present government. His systems of revenue having been generally
opposed by the southern members, and the original opposition to the
constitution having been particularly great in Virginia and North
Carolina, the aspersions on his views, and on the views of the eastern
members by whom his plans had been generally supported, were seldom
controverted. The remote tendency of particular systems, and the
motives for their adoption, are so often subjects of conjecture, that
the judgment, when exercised upon them, is peculiarly exposed to the
influence of the passions; and where measures are in themselves
burdensome, and the necessity for their adoption has not been
appreciated, suspicions of their unknown advocates, can seldom be
unsuccessfully urged by persons, in whom the people have placed their
confidence. It is not therefore cause of astonishment, that the dark
motives ascribed to the authors of tax laws, should be extensively
believed.