The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 (of 5)
J >> John Marshall >> The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 (of 5)Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25
"After having served my country," concluded the letter, "near twenty
years, the greater portion of the time under your immediate auspices,
it is with extreme reluctance I find myself constrained to withdraw
from so honourable a situation. But the natural and powerful claims of
a numerous family will no longer permit me to neglect their essential
interests.
"In whatever situation I shall be, I shall recollect your confidence
and kindness with all the fervour and purity of affection, of which a
grateful heart is susceptible."
In the letter accepting his resignation, the President expressed the
regret it occasioned, and added:
"I can not suffer you, however, to close your public service, without
uniting to the satisfaction which must arise in your own mind from
conscious rectitude, assurances of my most perfect persuasion that you
have deserved well of your country.
"My personal knowledge of your exertions, while it authorizes me to
hold this language, justifies the sincere friendship which I have
borne you, and which will accompany you in every situation of life."
[Sidenote: Is succeeded by Colonel Pickering.]
Colonel Pickering, a gentleman who had filled many important offices
through the war of the revolution; who had discharged several trusts
of considerable confidence under the present government; and who at
the time was postmaster general, was appointed to succeed him.
On the seventh of March, the treaty of amity, commerce, and
navigation, between the United States and Great Britain, which had
been signed by the ministers of the two nations, on the 19th of the
preceding November, was received at the office of state.
[Sidenote: Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.]
From his arrival in London on the 15th of June, Mr. Jay had been
assiduously and unremittingly employed on the arduous duties of his
mission. By a deportment respectful, yet firm, mingling a decent
deference for the government to which he was deputed, with a proper
regard for the dignity of his own, this minister avoided those little
asperities which frequently embarrass measures of great concern, and
smoothed the way to the adoption of those which were suggested by the
real interests of both nations. Many and intricate were the points to
be discussed. On some of them an agreement was found to be
impracticable; but, at length, a treaty was concluded, which Mr. Jay
declared to be the best that was attainable, and which he believed it
for the interests of the United States to accept.[32] Indeed it was
scarcely possible to contemplate the evidences of extreme exasperation
which were given in America, and the nature of the differences which
subsisted between the two countries, without feeling a conviction that
war was inevitable, should this attempt to adjust those differences
prove unsuccessful.
[Footnote 32: In a private letter to the President, of the
same date with the signature of the treaty, Mr. Jay said "to
do more was impossible. I ought not to conceal from you,
that the confidence reposed in your personal character was
visible and useful throughout the negotiation.
"If there is not a good disposition in the far greater part
of the cabinet and nation towards us, I am exceedingly
mistaken. I do not mean an ostensible and temporizing, but a
real good disposition.--I wish it may have a fair trial."]
On Monday, the 8th of June, the senate, in conformity with the summons
of the President, convened in the senate chamber, and the treaty, with
the documents connected with it, were submitted to their
consideration.
On the 24th of June, after a minute and laborious investigation, the
senate, by precisely a constitutional majority, advised and consented
to its conditional ratification.
An insuperable objection existed to an article regulating the
intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which is
understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the
contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the
United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of
the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To
give effect to this intention, the exportation from the United States
of those articles which were the principal productions of the islands
was to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a
few years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for
domestic consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the
southern states. The senate being informed of this fact, advised and
consented that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an
article be added thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article
which related to the intercourse with the West Indies.
Although, in the mind of the President, several objections to the
treaty had occurred, they were overbalanced by its advantages; and
before transmitting it to the senate, he had resolved to ratify it, if
approved by that body. The resolution of the senate presented
difficulties which required consideration. Whether they could advise
and consent to an article which had not been laid before them; and
whether their resolution was to be considered as the final exercise of
their power, were questions not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was
it absolutely clear that the executive could ratify the treaty, under
the advice of the senate, until the suspending article should be
introduced into it. A few days were employed in the removal of these
doubts, at the expiration of which, intelligence was received from
Europe which suspended the resolution which the President had formed.
The English papers contained an account, which, though not official,
was deemed worthy of credit, that the order of the 8th of June, 1793,
for the seizure of provisions going to French ports, was renewed. In
the apprehension that this order might be construed and intended as a
practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to
favour the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband,
might occasionally become so, a construction in which he had
determined not to acquiesce, the President thought it wise to
reconsider his decision. Of the result of this reconsideration, there
is no conclusive testimony. A strong memorial against this
objectionable order was directed; and the propositions to withhold the
ratifications of the treaty until the order should be repealed; to
make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon that event; and to
adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice of the senate,
connecting with that measure the memorial which had been mentioned, as
an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification was made,
were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his practice of
withholding his opinion on controverted points until it should become
necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination on these
propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid before
him. In the meantime, his private affairs required that he should
visit Mount Vernon.
So restless and uneasy was the temper respecting foreign nations, that
no surprise ought to be excited at the anxiety which was felt on the
negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain, nor at the means which
were used, before its contents were known, to extend the prejudices
against it.
Great umbrage was taken at the mysterious secrecy in which the
negotiation had been involved. That the instrument itself was not
immediately communicated to the public, and that the senate
deliberated upon it with closed doors, were considered as additional
evidences of the contempt in which their rulers held the feelings and
understandings of the people, and of the monarchical tendencies of the
government. Crowned heads, it was loudly repeated, who were
machinating designs subversive of the rights of man, and the happiness
of nations, might well cover with an impenetrable veil, their dark
transactions; but republics ought to have no secrets. In republics,
those to whom power was delegated, being the servants of the people,
acting solely for their benefit, ought to transact all national
affairs in open day. This doctrine was not too absurd for the
extravagance of the moment.
The predetermined hostility to the treaty increased in activity, as
the period for deciding its fate approached. On its particular merits,
no opinion could be formed, because they were unknown; but on the
general question of reconciliation between the two countries, a
decisive judgment was extensively made up. The sentiments called forth
by the occasion demonstrated, that no possible adjustment of
differences with Great Britain, no possible arrangement which might
promise a future friendly intercourse with that nation, could be
satisfactory. The President was openly attacked; his whole system
strongly condemned; and the mission of Mr. Jay, particularly, was
reprobated in terms of peculiar harshness. That a treaty of amity and
commerce should have been formed, whatever might be its principles,
was a degrading insult to the American people; a pusillanimous
surrender of their honour; and an insidious injury to France. Between
such a compact, and an alliance, no distinction was taken. It was an
abandonment of the ancient ally of the United States, whose friendship
had given them independence, and whose splendid victories still
protected them, for a close connexion with her natural enemy, and with
the enemy of human liberty.
The pretended object of the mission, it was said, was a reparation for
wrongs, not a contaminating connexion with the most faithless and
corrupt court in the world. The return of the envoy without that
reparation, was a virtual surrender of the claim. The honour of the
United States required a peremptory demand of the immediate surrender
of the western posts, and of compensation for the piratical
depredations committed on their commerce; not a disgraceful and
humiliating negotiation. The surrender, and the compensation, ought to
have been made instantly; for no reliance could be placed in promises
to be performed in future.
That the disinclination formerly manifested by Great Britain, to give
the stability and certainty of compact to the principles regulating
the commercial intercourse between the two countries, had constituted
an important item in the catalogue of complaints against that power:
that the existence, or non-existence of commercial treaties had been
selected as the criterion by which to regulate the discriminations
proposed to be made in the trade of foreign nations; that, in the
discussion on this subject, the favourers of commercial hostility had
uniformly supported the policy of giving value to treaties with the
United States; these opinions were instantly relinquished by the party
which had strenuously asserted them while urged by their leaders in
congress; and it was imputed as a crime to the government, and to its
negotiator, that he had proceeded further than to demand immediate and
unconditional reparation of the wrongs sustained by the United States.
The most strenuous and unremitting exertions to give increased energy
to the love which was openly avowed for France, and to the detestation
which was not less openly avowed for England,[33] were connected with
this course of passionate declamation.
[Footnote 33: See note No. XI. at the end of the volume.]
Such was the state of parties when the senate advised the ratification
of the treaty. Although common usage, and a decent respect for the
executive, and for a foreign nation, not less than a positive
resolution, required that the seal of secrecy should not be broken by
the senate, an abstract of this instrument, not very faithfully taken,
was given to the public; and on the 29th of June, a senator of the
United States transmitted a copy of it to the most distinguished
editor of the opposition party in Philadelphia, to be communicated to
the public through the medium of the press.
If the negotiation itself had been acrimoniously censured; if amicable
arrangements, whatever might be their character, had been passionately
condemned; it was not to be expected that the treaty would assuage
these pre-existing irritations.
In fact, public opinion did receive a considerable shock, and men
uninfested by the spirit of faction felt some disappointment on its
first appearance. In national contests, unless there be an undue
attachment to the adversary country, few men, even among the
intelligent, are sensible of the weakness which may exist in their own
pretensions, or can allow their full force to the claims of the other
party. If the people at large enter keenly into the points of
controversy with a foreign power, they can never be satisfied with any
equal adjustment of those points, unless other considerations,
stronger than abstract reason, afford that satisfaction; nor will it
ever be difficult to prove to them, in a case unassisted by the
passions, that in any practicable commercial contract, they give too
much, and receive too little.
On no subject whatever have considerations, such as these, possessed
more influence than in that which was now brought before the American
people. Their operation was not confined to those whose passions urged
them to take part in the war, nor to the open enemies of the
executive. The friends of peace, and of the administration, had
generally received impressions unfavourable to the fair exercise of
judgment in the case, which it required time and reflection to efface.
Even among them, strong prejudices had been imbibed in favour of
France, which the open attempts on the sovereignty of the United
States had only weakened; and the matters of controversy with Great
Britain had been contemplated with all that partiality which men
generally feel for their own interests. With respect to commerce also,
strong opinions had been preconceived. The desire to gain admission
into the British West India islands, especially, had excited great
hostility to that colonial system which had been adopted by every
country in Europe; and sufficient allowances were not made for the
prejudices by which that system was supported.
The treaty, therefore, when exposed to the public view, found one
party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other, not
ready in its defence. An appeal to the passions, the prejudices, and
the feelings of the nation, might confidently be made by those whose
only object was its condemnation; which reflection, information, and
consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were
not in its favour, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to
those impressions.
That a treaty involving a great variety of complicated national
interests, and adjusting differences of long standing, which had
excited strong reciprocal prejudices, would require a patient and
laborious investigation, both of the instrument itself, and of the
circumstances under which it was negotiated, before even those who are
most conversant in diplomatic transactions could form a just estimate
of its merits, would be conceded by all reflecting men. But an immense
party in America, not in the habit of considering national compacts,
without examining the circumstances under which that with Great
Britain had been formed, or weighing the reasons which induced it;
without understanding the instrument, and in many instances without
reading it, rushed impetuously to its condemnation; and, confident
that public opinion would be surprised by the suddenness, or stormed
by the fury of the assault, expected that the President would be
compelled to yield to its violence.
In the populous cities, meetings of the people were immediately
summoned, in order to take into their consideration, and to express
their opinions respecting an instrument, to comprehend the full extent
of which, a statesman would need deep reflection in the quiet of his
closet, aided by considerable inquiry. It may well be supposed that
persons feeling some distrust of their capacity to form, intuitively,
a correct judgment on a subject so complex, and disposed only to act
knowingly, would be unwilling to make so hasty a decision, and
consequently be disinclined to attend such meetings. Many intelligent
men, therefore, stood aloof, while the most intemperate assumed, as
usual, the name of the people; pronounced a definitive and unqualified
condemnation of every article in the treaty; and, with the utmost
confidence, assigned reasons for their opinions, which, in many
instances, had only an imaginary existence; and in some, were
obviously founded on the strong prejudices which were entertained with
respect to foreign powers. It is difficult to review the various
resolutions and addresses to which the occasion gave birth, without
feeling some degree of astonishment, mingled with humiliation, at
perceiving such proofs of the deplorable fallibility of human reason.
The first meeting was held in Boston. The example of that city was
soon followed by New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston;
and, as if their addresses were designed at least as much for their
fellow citizens as for their President, while one copy was transmitted
to him, another was committed to the press. The precedent set by these
large cities was followed, with wonderful rapidity, throughout the
union; and the spirit in which this system of opposition originated
sustained no diminution of violence in its progress.
On the 18th of July, at Baltimore, on his way to Mount Vernon, the
President received the resolutions passed by the meeting at Boston,
which were enclosed to him in a letter from the select men of that
town. The answer to this letter and to these resolutions evinced the
firmness with which he had resolved to meet the effort that was
obviously making, to control the exercise of his constitutional
functions, by giving a promptness and vigour to the expression of the
sentiments of a party, which might impose it upon the world as the
deliberate judgment of the public.
Addresses to the chief magistrate, and resolutions of town and country
meetings, were not the only means which were employed to enlist the
American people against the measure which had been advised by the
senate. In an immense number of essays, the treaty was critically
examined, and every argument which might operate on the judgment or
prejudice of the public, was urged in the warm and glowing language of
passion. To meet these efforts by counter efforts, was deemed
indispensably necessary by the friends of that instrument; and the
gazettes of the day are replete with appeals to the passions, and to
the reason, of those who are the ultimate arbiters of every political
question. That the treaty affected the interests of France not less
than those of the United States, was, in this memorable controversy,
asserted by the one party, with as much zeal as it was denied by the
other. These agitations furnished matter to the President for deep
reflection, and for serious regret; but they appear not to have shaken
the decision he had formed, or to have affected his conduct otherwise
than to induce a still greater degree of circumspection in the mode of
transacting the delicate business before him. On their first
appearance, therefore, he resolved to hasten his return to
Philadelphia, for the purpose of considering, at that place rather
than at Mount Vernon, the memorial against the provision order, and
the conditional ratification of the treaty. In a private letter to the
secretary of state, of the 29th of July, accompanying the official
communication of this determination, he stated more at large the
motives which induced it. These were, the violent and extraordinary
proceedings which were taking place, and might be expected, throughout
the union; and his opinion that the memorial, the ratification, and
the instructions which were framing, were of such vast magnitude as
not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn
conjunct revision.
He viewed the opposition which the treaty was receiving from the
meetings in different parts of the union, in a very serious
light;--not because there was more weight in any of the objections
than was foreseen at first,--for in some of them there was none, and
in others, there were gross misrepresentations; nor as it respected
himself personally, for that he declared should have no influence on
his conduct. He plainly perceived, and was accordingly preparing his
mind for, the obloquy which disappointment and malice were collecting
to heap upon him. But he was alarmed on account of the effect it might
have on France, and the advantage which the government of that country
might be disposed to make of the spirit which was at work, to cherish
a belief, that the treaty was calculated to favour Great Britain at
her expense. Whether she believed or disbelieved these tales, their
effect, he said, would be nearly the same.
"To sum up the whole," he added, "in a few words, I have never, since
I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis
which, in my opinion, has been so pregnant with interesting events,
nor one from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one
side or the other. From New York there is, and I am told will further
be, a counter current;[34] but how formidable it may appear I know
not. If the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it
will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner
universal, and would make the ratification a very serious business
indeed. But as it respects the French, even counter resolutions would,
for the reasons I have already mentioned, do little more than weaken,
in a small degree, the effect the other side would have."
[Footnote 34: The chamber of commerce in New York had voted
resolutions expressing their approbation of the treaty.]
In a private letter of the 31st of July to the same gentleman, after
repeating his determination to return to Philadelphia, and his
impression of the wisdom, the temperateness, and the firmness for
which the crisis most eminently called; he added, "for there is too
much reason to believe, from the pains that have been taken before,
at, and since the advice of the senate respecting the treaty, that the
prejudices against it are more extensive than is generally imagined.
How should it be otherwise? When no stone has been left unturned that
could impress on the minds of the people the most arrant
misrepresentation of facts: that their rights have not only been
neglected, but absolutely sold; that there are no reciprocal
advantages in the treaty: that the benefits are all on the side of
Great Britain: and, what seems to have had more weight with them than
all the rest, and has been most pressed, that the treaty is made with
the design to oppress the French republic, in open violation of our
treaty with that nation, and contrary too to every principal of
gratitude and sound policy. In time, when passion shall have yielded
to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but, in the mean
while, this government, in relation to France and England, may be
compared to a ship between Scylla and Charybdis. If the treaty is
ratified, the partisans of the French (or rather of war and confusion)
will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to unfriendly
sentiments;--if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the consequences
that may follow as it respects Great Britain.
"It is not to be inferred from hence that I am or shall be disposed to
quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than
have yet come to my knowledge, should compel it; for there is but one
straight course, and that is to seek truth, and to pursue it steadily.
But these things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of
the subject is more than ever necessary; and that there are strong
evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying
the determination of government into effect, with prudence as it
respects our own people, and with every exertion to produce a change
for the better with Great Britain."
In a letter of the third of August, written to the same gentleman, in
which he stated the increasing extent of hostility to the treaty, the
President added:
"All these things do not shake my determination with respect to the
proposed ratification, nor will they, unless something more imperious
and unknown to me, should, in the opinion of yourself and the
gentlemen with you, make it adviseable for me to pause."
[Sidenote: Conditionally ratified by the president.]
In the afternoon of the 11th of August the President arrived in
Philadelphia; and on the next day, the question respecting the
immediate ratification of the treaty was brought before the cabinet.
The secretary of state maintained, singly, the opinion, that, during
the existence of the provision order,[35] and during the war between
Britain and France, this step ought not to be taken. This opinion did
not prevail. The resolution was adopted to ratify the treaty
immediately, and to accompany the ratification with a strong memorial
against the provision order, which should convey, in explicit terms,
the sense of the American government on that subject. By this course,
the views of the executive were happily accomplished. The order was
revoked, and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.