The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 (of 5)
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This bright prospect was indeed, in part, shaded by the discontents of
France. Those who have attended to the particular points of difference
between the two nations, will assign the causes to which these
discontents are to be ascribed, and will judge whether it was in the
power of the President to have avoided them, without surrendering the
real independence of the nation, and the most invaluable of all rights
--the right of self-government.
Such was the situation of the United States at the close of
Washington's administration. Their circumstances at its commencement
will be recollected; and the contrast is too striking not to be
observed.
That this beneficial change in the affairs of America is to be
ascribed exclusively to the wisdom which guided the national councils
will not be pretended. That many of the causes which produced it
originated with the government, and that their successful operation
was facilitated, if not secured, by the system which was adopted, will
scarcely be denied. To estimate that system correctly, their real
influence must be allowed to those strong prejudices, and turbulent
passions, with which it was assailed.
Accustomed in the early part of his life to agricultural pursuits, and
possessing a real taste for them, General Washington was particularly
well qualified to enjoy, in retirement, that tranquil felicity which
he had anticipated. Resuming former habits, and returning to ancient
and well known employments, he was familiar with his new situation,
and therefore exempt from the danger of that disappointment which is
the common lot of those who, in old age, retire from the toils of
business, or the cares of office, to the untried pleasures of the
country. A large estate, which exhibited many proofs of having been
long deprived of the attentions of its proprietor, in the management
and improvement of which he engaged with ardour, an extensive
correspondence, and the society of men and books, gave employment to
every hour which was equally innocent and interesting, and furnished
ground for the hope that the evening of a life which had been devoted
to the public service, would be as serene, as its mid-day had been
brilliant.
Though devoted to these occupations, an absolute indifference to
public affairs would have been incompatible with that love of country
which had influenced all his conduct. Feeling strong impressions in
favour of that system, with regard to foreign powers, which had been
adopted by himself, and which was faithfully pursued by his successor,
he could not be inattentive to the immense, and continued exertions,
made by a powerful party to overturn it. Yet for a time, he sought to
abstract himself from these political contests, and to diminish the
interest which his feelings impelled him to take in them. His letters
abound in paragraphs not unlike the following. "I have confidence
however in that Providence which has shielded the United States from
the evils that have hitherto threatened them; and, as I believe the
major part of the people of this country to be well affected to its
constitution and government, I rest satisfied that, should a crisis
ever arise to call forth the sense of the community, it will be strong
in support of the honour and dignity of the nation. Therefore, however
much I regret the opposition which has for its object the
embarrassment of the administration, I shall view things in the 'calm
light of mild philosophy,' and endeavour to finish my course in
retirement and ease."
But the designs of France were soon manifested in a form which, to the
veteran soldier and statesman of Mount Vernon, appeared to be too
dangerous as well as unequivocal, to admit the preservation of this
equanimity.
[Sidenote: The French government refuses to receive General Pinckney
as minister.]
In the executive of that republic, General Pinckney encountered
dispositions of a very different character from that amicable and
conciliatory temper which had dictated his mission. After inspecting
his letter of credence, the Directory announced to him their haughty
determination "not to receive another minister plenipotentiary from
the United States, until after the redress of grievances demanded of
the American government, which the French republic had a right to
expect from it." This message was succeeded, first by indecorous
verbal communications, calculated to force the American minister out
of France, and afterwards, by a written mandate to quit the
territories of the republic.
This act of hostility was accompanied with another which would explain
the motives for this conduct, if previous measures had not rendered
all further explanation unnecessary.
On giving to the recalled minister his audience of leave, the
president of the directory addressed a speech to him, in which terms
of outrage to the government, were mingled with expressions of
affection for the people of the United States; and the expectation of
ruling the former, by their influence over the latter, was too clearly
manifested not to be understood. To complete this system of hostility,
American vessels were captured wherever found; and, under the pretext
of their wanting a document, with which the treaty of commerce had
been uniformly understood to dispense, they were condemned as prize.
[Sidenote: Congress is convened.]
[Sidenote: President's speech.]
This serious state of things demanded a solemn consideration. On
receiving from General Pinckney the despatches which communicated it,
the President issued his proclamation requiring congress to meet on
the 15th day of June. The firm and dignified speech delivered by the
chief magistrate at the commencement of the session, exhibited that
sensibility which a high minded and real American might be expected to
feel, while representing to the national legislature the great and
unprovoked outrages of a foreign government. Adverting to the audience
of leave given by the executive Directory to Colonel Monroe, he said,
"the speech of the President discloses sentiments more alarming than
the refusal of a minister, because more dangerous to our independence
and union; and, at the same time, studiously marked with indignities
towards the government of the United States. It evinces a disposition
to separate the people from their government; to persuade them that
they have different affections, principles, and interests from those
of their fellow citizens whom they themselves have chosen to manage
their common concerns; and thus to produce divisions fatal to our
peace. Such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision which shall
convince France, and the world, that we are not a degraded people,
humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear, and sense of inferiority,
fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, and
regardless of national honour, character, and interest."
"Retaining still the desire which had uniformly been manifested by the
American government to preserve peace and friendship with all nations,
and believing that neither the honour nor the interest of the United
States absolutely forbade the repetition of advances for securing
these desirable objects with France, he should," he said, "institute a
fresh attempt at negotiation, and should not fail to promote and
accelerate an accommodation on terms compatible with the rights,
duties, interests, and honour of the nation." But while he should be
making these endeavours to adjust all differences with the French
republic by amicable negotiation, he earnestly recommended it to
congress to provide effectual measures of defence.
[Sidenote: Three envoys extraordinary deputed to negotiate with
France.]
To carry into effect the pacific dispositions avowed in the speech,
three envoys extraordinary were appointed, at the head of whom General
Pinckney was placed. Their instructions conformed to the public
language of the President. Peace and reconciliation were to be pursued
by all means, compatible with the honour and the faith of the United
States; but no national engagements were to be impaired; no innovation
to be permitted upon those internal regulations for the preservation
of peace which had been deliberately and uprightly established; nor
were the rights of the government to be surrendered.
The debates in the house of representatives, on the answer to the
speech, were long and earnest. To expressions approving the conduct of
the executive with regard to foreign nations, the opposition was
ardent, but unsuccessful. On the third of June, an answer was agreed
to which contained sentiments worthy of an American legislature, and
for which several of the leaders of the opposition voted.
The speech of the President was well adapted to the occasion, and to
the times. It was calculated to rouse those indignant feelings which a
high spirited people, insulted and injured by a foreign power, can
never fail to display, if their judgment be not blinded, or their
sensibility to external wrongs blunted, by invincible prejudices. He
relied principally on the manifestation of these feelings for the
success of the negotiation; and on their real existence, for the
defence of the national rights, should negotiation fail. His
endeavours were not absolutely unsuccessful. Some impression was made
on the mass of the people; but it was too slight to be productive of
the advantages expected from it. The conduct of France was still
openly defended; and the opinion, that the measures which had been
adopted by the executive of the United States furnished that republic
with just cause of war, was still publicly maintained, and
indefatigably circulated. According to these opinions, America could
entitle herself to peace, only by retracing the steps she had taken,
and yielding to the demands of her justly offended but generous and
magnanimous ally.
Still jealous for the honour, as well as confident of the importance,
of his country, and retaining that full conviction respecting the
propriety of its measures which had induced their adoption, General
Washington could not repress the solicitude with which he contemplated
passing events. His confidential letters disclose the strong feelings
of his own bosom, but betray no apprehensions that the French
government would press its present system to extremities. He firmly
believed that the hostile attitude it had assumed was to be,
exclusively, ascribed to the conduct of those Americans who had been
the uniform advocates of all the pretensions of France, and who were
said to be supported by a real majority of the people; and confidently
expected that, under the old pretext of magnanimous forbearance, the
executive directory would, slowly, and gradually, recede from its
present system, so soon as the error in which it originated should
become manifest. The opinion he had always entertained of the good
sense and patriotism of his fellow citizens, silenced every doubt
respecting the manner in which they would act, when their real
situation should be perceived by themselves.
{1798}
For a considerable length of time, no certain intelligence reached the
United States respecting the negotiation at Paris. At length, in the
winter of 1798, letters were received from the American envoys,
indicating an unfavourable state of things; and, in the spring,
despatches arrived which announced the total failure of the mission.
History will scarcely furnish the example of a nation, not absolutely
degraded, which has received from a foreign power such open contumely,
and undisguised insult, as were, on this occasion, suffered by the
United States in the persons of their ministers.
[Sidenote: Their treatment.]
It was insinuated that their being taken from the party[53] which had
supported the measures of their own government furnished just cause of
umbrage; and, under slight pretexts, the executive directory delayed
to accredit them as the representatives of an independent nation. In
this situation, they were assailed by persons, not indeed invested
with formal authority, but exhibiting sufficient evidence of the
source from which their powers were derived, who, in direct and
explicit terms, demanded money from the United States as the condition
which must precede, not only the reconciliation of America to France,
but any negotiation on the differences between the two countries.
[Footnote 53: Two of them were of the party denominated
federal; the third was arranged with the opposition.]
That an advance of money by a neutral to a belligerent power would be
an obvious departure from neutrality, though an insuperable objection
to this demand, did not constitute the most operative reason for
repelling it. Such were the circumstances under which it was made,
that it could not be acceded to without a surrender of the real
independence of the United States; nor without being, in fact, the
commencement of a system, the end of which it was impossible to
foresee.
[Illustration: Mount Vernon
_This colonial mansion overlooking the Potomac River fifteen miles
south of Washington, D.C., and famous as the home and burial-place of
the "Father of His Country," was built in 1743 by Washington's elder
brother, Lawrence, who called it Mount Vernon, after Admiral Vernon,
under whom he had served in the British Navy. Mount Vernon, which was
much enlarged by President Washington, was by him bequeathed to
Bushrod Washington, upon whose death it came into the hands of John A.
Washington, his nephew, who sold it in 1858 to the Ladies Mount Vernon
Association, which holds it in trust as a national shrine._]
A decided negative was therefore given to the preliminary required by
these unofficial agents; but they returned to the charge with
wonderful perseverance, and used unwearied arts to work upon the fears
of the American ministers for their country, and for themselves. The
immense power of France was painted in glowing colours, the
humiliation of the house of Austria was stated, and the conquest of
Britain was confidently anticipated. In the friendship of France
alone, it was said, could America look for safety; and the fate of
Venice was held up to warn her of the danger which awaited those who
incurred the displeasure of the great republic. The ministers were
assured that, if they believed their conduct would be approved in the
United States, they were mistaken. The means which the Directory
possessed, in that country, to excite odium against them, were great,
and would unquestionably be employed.
This degrading intercourse was at length interrupted by the positive
refusal of the envoys to hold any further communication with the
persons employed in it.
Meanwhile, they urged the object of their mission with persevering but
unavailing solicitude. The Directory still refused to acknowledge them
in their public character; and the secretary of exterior relations, at
unofficial visits which they made him, renewed the demand which his
agents had unsuccessfully pressed.
Finding the objections to their reception in their official character
insurmountable, the American ministers made a last effort to execute
the duties assigned to them. In a letter addressed to the secretary of
exterior relations, they entered at large into the explanations
committed to them by their government, and illustrated, by a variety
of facts, the uniform friendliness of its conduct to France.[54]
Notwithstanding the failure of this effort, and their perfect
conviction that all further attempts would be equally unavailing, they
continued, with a passiveness which must search for its apology in
their solicitude to demonstrate to the American people the real views
of the French republic, to employ the only means in their power to
avert the rupture which was threatened, and which appeared to be
inevitable.
[Footnote 54: It is a remarkable fact, that the answer of
the French minister to this letter, an answer which
criminated the American government in bitter terms, was in
the possession of a printer in Philadelphia who had
uniformly supported the pretensions of that republic, before
it reached the American government.]
During these transactions, occasion was repeatedly taken to insult the
American government; open war was continued to be waged by the
cruisers of France on American commerce; and the flag of the United
States was a sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation
of any vessel over which it waved.
At length, when the demonstration became complete, that the resolution
of the American envoys was not less fixed, than their conduct had been
guarded and temperate, various attempts were made to induce two of
them, voluntarily, to relinquish their station; on the failure of
which, they were ordered to quit the territories of the republic. As
if to aggravate this national insult, the third, who had been selected
from that party which was said to be friendly to France, was permitted
to remain, and was invited to resume the discussions which had been
interrupted.
The despatches communicating these events were laid before congress,
and were afterwards published. The indignation which they excited was
warm and extensive. The attempt to degrade the United States into a
tributary nation was too obvious to be concealed; and the resentment
produced, as well by this attempt as by the threats which accompanied
it, was not confined to the federalists. For the moment, a spirit was
roused on which an American may reflect with pride, and which he may
consider as a sure protection from external danger. In every part of
the continent, the favourite sentiment was "millions for defence, not
a cent for tribute."
The disposition still existed to justify France, by criminating the
American government, by contending that her intentions were not really
hostile, that her conduct was misrepresented by men under British
influence, who wished for war, or had been deceived by unauthorized
intriguers; that, admitting it to be otherwise, she only demanded
those marks of friendship which, at a critical moment, she had herself
afforded; that the real interests of the United States required a
compliance with this demand; that it would cost more money to resist
than to yield to it; that the resistance would infallibly be
ineffectual; and that national honour was never secured by national
defeat. Neither these sentiments, nor the arguments which were founded
on them, accorded with the general feeling; and it required the
co-operation of other causes to establish the influence of those who
urged them.
[Sidenote: Measures of hostility adopted by the American government
against France.]
In congress, vigorous measures were adopted for retaliating injuries
which had been sustained, and for repelling those which were
threatened. Amongst these was a regular army. A regiment of
artillerists and engineers was added to the permanent establishment;
and the President was authorized to raise twelve additional regiments
of infantry, and one regiment of cavalry, to serve during the
continuance of the existing differences with the French republic if
not sooner discharged. He was also authorized to appoint officers for
a provisional army, and to receive and organize volunteer corps who
would be exempt from ordinary militia duty; but neither the volunteers
nor the officers of the provisional army were to receive pay unless
called into actual service.
Addresses[55] to the executive from every part of the United States
attested the high spirit of the nation, and the answers of the
President were well calculated to give it solidity and duration.
[Footnote 55: Having heard that the President contemplated a
tour as far south as the district of Columbia, General
Washington invited him to Mount Vernon, and concluded his
letter with saying: "I pray you to believe that no one has
read the various approbatory addresses which have been
presented to you with more heartfelt satisfaction than I
have done, nor are there any who more sincerely wish that
your administration of the government may be easy, happy and
honourable to yourself, and prosperous to the country."]
No sooner had a war become probable, to the perils of which no man
could be insensible, than the eyes of all were directed to General
Washington, as the person who should command the American army. He
alone could be seen at the head of a great military force without
exciting jealousy; he alone could draw into public service, and
arrange properly the best military talents of the nation; and he more
than any other, could induce the utmost exertions of its physical
strength.
Indignant at the unprovoked injuries which had been heaped upon his
country, and convinced that the conflict, should a war be really
prosecuted by France with a view to conquest, would be extremely
severe, and could be supported, on the part of America, only by a
persevering exertion of all her force, he could not determine, should
such a crisis arrive, to withhold those aids which it might be in his
power to afford, should public opinion really attach to his services
that importance which would render them essential. His own reflections
appear to have resulted in a determination not to refuse once more to
take the field, provided he could be permitted to secure efficient aid
by naming the chief officers of the army, and to remain at home until
his service in the field should be required by actual invasion.
A confidential and interesting letter from Colonel Hamilton of the
19th of May, on political subjects, concludes with saying, "You ought
also to be aware, my dear sir, that in the event of an open rupture
with France, the public voice will again call you to command the
armies of your country; and though all who are attached to you will
from attachment as well as public considerations, deplore an occasion
which should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so
good a right; yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse
that you will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past
labours may demand, to give them efficacy, this further, this very
great sacrifice."
"You may be assured," said General Washington in reply, "that my mind
is deeply impressed with the present situation of public affairs, and
not a little agitated by the outrageous conduct of France towards the
United States, and at the inimitable conduct of those partisans who
aid and abet her measures. You may believe further, from assurances
equally sincere, that if there was any thing in my power to be done
consistently, to avert or lessen the danger of the crisis, it should
be rendered with hand and heart.
"But, my dear sir, dark as matters appear at present, and expedient as
it is to be prepared for the worst that can happen, (and no man is
more disposed to this measure than I am) I can not make up my mind
yet, for the expectation of open war; or, in other words, for a
formidable invasion by France. I can not believe, although I think her
capable of any thing, that she will attempt to do more than she has
done. When she perceives the spirit and policy of this country rising
into resistance, and that she has falsely calculated upon support from
a large part of the people[56] to promote her views and influence in
it, she will desist even from those practices, unless unexpected
events in Europe, or the acquisition of Louisiana and the Floridas,
should induce her to continue them. And I believe further, that
although the leaders of their party in this country will not change
their sentiments, they will be obliged to change their plan, or the
mode of carrying it on. The effervescence which is appearing in all
quarters, and the desertion of their followers, will frown them into
silence--at least for a while.
[Footnote 56: See note No. XVIII. at the end of the volume.]
"If I did not view things in this light, my mind would be infinitely
more disquieted than it is: for, if a crisis should arrive when a
sense of duty, or a call from my country should become so imperious as
to leave me no choice, I should prepare for relinquishment, and go
with as much reluctance from my present peaceful abode, as I should go
to the tombs of my ancestors."
The opinion that prudence required preparations for open war, and that
General Washington must once more be placed at the head of the
American armies, strengthened every day; and on the 22d of June, the
President addressed him a letter in which that subject was thus
alluded to.
"In forming an army, whenever I must come to that extremity, I am at
an immense loss whether to call out the old generals, or to appoint a
young set. If the French come here, we must learn to march with a
quick step, and to attack, for in that way only they are said to be
vulnerable. I must tax you, sometimes, for advice. We must have your
name, if you will in any case permit us to use it. There will be more
efficacy in it than in many an army."
A letter from the secretary of war, written four days afterwards,
concludes with asking, "May we flatter ourselves that, in a crisis so
awful and important, you will accept the command of all our armies? I
hope you will, because you alone can unite all hearts and all hands,
if it is possible that they can be united."