The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 (of 5)
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_In June, 1783, Washington spent some time in Princeton, New Jersey,
whither the Continental Congress had adjourned from Philadelphia in
consequence of a mutiny among the unpaid troops stationed there. On
leaving Princeton the American Commander-in-Chief donated 50 guineas
to the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University. The trustees
spent the money on this portrait and had it put in the frame formerly
occupied by a picture of King George III, which was destroyed by a
cannon ball in the Battle of Princeton. This canvas still hangs in the
Princeton Faculty room._
By Courtesy of Princeton University]
From governments accustomed to trust rather to artifice, than to force
or to reason, and influenced by vindictive passions which they have
not strength or courage to gratify, hostility may be expected to exert
itself in a cruel insidious policy, which unfeelingly dooms
individuals to chains, and involves them in ruin, without having a
tendency to effect any national object. But the British character
rather wounds by its pride, and offends by its haughtiness, and open
violence, than injures by the secret indulgence of a malignant, but a
paltry and unprofitable revenge: and, certainly, such unworthy motives
ought not lightly to be imputed to a great and magnanimous nation,
which dares to encounter a world, and risk its existence, for the
preservation of its station in the scale of empires, of its real
independence, and of its liberty.
But, in believing the views of the British cabinet to be unfriendly to
the United States, America was perhaps not entirely mistaken. Indeed,
dispositions of a different nature could not reasonably have been
expected. It may be denied, but can not be disguised, that the
sentiments openly expressed by a great majority of the American
people, warranted the opinion that, notwithstanding the exertions of
the administration, they were about to arrange themselves, in the war,
on the side of France. In a government like that of the United States,
no firmness on the part of the chief magistrate can long resist the
current of popular opinion; and that opinion, without professing it,
unquestionably led to war.
If the character of the British minister at Philadelphia is to be
collected from his intercourse with the executive of the country to
which he was deputed, there is reason to suppose that his
communications to his own government did not diminish the impression
which the evidence furnished on this subject, by the American people
themselves, was calculated to make. It is therefore not improbable,
whatever may be the permanent views of England respecting the
commercial prosperity of the United States, that the measures of the
British cabinet, about this time, were taken in the belief that war
between the two nations was a probable event.
[Sidenote: Report of the secretary of state in relation to the
commerce of the United States.]
Early in the session a report was made by the secretary of state, in
pursuance of a resolution of the house of representatives passed on
the 23d of February, 1791, requiring him "to report to congress the
nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the commercial
intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the
measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the
improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same."
This report stated the exports of the United States in articles of
their own produce and manufacture at nineteen millions, five hundred
and eighty-seven thousand, and fifty-five dollars; and the imports at
nineteen millions, eight hundred and twenty-three thousand, and sixty
dollars.
Of the exports, nearly one-half was carried to the kingdom of Great
Britain and its dominions; of the imports, about four-fifths were
brought from the same countries. The American shipping amounted to two
hundred and seventy-seven thousand, five hundred and nineteen tons, of
which not quite one-sixth was employed in the trade with Great Britain
and its dominions.
In all the nations of Europe, most of the articles produced in the
United States were subjected to heavy duties, and some of them were
prohibited. In England, the trade of the United States was in the
general on as good a footing as the trade of other countries; and
several articles were more favoured than the same articles of the
growth of other countries.
The statements and arguments of this report tended to enforce the
policy of making discriminations which might favour the commerce of
the United States with France, and discourage that with England; and
which might promote the increase of American navigation as a branch of
industry, and a resource of defence.
This was the last official act of the secretary of state. Early in the
preceding summer, he had signified to the President his intention to
retire in September from the public service; and had, with some
reluctance, consented to postpone the execution of this intention to
the close of the year. Retaining his purpose, he resigned his office
on the last day of December.
[Sidenote: He resigns.]
This gentleman withdrew from political station at a moment when he
stood particularly high in the esteem of his countrymen. His
determined opposition to the financial schemes which had been proposed
by the secretary of the treasury, and approved by the legislative and
executive departments of the government; his ardent and undisguised
attachment to the revolutionary party in France; the dispositions
which he was declared to possess in regard to Great Britain; and the
popularity of his opinions respecting the constitution of the United
States; had devoted to him that immense party whose sentiments were
supposed to comport with his, on most, or all of these interesting
subjects. To the opposite party he had, of course, become particularly
unacceptable. But the publication of his correspondence with Mr. Genet
dissipated much of the prejudice which had been excited against him.
He had, in that correspondence, maintained with great ability the
opinions embraced by the federalists on those points of difference
which had arisen between the two republics; and which, having become
universally the subjects of discussion, had in some measure displaced
those topics on which parties were previously divided. The partiality
for France that was conspicuous through the whole of it, detracted
nothing from its merit in the opinion of the friends of the
administration, because, however decided their determination to
support their own government in a controversy with any nation
whatever, they felt all the partialities for that republic which the
correspondence expressed. The hostility of his enemies therefore was,
for a time, considerably lessened, without a corresponding diminution
of the attachment of his friends. It would have been impracticable, in
office, long to preserve these dispositions. And it would have been
difficult to maintain that ascendency which he held over the minds of
those who had supported, and probably would continue to support, every
pretension of the French republic, without departing from principles
and measures which he had openly and ably defended.
[Sidenote: Is succeeded by Mr. Randolph.]
He was immediately succeeded by Mr. Edmund Randolph; and the office of
attorney general was filled by Mr. William Bradford, a gentleman of
considerable eminence in Pennsylvania.
{1794}
On the fourth of January, the house resolved itself into a committee
of the whole, on the report of the secretary of state, relative to the
privileges and restrictions of the commerce of the United States; when
Mr. Madison, after some prefatory observations, laid on the table a
series of resolutions[13] for the consideration of the members.
[Footnote 13: See note No. VII. at the end of the volume.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Madison's resolutions founded on the above report.]
These memorable resolutions embraced almost completely the idea of the
report. They imposed an additional duty on the manufactures, and on
the tonnage of vessels, of nations having no commercial treaty with
the United States; while they reduced the duties already imposed by
law, on the tonnage of vessels belonging to nations having such
commercial treaty: and they reciprocated the restrictions which were
imposed on American navigation.
[Sidenote: Debate thereon.]
On the 13th of January they were taken into consideration, when the
debate was opened by Mr. Smith of South Carolina.
After noticing the importance of the subject to the best interests of
the United States, he observed that, being purely commercial in its
nature, he would exclude from the view he should take of it, those
political considerations which some might think connected with it. He
imagined it would be right to dismiss, for the present, all questions
respecting the Indians, Algerines, and western posts. There would be a
time for these questions; and then he should give his opinion upon
them with firmness, and according to what he conceived to be the true
interests of his country. The regulation of commerce gave of itself
sufficient scope for argument, without mixing it with extraneous
matter.
After some general observations on the delicacy of the crisis, and on
the claims of the resolutions to dispassionate investigation, he
proceeded to consider the report on which they were founded.
The great object of that report being to establish a contrast between
France and Britain, he would request the attention of the committee to
an accurate statement of facts, which, being compared with the report,
would enable them to decide on the justness of its inferences.
In the opinion that any late relaxations of the French republic were
produced by interests too momentary and fluctuating to be taken as the
basis of calculations for a permanent system, he should present a
comparative view of the commerce of the United States to those
countries, as it stood anterior to the revolution of France. For this
purpose, he produced a table which had been formed by a person whose
commercial information was highly respectable, from which he said it
would appear, notwithstanding the plaudits so generally bestowed on
the justice and liberality of the one nation, and the reproaches
uttered against the other, that, with the exception of the trifling
article of fish oil, the commerce of the United States was not more
favoured in France than in Great Britain, and was, in many important
articles, more favoured by the latter power, than that of other
nations.
Mr. Smith then reviewed, in detail, the advantages and disadvantages
attending the sale of the great products of America in the ports of
each nation, which, he conceived, were more encouraged by the British
than by the French market.
A comparative statement, he added, of the value of the exports of the
two countries, would assist in confirming this opinion.
The value of the exports to Great Britain, at the close of the year
ending with September, 1789, was nearly double those made to France in
the same period: and even the average of the years 1790, 1791 and
1792, gave an annual excess to the exports to Great Britain of three
millions, seven hundred and fifty-two thousand, seven hundred and
sixty dollars.
The great amount of merchandise imported from Britain, instead of
being a grievance, demonstrated, in the opinion of Mr. Smith, the
utility of the trade with that country. For the extent of the
intercourse between the two nations, several obvious reasons might be
assigned. Britain was the first manufacturing country in the world,
and was more able, than any other, to supply an assortment of those
articles which were required in the United States. She entitled
herself, too, to the preference which was given her, by the extensive
credit she afforded. To a young country wanting capital, credit was of
immense advantage. It enabled them to flourish by the aid of foreign
capital, the use of which had, more than any other circumstance,
nourished the industry of America.
By the advocates for forcing a trade with France, it was asserted that
she could supply the wants of America on better terms than Great
Britain. To do this, she must not only sell cheaper, but give credit,
which, it was known her merchants either could not, or would not give.
The very necessity of laying a duty on British manufactures, in order
to find a sale for those of other countries, was a proof that the
first could be purchased on better terms, or were better adapted to
the market.
If the object of the resolutions were the encouragement of domestic
manufactures, there might be some semblance of argument in their
favour. But this is not contemplated. Their avowed object is to turn
the course of trade from one nation to another, by means which would
subject the citizens of the United States to great inconvenience.
Mr. Smith next proceeded to consider the subject with a view to
navigation.
The trade of the United States to Great Britain, for the
transportation of their own produce, was as free in American as in
British bottoms, a few trifling port charges excepted. In France, they
enjoyed the advantages granted to the most favoured nation. Thus far
the comparison was in favour of Great Britain. In the West Indies, he
admitted the existence of a different state of things. All American
bottoms were excluded from the British islands, with the exception of
Turks island. In the French islands, vessels under sixty tons were
admitted, but this advantage was common to all other nations.
The effect of the difference in the regulations of the two rival
nations in respect of navigation, was not so considerable as the
secretary of state had supposed. He had stated the tonnage employed in
the intercourse with France and her colonies, at 116,410 tons; and
that employed in the commerce with Great Britain at 43,580 tons. The
secretary was led into this miscalculation by taking for his guide,
the actual entries of American bottoms from the dominions of each
country in the year. As four voyages are made to the West Indies,
while only two are made to Europe, the vessels employed in the former
traffic will be counted four times in the year, and those employed in
the latter will be counted only twice in the same period. The
deceptiveness of the calculations made from these data had induced a
call on the secretary of the treasury for an account of the actual
tonnage employed in trade with foreign nations for one year. This
account shows that France employs 82,510 tons, and Great Britain
66,582 tons, of American shipping; leaving in favour of France, an
excess of 15,928, instead of 72,830 tons, as reported by the secretary
of state.
From this comparative view taken of the regulations of the two
nations, Mr. Smith conceived himself justified in saying, that the
commercial system of Great Britain towards the United States, far from
being hostile, was friendly; and that she made many discriminations in
their favour. France, on the contrary, placed them on a better
situation than her rival, only in one solitary instance, the
unimportant article of fish oil.
If this be a true picture of the existing state of things, and he
could not perceive in what it was defective, was it not time, he
asked, that the deceptions practised on the people by the eulogists of
France and the revilers of Great Britain, should be removed?
The resolutions were supported by Mr. Madison, Mr. Findley, Mr.
Nicholas, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Smiley, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Giles.
They admitted the subject before the committee to be of a commercial
nature, but conceived it to be impracticable to do justice to the
interests of the United States, without some allusions to politics.
The question was in some measure general. They were to inquire how far
it was the interest of this country by commercial regulations to vary
the state of commerce now existing. They were of opinion that most of
the injuries proceeding from Great Britain were inflicted for the
promotion of her commercial objects, and were to be remedied by
commercial resistance. The Indian war, and the Algerine attack,
originated both in commercial views, or Great Britain must stand
without excuse for instigating the most horrid cruelties. The
propositions before the committee were the strongest weapon America
possessed, and would, more probably than any other, restore her to all
her political and commercial rights. They professed themselves the
friends of free trade, and declared the opinion that it would be to
the general advantage, if all commerce was free. But this rule was not
without its exceptions. The navigation act of Great Britain was a
proof of the effect of one exception on the prosperity of national
commerce. The effect produced by that act was equally rapid and
extensive.
There is another exception to the advantages of a free trade, where
the situation of a country is such with respect to another, that by
duties on the commodities of that other, it shall not only invigorate
its own means of rivalship, but draw from that other the hands
employed in the production of those commodities. When such an effect
can be produced, it is so much clear gain, and is consistent with the
general theory of national rights.
The effect of leaving commerce to regulate itself is to submit it to
the regulation of other nations. If the United States had a commercial
intercourse with one nation only, and should permit a free trade,
while that nation proceeded on a monopolizing system, would not the
carrying trade be transferred to that nation, and with it, the
maritime strength it confers be heaped upon a rival? Then, in the same
proportion to the freedom granted to the vessels of other nations in
the United States, and to the burdens other nations impose on American
vessels, will be the transfer of those maritime resources.
The propositions before the committee should be examined as they
concern navigation, manufactures, and the just principles of
discrimination that ought to prevail in their policy to nations having
treaties with them.
With respect to navigation, it was conceded that they were not placed
upon the same footing by the two nations with whom they had the
greatest commercial intercourse. British vessels could bring the
produce of all countries into any port of the United States; while
American vessels could carry to the ports of Britain only their own
commodities, and those only to a part of her dominions. From her ports
in the West Indies they were entirely excluded.
To exhibit at a glance the effect of the British navigation act, it
was sufficient to compare the quantity of American and British tonnage
employed in their intercourse with each other. The former in 1790
amounted to 43,000 tons, and the latter to 240,000 tons. The effect of
British policy would be further shown by showing the proportion of
domestic tonnage employed at the same time in the intercourse with
other European nations. With Spain the American was to the Spanish as
five to one, with Portugal six to one, Netherlands fifteen to one,
Denmark twelve to one, France five to one, Great Britain one to five.
This ratio had by particular circumstances been somewhat changed. From
calculations founded on the documents last introduced into the house,
it appeared that, at present, the proportion of American to foreign
tonnage employed in the American trade was, with Spain as sixteen to
one, Portugal seventeen to one, Netherlands twenty-six to one, Denmark
fifteen to one, Russia fourteen to one, France between four and five
to one, and Great Britain one to three.
The situation of American commerce was the more mortifying when the
nature and amount of their exports came to be considered. They were
not only necessaries of life, or necessaries for manufactures, and
therefore of life to the manufacturer, but their bulkiness gave them
an advantage over the exports of every other country. If America, to
increase her maritime strength, should secure to herself the
transportation of her own commodities, leaving to other nations the
transportation of theirs, it would greatly augment the proportion of
her shipping and of her sailors.
In relation to manufactures, the regulations existing between the
United States and Great Britain were not more equal. Out of the whole
amount of manufactured articles imported into this country, which was
stated in round numbers at fifteen millions, two hundred and ninety
thousand dollars, Great Britain furnished thirteen millions, nine
hundred and sixty thousand. In the same period, in the year 1789-90,
the articles which the United States received from France, a country
which actually consumed more of their produce, amounted only to one
hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars. The balance of trade, at the
same epoch, was greatly in favour of the United States with every
other nation, and greatly against them with Britain. Although it might
happen in some cases, that other advantages might be derived from an
intercourse with a particular nation, which might compensate for an
unfavourable balance of trade, it was impossible that this could
happen in the intercourse with Great Britain. Other nations, however,
viewed a balance of trade against them as a real evil; and Great
Britain, in particular, was careful to prevent it. What then must be
the feelings of a nation, between whom and the United States the most
friendly relations existed, when she saw, not only the balance of
trade against her, but that what was thus obtained from her, flowed in
the same manner into the coffers of one of her most jealous rivals,
and inveterate enemies?
The propriety of discriminating between nations having treaties with
the United States, and those having none, was admitted in some states
before the establishment of the present government, and was sanctioned
by that house during their sittings in New York. It was the practice
of nations to make such a discrimination. It was necessary to give
value to treaties.
The disadvantages of depending on a single nation for articles of
necessary consumption was strongly pressed; and it was added as an
evil of most serious magnitude, more truly alarming than any other of
its features, that this commercial dependence produced an influence in
their councils which enabled it, the more inconvenient it became by
its constant growth, to throw the more obstacles in the way of a
necessary remedy.
They entertained no apprehensions of injurious consequences from
adopting the proposed resolutions. The interests of Great Britain
would not suffer her to retaliate: and the intercourse between the two
countries would not be interrupted further than was required by the
convenience and the interests of the United States. But if Great
Britain should retaliate, the effects of a commercial conflict would
be felt by her, much more sensibly, than by the United States. Its
effects would be felt in the shipping business, by the merchants, and
above all by the manufacturer.
Calculations were offered, by comparing the total amount of British
exports with those to the United States, to prove, that three hundred
thousand British manufacturers would be suddenly thrown out of
employment, by withdrawing the trade carried on between America and
that country. In the complication of distress to which such a measure
would reduce them, they would consider the United States as a natural
asylum from wretchedness. But whether they remained in discontent at
home, or sought their fortune abroad, the evil would be considered and
felt by the British government as equally great, and they would surely
beware of taking any step that might provoke it.
On the advantages of America in such a contest with a populous and
manufacturing country, they dwelt with peculiar earnestness. She
produced all the necessaries of life within herself, and could
dispense with the articles received from others. But Great Britain,
not producing them in sufficient abundance, was dependent on the
United States for the supply of her most essential wants. Again, the
manufacturer of that country was dependent on this for the sale of his
merchandise which was to purchase his bread. Thus was produced a
double dependence of Great Britain on the United States. She was also
dependent on them for the raw materials which formed the basis of her
manufactures. Her West Indies were almost completely dependent. This
country furnished the best market for their productions, and was
almost the only one which could supply them with the necessaries of
life. The regulation excluding the provisions of other foreign
countries was entitled to no consideration. It was of ancient date,
and had remained untouched because there was no other foreign country
by which provisions could be supplied.
That the commercial regulations of Great Britain were as favourable to
the United States as to other nations, ought not to satisfy America.
If other nations were willing to bear impositions, or were unable to
retaliate, their examples were not worthy of imitation. America was in
a condition to insist, and ought to insist, on perfect commercial
equality.