The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 (of 5)
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It was denied that any real advantage was derived from the extensive
credit given by the merchants of Great Britain. On the contrary, the
use made of British capital was pronounced a great political evil. It
increased the unfavourable balance of trade, discouraged domestic
manufactures, and promoted luxury. But its greatest mischief was, that
it favoured a system of British influence, which was dangerous to
their political security.
As the debate advanced, the expressions of exasperation against
Britain became stronger; and occasionally allusions were made to those
party questions which had long agitated the public mind, with a
bitterness which marked their intimate connexion with the conduct of
the United States to foreign countries.
It was said to be proper in deciding the question under debate, to
take into view political, as well as commercial considerations. Ill
will and jealousy had at all times been the predominant features of
the conduct of England to the United States. That government had
grossly violated the treaty of peace, had declined a commercial
treaty, had instigated the Indians to raise the tomahawk and scalping
knife against American citizens, had let loose the Algerines upon
their unprotected commerce, and had insulted their flag, and pillaged
their trade in every quarter of the world. These facts being
notorious, it was astonishing to hear gentlemen ask how had Britain
injured their commerce?
The conduct of France, on the contrary, had been warm and friendly.
That nation respected American rights, and had offered to enter into
commercial arrangements on the liberal basis of perfect reciprocity.
The period which Mr. Smith had taken as that at which the systems of
the two nations should be compared with each other, was reprobated
with peculiar severity. It was insinuated to proceed from a wish that
the United States should directly countenance the restoration of
despotism; and much regret was expressed that a distrust of the
permanency of the French revolution should be avowed. It was hoped and
believed that the present was the settled state of things; and that
the old order of things was unsettled for ever: that the French
revolution was as much more permanent than had been the French
despotism, as was the great fabric of nature, than the petty plastic
productions of art. To exclude the period since the revolution, would
be to exclude some of the strongest evidences of the friendship of one
nation, and the enmity of the other.
The animadversions which had been made on the report of the secretary
of state were retorted with acrimony. It was declared that he would
not suffer by a comparison in point of intelligence, accuracy, and
patriotism, either with the laborious compiler of the table produced
by Mr. Smith, or with the gentleman who had been judiciously selected
for its interpreter. Some explanations were given of the inaccuracies
which had been alleged; and the facts omitted were declared to be
immaterial circumstances, which, if inserted, would have swelled the
report, without adding to the information it communicated.
In reply to the argument which stated that Great Britain did not, in
common years, raise a sufficient quantity of grain for her own
consumption, and would consequently afford an increasing market for
American wheat and flour, it was remarked that this not only
established the all important position of the dependence of that
country on this, but suggested a very interesting reflection. It was
that the continual increase of debt and paper machinery, will not
produce a correspondent increase of ability in the nation to feed
itself. That an infinity of paper will not produce an infinity of
food.
In contrasting the ability of the two nations to support a commercial
conflict, it was said, "Great Britain, tottering under the weight of a
king, a court, a nobility, a priesthood, armies, navies, debts, and
all the complicated machinery of oppression which serves to increase
the number of unproductive, and lessen the number of productive hands;
at this moment engaged in a foreign war; taxation already carried to
the ultimatum of financial device; the ability of the people already
displayed in the payment of taxes, constituting a political
phenomenon; all prove the debility of the system, and the decreptitude
of old age. On the other hand, the United States, in the flower of
youth; increasing in hands; increasing in wealth; and, although an
imitative policy had unfortunately prevailed in the erection of a
funded debt, in the establishment of an army, the anticipation of a
navy,[14] and all the paper machinery for increasing the number of
unproductive, and lessening the number of productive hands; yet the
operation of natural causes has, as yet, in some degree, countervailed
their influence, and still furnish a great superiority in comparison
with Great Britain."
An attempt was made to liken the present situation of America to that
in which she stood at the commencement of her revolutionary war; and
the arguments drawn from the inconvenience to which a privation of
British manufactures would expose the people at large were answered by
observing--"This was not the language of America at the time of the
non-importation association; this was not her language at the time of
the declaration of independence. Whence then this change of American
sentiment? Has America less ability than she then had? Is she less
prepared for a national trial than she then was? This can not be
pretended. There is, it is true, one great change in her political
situation. America has now a funded debt: she had no funded debt at
those glorious epochs. May not this change of sentiment, therefore, be
looked for in her change of situation in this respect? May it not be
looked for in the imitative sympathetic organization of our funds with
the British funds? May it not be looked for in the indiscriminate
participation of citizens and foreigners in the emoluments of the
funds? May it not be looked for in the wishes of some to assimilate
the government of the United States to that of Great Britain? or at
least, in wishes for a more intimate connexion?
[Footnote 14: Resolutions had been offered for the creation
of a small navy to be employed in the Mediterranean.]
"If these causes exist, it is not difficult to find the source of the
national debility. It is not difficult to see that the interests of
the few, who receive and disburse the public contributions, are more
respected than the interest of the great majority of the society, who
furnish the contributions. It is not difficult to see that the
government, instead of legislating for a few millions, is legislating
for a few thousands; and that the sacredness of their rights is the
great obstacle to a great national exertion."
In addition to Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, the resolutions were
opposed by Mr. Smith, of Maryland, Mr. Goodhue, Mr. Lea, Mr. Dexter,
Mr. Ames, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Hartley, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Hillhouse, Mr.
Forest, Mr. Fitzsimmons, and Mr. Foster.
If, it was said, the United States had sustained political wrongs from
Great Britain, they should feel as keenly as any persons for the
prostrated honour of their country; but this was not the mode of
redressing them. When that subject should be brought before congress,
they would not be slow in taking such measures as the actual state of
things might require. But they did not approve of retaliating injuries
under the cloak of commercial regulations. Independent of other
objections, it would derogate from the dignity of the American
character.
The resolutions, it was said, ought to be contemplated commercially;
and the influence they would probably have on the United States,
deliberately weighed. If they were adopted, it ought to be because
they would promote the interests of America, not because they would
benefit one foreign nation, and injure another. It was an old adage
that there was no friendship in trade. Neither ought there to be any
hatred. These maxims should not be forgotten in forming a judgment on
the propositions before the committee. Their avowed objects were to
favour the navigation and the manufactures of the United States, and
their probable operation on these objects ought to be considered.
It had been said that the American tonnage ought to bear the same
proportion to the foreign tonnage employed in her trade, as exists
between the bulk of her exports and imports. But the correctness of
this principle was not admitted. The fact was otherwise, and it was
not believed to be an evil.
Great Britain carries for other nations from necessity. Her situation
is calculated for navigation. Her country is fully peopled, so full
that the ground is not sufficient to furnish bread for the whole.
Instead, therefore, of ploughing the earth for subsistence, her
subjects are obliged to plough the ocean. The defence of their coasts
has been another cause which obliges them to abandon the more
lucrative pursuits of agriculture, to provide for their defence. They
have been compelled to sacrifice profit to safety.
The United States possessed a fertile, extensive, and unsettled
country; and it might well be questioned how far their real interests
would be promoted by forcing a further acceleration of the growth of
their marine, by impelling their citizens from the cultivation of the
soil to the navigation of the ocean. The measures already adopted had
been very operative; and it was by no means certain that an additional
stimulus would be advantageous. The increased duty on foreign tonnage,
and on goods imported in foreign bottoms, had already been attended
with sensible effects. In 1790, the American tonnage was one-half the
whole tonnage employed in their trade: in 1791, it was three-fifths:
in 1792, it had increased to two-thirds. This growth was believed to
be sufficiently rapid. It was more rapid than the growth of British
tonnage had ever been under the fostering care of their celebrated
navigation act. Let the existing system be left to its natural
operation, and it was believed that it would give to the United States
that share in the carriage of their commodities, which it was their
interest to take.
But if a different opinion prevailed, and it was conceived that
additional encouragement ought to be given to navigation, then let the
duty on all foreign bottoms be increased, and let the particular
disabilities to which American vessels are subjected in any country,
be precisely retaliated. The discriminations proposed, instead of
increasing American navigation, were calculated to encourage the
navigation of one foreign nation at the expense of another.
The United States did not yet possess shipping sufficient for the
exportation of their produce. The residue must reach a market in
foreign bottoms, or rot upon their hands. They were advancing to a
different state of things; but, in the mean time, they ought to pursue
their interest, and employ those vessels which would best answer their
purpose. The attempt to make it their interest to employ the vessels
of France rather than those of Britain, by discriminating duties which
must enhance the price of freight, was a premium to the vessels of the
favourite nation, paid by American agriculture.
The navigation act of Great Britain had been made a subject of heavy
complaint. But that act was not particularly directed against the
United States. It had been brought into operation while they were yet
colonies, and was not more unfavourable to them than to others. To its
regulations, Great Britain was strongly attached; and it was not
probable that America could compel her to relinquish them.
Calculations were made on the proportion of British manufactures
consumed in America, from which it was inferred that her trade, though
important, was not sufficiently important to force that nation to
abandon a system which she considered as the basis of her grandeur. In
the contest, considerable injury would be unquestionably sustained;
and nothing was perceived in the situation of the United States, which
should induce them to stand forth the champions of the whole
commercial world, in order to compel the change of a system, in which
all other nations had acquiesced. But if they were to engage in such a
contest, it was by a similar act, by opposing disabilities to
disabilities, that it ought to be carried on. Upon this point, several
members who were opposed to the resolutions, avowed an opinion
favourable to an American navigation act, and expressed their
willingness to concur in framing regulations which meet the
prohibitions imposed on their vessels with corresponding prohibitions.
Thus far they were ready to go; but they were not ready to engage in a
contest injurious to themselves, for the benefit of a foreign nation.
Another avowed object of the resolutions was to favour the
manufactures of the United States. But certainly it was not by
discriminating duties, by endeavouring to shift commerce from one
channel to another, that American manufactures were to be promoted.
This was to be done by pursuing the course already adopted, by laying
protecting duties on selected articles, in the manufacture of which
America had made some progress; and by a prohibitory duty on others,
of which a sufficient domestic supply could be afforded. But the
proposed measure only went to the imposition of a tax on their own
citizens, for the benefit of a foreign nation.
If the British market afforded an assortment of goods best suited to
their consumption, and could give them cheaper, a prohibitory duty
imposed upon those goods would only drive their citizens to seek them
in another market, less able to supply their wants, and at a dearer
rate. There was nothing in this tending to encourage manufactures.
If the United States were prepared to manufacture to the whole amount
of their wants, the importation of all rival articles might be
prohibited. But this they were not prepared to do. Their manufactures
must advance by slow degrees; and they were not to enter into a
measure of this kind, for the purpose of retaliating on a nation which
had not commercially injured them.
The resolutions then were adapted to the encouragement neither of the
navigation, nor the manufactures of the United States, but of a
foreign nation. Their effect would obviously be to force trade to
change its natural course, by discriminations against a nation which
had in no instance discriminated against the United States, but had
favoured them in many points of real importance. By what commercial
considerations could such a system be recommended?
That it would be attended with great immediate inconveniences must be
admitted; but for these, ample compensation, it had been said, was to
be found in its remote advantages. These were, a diminution of
American commerce with one nation, by its proportional augmentation
with another; and a repeal of the navigation act, and of the colonial
system of Great Britain.
On the subject of forcing trade from one nation to another, which is,
of necessity, so complicated in principle, so various and invisible in
consequence, the legislature should never act but with the utmost
caution. They should constantly keep in view, that trade will seek its
own markets, find its own level, and regulate itself much better than
it could be regulated by law. Although the government might embarrass
it, and injure their own citizens, and even foreign nations, for a
while, it would eventually rise above all the regulations they could
make. Merchants, if left to themselves, would always find the best
markets. They would buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible. Why
drive them from those markets into others which were less
advantageous? If trade with Britain was less free, or less profitable,
than with France, the employment of coercive means to force it into
French channels would be unnecessary. It would voluntarily run in
them. That violence must be used in order to change its course,
demonstrated that it was in its natural course.
It was extraordinary to hear gentlemen complaining of British
restrictions on American commerce, and at the same time stating her
proportion of that commerce as a national grievance, and that the
trade was so free as to become an injury. The very circumstance that
she retained so large a share of it, was evidence that it did not
experience in her ports unusual burdens. Whenever greater advantages
were offered by other countries, there would be no need of legislative
interference to induce the merchants to embrace them. That portion of
trade would go to each country, for which the circumstances of each
were calculated. If Great Britain purchased more American produce than
she consumed, it was because, all circumstances considered, it was the
interest of America to sell her more than she consumed. While this
interest continued, no mischief could result from the fact; when the
cause should cease, the effect would cease also, without the
intervention of the legislature.
It was very improbable that the resolutions under consideration would
effect their other avowed object, a repeal of the British navigation
act.
The season, it was said, was peculiarly unfavourable to such
experiments. The internal convulsions of France had laid her
manufactures in ruins. She was not in a condition to supply her own
wants, much less those of the United States. The superb column erected
at Lyons could furnish no stimulus to the industry of her
manufacturers.
But the attempt to stop the natural intercourse between the United
States and Great Britain, though incapable of producing on the latter
the full effect which was desired, might inflict deep and lasting
wounds on the most essential interests of the former. The injuries
which their agriculture would sustain from the measure, might be long
and severely felt.
It had been proudly stated, that while America received articles which
might be dispensed with, she furnished in return the absolute
necessaries of life; she furnished bread, and raw materials for
manufactures. "One would think," said Mr. Tracy, "to hear the
declarations in this house, that all men were fed at the opening of
our hand; and, if we shut that hand, the nations starve, and if we but
shake the fist after it is shut, they die." And yet one great
objection to the conduct of Britain was, her prohibitory duty on the
importation of bread stuff while it was under a certain price.
Nothing could be more deceptive than the argument founded on the
nature of American exports. What, it was asked, would be done with the
surplus produce of the United States? Was it to remain in the country,
and rot upon the hands of those who raised it? If not, if it was to be
exported, it would find its way to the place of demand. Food would
search out those who needed it; and the raw material would be carried
to the manufacturer whose labour could give it value.
But there was a much more serious aspect in which this subject ought
to be placed. The products of America grew in other soils than hers.
The demands for them might be supplied by other countries. Indeed, in
some instances, articles usually obtained from the United States would
be excluded by a fair competition with the same articles furnished by
other countries. The discriminations made in their favour enabled them
to obtain a preference in the British market. By withholding those
which were of the growth of the United States, Great Britain would not
lose the article, but America would lose the market; and a formidable
rival would be raised up, who would last much longer than the
resolutions under consideration. It is easy by commercial regulations
to do much mischief, and difficult to retrieve losses. It is
impossible to foresee all evils which may arise out of such measures;
and their effects may last after the cause is removed.
The opponents of the resolutions persisted to consider the credit
given by British merchants, as a solid advantage to any country which,
like the United States, was defective in commercial capital; but they
denied that, from that source, any political influence had arisen.
"If," said Mr. Tracy, "we may argue from a great state, Virginia, to
the union, this is not true; for although that state owes immense
debts, her representatives come forward with great spirit to bring
Great Britain to her feet. The people to the eastward do not owe the
English merchants, and are very generally opposed to these
regulations. These facts must convince us that the credit given by
Great Britain, does not operate to produce a fear, and a dependence,
which can be alarming to government."
"If," said Mr. Dexter, "I have a predilection for any country besides
my own, that bias is in favour of France, the place of my father's
sepulture. No one, more than myself, laments the spasm of patriotism
which convulses that nation, and hazards the cause of freedom; but I
shall not suffer the torrent of love or hatred to sweep me from my
post. I am sent neither to plead the cause of France nor England, but
am delegated as a guardian of the rights and interests of America."
The speakers against the resolutions universally laboured to exclude
from all weight in the decision on them, considerations which were
foreign to the interests of the United States. "The discussion of this
subject," said Mr. Tracy, "has assumed an appearance which must be
surprising to a stranger, and painful in the extreme to ourselves. The
supreme legislature of the United States is seriously deliberating,
not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative
circumstances of two European nations; and this deliberation has not
for its object, the relative benefits of their markets to us, but
which form of government is best and most like our own, which people
feel the greatest affection for us, and what measures we can adopt
which will best humble one and exalt the other.
"The primary motive of these resolutions, as acknowledged by their
defenders, is, not the increase of our agriculture, manufactures, or
navigation, but to humble Great Britain and build up France; and
although it is said our manufactures and navigation may receive some
advantage, it is only mentioned as a substitute in case of failure as
to the great object.
"The discussion in favour of these resolutions has breathed nothing
but hostility and revenge against the English; and yet _they_ put on
the mild garb of commercial regulations. Legislatures, always cautious
of attempting to force trade from its own channels and habits, should
certainly be peculiarly cautious, when they do undertake such
business, to set about it with temperance and coolness; but in this
debate, we are told of the inexecution of a former treaty, withholding
western posts, insults and dominations of a haughty people, that
through the agency of Great Britain the savages are upon us on one
side, and the Algerines on the other. The mind is roused by a group of
evils, and then called upon to consider a statement of duties on goods
imported from foreign countries. If the subject is commercial, why not
treat it commercially, and attend to it with coolness? if it is a
question of political hostility, or of war, a firmer tone may be
adopted."
On this side of the question, the conduct of Great Britain, if as
hostile as it was represented to be, was spoken of with high
indignation. "If," said Mr. Tracy, "these statements are founded in
fact, I can not justify myself to my constituents, or my conscience,
in saying the adoption of the regulations of commerce, a navigation
act, or the whole parade of shutting ports, and freeing trade from its
shackles, is in any degree calculated to meet or remedy the evil.
"Although I deprecate war as the worst of calamities for my country,
yet I would inquire seriously whether we had on our part, fulfilled
the treaty with Great Britain, and would do complete justice to them
first. I would negotiate as long and as far as patience ought to go;
and, if I found an obstinate denial of justice, I would then lay the
hand of force upon the western posts, and would teach the world that
the United States were no less prompt in commanding justice to be done
them, than they had been patient and industrious in attempting to
obtain it by fair and peaceable means. In this view of the subject I
should be led to say, away with your milk and water regulations; they
are too trifling to effect objects of such importance. Are the
Algerines to be frightened with paper resolves, or the Indians to be
subdued, or the western posts taken, by commercial regulations? when
we consider the subject merely as a commercial one, it goes too far,
and attempts too much; but when considered as a war establishment, it
falls infinitely short of the mark, and does too little."
This earnest and interesting debate was protracted to a great length,
and was conducted on both sides with great spirit and eloquence. At
length, on the third of February, the question was taken on the first
resolution, which was carried by a majority of five. The further
consideration of the resolutions was then postponed until the first
Monday in March.