The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 (of 5)
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This animated debate was succeeded by another, on a question which
also brought into full view, the systems that were embraced by the
opposite parties, on some of those great national subjects which give
a character to an administration.
On the second of January, a resolution was agreed to in the house of
representatives declaring "that a naval force adequate to the
protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine
corsairs, ought to be provided." The force proposed was to consist of
six frigates; four of forty-four, and two of thirty-six guns.
This measure was founded on the communications of the President,
representing the improbability of being able to negotiate a peace with
the dey of Algiers; and on undoubted information that the corsairs of
that regency had, during their first short cruise in the Atlantic,
captured eleven American merchantmen, and made upwards of one hundred
prisoners; and were preparing to renew their attack on the unprotected
vessels of the United States.
In every stage of its progress this bill was most strenuously opposed.
[Sidenote: Debates on the subject of a navy.]
The measure was viewed simply as a present protection to commerce, and
then as the commencement of a permanent naval establishment. In both
characters it was reprobated with extreme severity.
As a measure of protection, it was declared to be altogether
incompetent to the attainment of its object, because the force
contemplated was insufficient, and because it could not be brought
into immediate use. The measure, therefore, would be totally
inefficacious.
But the object might be effected by other means, more eligible, and
less expensive. By proper management, and a due attention to time and
circumstances, a peace might be procured with money.
Nations possessing a naval force greatly superior to the proposed
armament, had found it to their advantage to purchase the friendship
of the Algerines. That mode of procuring peace was recommended both by
its efficacy, and its economy. Unless the object was obtained, the
money would not be expended.
Another mode of giving security to their commerce, preferable to the
plan in the bill, was to purchase the protection of foreign powers.
This might be acquired at a less expense than would be incurred in
fitting out the proposed armament, and its utility would be immediate.
But the measure was also to be considered as the commencement of a
permanent navy. The question which this view of it presented, was one
of the most important that could engage the consideration of the
house. The adoption of the principle would involve a complete
dereliction of the policy of discharging the public debt. History
afforded no instance of a nation which continued to increase its navy,
and at the same time to decrease its debt.
To the expensiveness of the navy system were ascribed the oppression
under which the people of England groaned, the overthrow of the French
monarchy, and the dangers which threatened that of Great Britain. The
expensiveness of the government was the true ground of the oppression
of the people. The king, the nobility, the priesthood, the _army_, and
above all, the navy. All this machinery lessens the number of
productive, and increases the number of unproductive hands in the
nation.
The United States had already advanced full far enough in this system.
In addition to the civil list, they had funded a debt on the
principles of duration, had raised an army at an immense expense, and
now a proposition was made for a navy.
The system of governing by debts, was the most refined system of
tyranny. It seemed to be a contrivance devised by politicians to
succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both were tyrannical, but
the objects of their tyranny were different. The one operated on the
person, the other operates on the pockets of the individual. The
feudal lord was satisfied with the acknowledgment of the tenant that
he was a slave, and the rendition of a pepper corn as an evidence of
it; the product of his labour was left for his own support. The system
of debts affords no such indulgence. Its true policy is to devise
objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the
people in the least visible mode. No device can facilitate the system
of debts and expense so much as a navy; and they should hold the
liberty of the American people at a lower rate, should this policy be
adopted.
Another great objection to the establishment of a navy was, that until
the United States should be able to contend with the great maritime
powers on the ocean, it would be a hostage, to its full value, for
their good behaviour. It would increase rather than lessen their
dependence.
In reply, it was said that if it had been the intention of the house
to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy for vain
parade, there might be force in some of the objections which had been
made. But this was not the case. It was a measure, not of choice, but
of necessity. It was extorted by the pressure of unavoidable events.
It being universally admitted that their commerce required protection
against the Algerine corsairs, the question was, simply, whether the
plan proposed in the bill was the best mode of affording that
protection.
To decide this question, it would be proper to consider the
substitutes which had been offered; and then to review the objections
which had been made to the measure.
The substitutes were, first, to purchase a peace; and secondly, to
subsidize other nations to protect commerce.
On the first substitute, it was said that the late communications must
satisfy every person who had attended to them, that all hope of
purchasing a peace must be abandoned, unless there was a manifestation
of some force which might give effect to negotiation. So long as the
vessels of the United States remained an easy and tempting prey to the
cupidity of those corsairs, it would be vain to expect that they would
sell a peace for the price the government would be willing to give, or
that a peace would be of any duration. If the executive had
experienced such difficulties while the Algerine cruisers had captured
only one or two vessels, and were confined to the Mediterranean by a
Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after
they had captured a considerable number of ships, were likely to
capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise on the Atlantic to
the very coasts of the United States? Even that little prospect of
success would be diminished, when the dey of Algiers should understand
that the United States would take no measures to protect their trade,
and were afraid of the expense of a small armament.
It was to be understood that they did not rely solely on the
operations of the armament. They still looked forward to negotiation,
and were willing to provide the means for purchasing a peace. But the
former measure was necessary to give success to the latter, and the
armament might be employed to advantage should negotiation fail.
The other substitute was to subsidize foreign powers. The national
dishonour of depending upon others for that protection which the
United States were able to afford themselves, was strongly urged. But
there were additional objections to this project. Either the nations
in contemplation were at peace or at war with the regency of Algiers.
If the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish
that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them.
If the latter, they had sufficient inducements to check the
depredations of their enemies without subsidies. Such a protection
would be hazardous, as it would be, at any time, in the power of the
nation that should be employed, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and
leave the trade of the United States at the mercy of her corsairs.
While the expense of protection was perpetually to be incurred, it
would never furnish the strength which that expense ought to give.
With a navy of her own, America might co-operate to advantage with any
power at war with Algiers, but it would be risking too much to depend
altogether on any foreign nation.
To the argument that the force was incompetent to the object, it was
answered, that, from the documents before them, and from the diligent
inquiries of a large committee, the number and strength of the
Algerine corsairs had been ascertained, and the armament contemplated
in the bill was believed to be sufficient. If gentlemen thought
differently, it was surprising that they did not move to augment it.
The expense of the frigates had been strongly urged. But the saving in
insurance, in ships and cargoes, and in the ransom of seamen, was more
than equivalent to this item. "But are not the slavery of our fellow
citizens, and the national disgrace resulting from it, to be taken
into the account? these are considerations beyond all calculation. Who
can, after reading the affecting narratives of the unfortunate, sit
down contented with cold calculations and syllogisms? their narratives
ought to excite every possible exertion, not only to procure the
release of the captured, but to prevent the increase of the number of
these unhappy victims."
That a bill providing six frigates, to exist during the war with the
Algerines, should excite apprehensions of a large permanent navy, and
of an immense debt, was truly astonishing. But even if the bill had
not contained a clause enabling the President to discontinue the
armament provided peace should be concluded with the regency of
Algiers, the weight of the objection was denied. America was
peculiarly fitted for a navy; she abounded in all kinds of naval
resources, and had within herself, those means which other nations
were obliged to obtain from abroad. Her situation, and the
dispositions of a considerable proportion of her citizens, evinced
still more the propriety of a naval establishment. Perhaps the country
was not yet mature for such an establishment to any great extent. But
the period was not far distant when it would be. The United States had
an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable
national resources. It was not believed that the expense of equipping
a small naval armament for the protection of their commerce, would be
insupportable.
It was, however, matter of surprise, that gentlemen who had deemed the
improvement of American navigation, as a source of defence, an object
of so much importance as to be anxious to wage an immediate commercial
war with Great Britain for that purpose, should avow such a fixed
determination against resorting to that resource in any degree
whatever, under circumstances the most urgent.
The original resolution was carried only by a majority of two voices;
but as the bill advanced, several members who were accustomed to vote
in the opposition gave it their support; and, on the final question, a
majority of eleven appeared in its favour. The other branch of the
legislature concurred, and it received the cordial assent of the
President.
Pending these discussions, the irritations in which they commenced
were greatly aggravated by accounts, that captures of American vessels
by British cruisers were made to an extent altogether unprecedented;
and early in March, an authentic paper was received which proved that
those captures were not unauthorized.
On the sixth of November, 1793, additional instructions had been
issued to the ships of war and privateers of Great Britain, requiring
them to stop and detain all ships, laden with goods the produce of any
colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies
to any such colony, and to bring the same, with their cargoes, to
legal adjudication, in the British courts of admiralty.
These instructions made a serious impression on the most reflecting
and moderate men in the United States. It was believed that they
originated in a spirit of hostility which must lead to war; and that
it had now become the part of prudence to prepare for that event.
On the 12th of March, Mr. Sedgewick moved several resolutions, the
objects of which were to raise a military force, and to authorize the
President to lay an embargo. The armament was to consist of fifteen
thousand men, who should be brought into actual service in case of war
with any European power, but not until war should break out. In the
mean time, they were to receive pay while assembled for the purpose of
discipline, which was not to exceed twenty-four days in each year.
After stating the motives which led to the introduction of these
resolutions, they were laid on the table for the consideration of the
members. Two days afterwards, a motion was made to take up that which
related to an embargo; but this motion was negatived for the purpose
of resuming the consideration of the commercial regulations which had
been offered by Mr. Madison. On the motion of Mr. Nicholas, those
resolutions were amended so as to subject the manufactures of Great
Britain alone, instead of those of all nations having no commercial
treaties with the United States, to the proposed augmentation of
duties. They were again debated with great earnestness, but no
decision on them was made.
In addition to the objections urged against them as forming a
commercial system in time of peace, they were said to be particularly
inapplicable to the present moment. If, as was believed, the United
States were about to be forced into a war, the public counsels ought
to be directed to measures of defence. In that event, the resolutions
would, at best, be useless. But the greater the danger of war, the
more incumbent was it on the government to unite public opinion in
support of it; and this would best be effected by observing a line of
conduct which would furnish no just cause of hostility. The commercial
discriminations proposed were of a hostile and irritating nature,
might render war certain, would be considered by many as unnecessary,
and might impair that unanimity in which the great strength of the
country consisted. It was submitted to the gentlemen to decide whether
it was wise to press their system through, with so small a majority as
was in its favour.
The resolutions were defended on the principle, that though not in
themselves contributing to the national defence, they would not
prevent the adoption of such other measures as the state of things
might render necessary. If war should take place, they could do no
harm. But war must at some time be succeeded by peace: and they would
form a valuable basis for negotiation.[15]
[Footnote 15: In the course of this debate the resolutions
were still considered as calculated to promote the
interests, not of the United States, but of France. Mr. Ames
said they had _French_ stamped upon the very face of them.
This expression produced a warm retort from Colonel Parker.
He wished there was a stamp on the forehead of every person
to designate whether he was for France or Britain. For
himself he would not be silent and hear that nation abused
to whom America was indebted for her rank as a nation. He
was firmly persuaded that but for the aid of France in the
last war, those gentlemen now on the floor who prided
themselves in abusing her, would not have had an opportunity
in that place of doing it. This sentiment produced a clap in
the galleries. This indecorum was severely reprobated, and a
motion was made to clear the galleries. Although the debate
shows that the degree of sensibility excited by this
disorder was extremely different in the different parties,
it was justified by none, and the galleries were cleared.]
[Sidenote: An embargo law.]
On the 21st of March, Mr. Sedgewick's motion authorizing the President
to lay an embargo was negatived by a majority of two voices; but in a
few days, the consideration of that subject was resumed, and a
resolution passed, prohibiting all trade from the United States to any
foreign port or place for the space of thirty days, and empowering the
President to carry the resolution into effect.
This resolution was accompanied with vigorous provisional measures for
defence, respecting the adoption of which, no considerable division of
sentiment was avowed.
While the measures of congress indicated that expectation of war, a
public document made its appearance which seemed to demonstrate that
Great Britain also was preparing for that event. This was the answer
of Lord Dorchester, on the 10th of February, to a speech delivered by
the deputies of a great number of Indian tribes assembled at Quebec.
In this answer, his lordship had openly avowed the opinion, founded,
as he said, on the conduct of the American people, that a war between
Great Britain and the United States, during the present year, was
probable, and that a new line between the two nations must then be
drawn by the sword.
This document was not authentic; but it obtained general belief, and
contributed to confirm the opinion that war was scarcely to be
avoided.
On the 27th of March, Mr. Dayton moved a resolution for sequestering
all debts due to British subjects, and for taking means to secure
their payment into the treasury, as a fund out of which to indemnify
the citizens of the United States for depredations committed on their
commerce by British cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations.
The debate on this resolution was such as was to be expected from the
irritable state of the public mind. The invectives against the British
nation were uttered with peculiar vehemence, and were mingled with
allusions to the exertions of the government for the preservation of
neutrality, censuring strongly the system which had been pursued.
Before any question was taken on the proposition for sequestering
British debts, and without a decision on those proposed by Mr.
Madison, Mr. Clarke moved a resolution, which in some degree suspended
the commercial regulations that had been so earnestly debated. This
was to prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain until her
government should make full compensation for all injuries done to the
citizens of the United States by armed vessels, or by any person or
persons acting under the authority of the British king; and until the
western posts should be delivered up.[16]
[Footnote 16: A few days before the motions of Mr. Dayton
and Mr. Clarke, a report was made by the secretary of state
relative to the vexations of American commerce committed by
the officers and cruisers of the belligerent powers. It was
made from materials collected in an inquiry which had been
instituted by the President before the meeting of congress.
In this report, after detailing the numerous complaints
which were made against Great Britain, the secretary
proceeded to notice those which were brought against other
nations. Against France, he said, it was urged that her
privateers harassed the American trade no less than those of
the British. That their courts of admiralty were guilty of
equal oppression. That they had violated the treaty between
the two nations. That a very detrimental embargo had
detained a number of American vessels in her ports, and that
the government had discharged a specie contract with
assignats. The effect of this report seems to have been to
excite a suspicion that the secretary of state was not
sufficiently attached to liberty and to France.]
On the fourth of April, before any decision was made on the several
propositions which have been stated, the President laid before
congress a letter just received from Mr. Pinckney, the minister of the
United States at London, communicating additional instructions to the
commanders of British armed ships, which were dated the eighth of
January. These instructions revoked those of the sixth of November;
and, instead of bringing in for adjudication all neutral vessels
trading with the French islands, British cruisers were directed to
bring in those only which were laden with cargoes the produce of the
French islands, and were on a direct voyage from those islands to
Europe.
The letter detailed a conversation with Lord Grenville on this
subject, in which his lordship explained the motives which had
originally occasioned the order of the sixth of November, and gave to
it a less extensive signification than it had received in the courts
of vice admiralty.
It was intended, he said, to be temporary, and was calculated to
answer two purposes. One was, to prevent the abuses which might take
place in consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone
to the United States; the other was, on account of the attack designed
upon the French West India islands by the armament under Sir John
Jarvis and Sir Charles Grey; but it was now no longer necessary to
continue the regulations for those purposes. His lordship added, that
the order of the sixth of November did not direct the confiscation of
all vessels trading with the French islands, but only that they should
be brought in for legal adjudication; and he conceived that no vessel
would be condemned under it, which would not have been previously
liable to the same sentence.
The influence of this communication on the party in the legislature
which was denominated federal, was very considerable. Believing that
the existing differences between the two nations still admitted of
explanation and adjustment, they strenuously opposed all measures
which were irritating in their tendency, or which might be construed
into a dereliction of the neutral character they were desirous of
maintaining; but they gave all their weight to those which, by putting
the nation in a posture of defence, prepared it for war, should
negotiation fail.
On the opposite party, no change of sentiment or of views appears to
have been produced. Their system seems to have been matured, and not
to have originated in the feelings of the moment. They adhered to it
therefore with inflexible perseverance; but seemed not anxious to
press an immediate determination of the propositions which had been
made. These propositions were discussed with great animation; but,
notwithstanding an ascertained majority in their favour, were
permitted to remain undecided, as if their fate depended on some
extrinsic circumstance.
Meanwhile, great exertions were made to increase the public agitation,
and to stimulate the resentments which were felt against Great
Britain. The artillery of the press was played with unceasing fury on
the minority of the house of representatives; and the democratic
societies brought their whole force into operation. Language will
scarcely afford terms of greater outrage than were employed against
those who sought to stem the torrent of public opinion, and to
moderate the rage of the moment. They were denounced as a British
faction, seeking to impose chains on their countrymen. Even the
majority was declared to be but half roused; and to show little of
that energy and decision which the crisis required.
Unequivocal evidence, it was said, had been obtained of the
liberticide intentions of Great Britain; and only the successes of
freedom against tyranny, the triumphs of their magnanimous French
brethren over slaves, had been the means of once more guaranteeing the
independence of this country. The glorious example of France ought to
animate the American people to every exertion to raise their prostrate
character; and every tie of gratitude and interest should lead them to
cement their connexion with that great republic. The proclamation of
neutrality, though admitted to have originated in the best motives on
the part of the President, was declared to be not only questionable in
a constitutional point of view, but eventually to have proved
impolitic. Being falsely construed by Great Britain into a
manifestation of a pusillanimous disposition, it served to explain the
aggressions of that nation. Experience now urged the abandonment of a
line of conduct, which had fed the pride and provoked the insults of
their unprincipled and implacable enemy; and was derogatory to the
honour, inconsistent with the interest, and hostile to the liberties
of their country.
Their tameness under British aggressions was declared to furnish just
cause of offence to France; since every infringement of right
submitted to by a neutral, inflicted a correspondent injury on the
nation at war with the offending power.
The proceedings of the legislature continued to manifest a fixed
purpose to pursue the system which had been commenced; and the public
sentiment seemed to accord with that system. That the nation was
advancing rapidly to a state of war, was firmly believed by many
intelligent men, who doubted the necessity, and denied the policy of
abandoning the neutral position which had been thus long maintained.
In addition to the extensive calamities which must, in any state of
things, result to the United States from a rupture with a nation which
was the mistress of the ocean, and which furnished the best market for
the sale of their produce, and the purchase of manufactures of
indispensable necessity, there were considerations belonging
exclusively to the moment, which, though operating only in a narrow
circle, were certainly entitled to great respect.