Ontario Normal School Manuals: Science of Education

O >> Ontario Ministry of Education >> Ontario Normal School Manuals: Science of Education

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25

CONDITIONS OF APPERCEPTION

=A. Present Knowledge.=--Since the mind can apperceive only that for
which it is prepared through former experience, the interpretation of
the same presentations will be likely to differ greatly in different
individuals. The book lying before him is to the young child a place in
which to find pictures, to the ignorant man a source of mysterious
information, and to the scholar a symbolic representation of certain
mathematical knowledge. In the same manner, the object outside the
window is a noxious weed to the farmer, a flower to the naturalist, and
a medicinal plant to the physician or the druggist. From this it is
clear that the interpretation of the impressions must differ according
to the character of our present knowledge. In other words, the more
important the aspects read into any presentation, the more valuable will
be the present experience. Although when the child apperceives a stick
as a horse, and the mechanic apperceives it as a lever, each
interpretation is valuable within its own sphere, yet there is evidently
a marked difference in the ultimate significance of the two
interpretations. Education is especially valuable, in fact, in that it
so adds to the experience of the child that he may more fully apperceive
his surroundings.

=B. Present Interests and Needs.=--But apperception is not solely
dependent upon present knowledge. The interests and needs of the
individual reflect themselves largely in his apperceptive tendencies.
While the boy sees a tent in the folded paper, the girl is more likely
to find in it a screen. To the little boy the lath is a horse, to the
older boy it becomes a sword. Feelings and interest, therefore, as well
as knowledge, dominate the apperceptive process. Nor should this fact be
overlooked by the teacher. The study of a poem would be very incomplete
and unsatisfactory if it stopped with the apprehension of the ideas.
There must be emotional appreciation as well; otherwise the study will
result in entire indifference to it. In introducing, for instance, the
sonnet, "Mysterious Night" (page 394, _Ontario Reader, Book IV_), the
teacher might ask: "Why can we not see the stars during the day?" The
answer to this question would put the pupils in the proper intellectual
attitude to interpret the ideas of the poem, but that is not enough. A
recall of such an experience as his contemplation of the starry sky on a
clear night will put the pupil in a suitable emotional attitude. He is a
rare pupil who has not at some time gazed in wonder at the immense
number and magnificence of the stars, or who has not thought with awe
and reverence of the infinite power of the Creator of "such countless
orbs." A recall of these feelings of wonder, awe, and reverence will
place the pupil in a suitable mood for the emotional appreciation of the
poem. It is in the teaching of literature that the importance of a
proper feeling attitude on the part of the pupil is particularly great.
Without it the pupil is coldly indifferent toward literature and will
never cultivate an enthusiasm for it.

FACTORS IN APPERCEPTION

=Retention and Recall.=--The facts already noted make it plain that
apperception involves two important factors. First, apperception implies
retention and recall. Unless our various experiences left behind them
the permanent effects already noted in describing the retentive power of
the nervous organism and the consequent possibility of recall, there
could be no adjustment to new impressions on the basis of earlier
experiences.

=Attention.=--Secondly, apperception involves attention. Since to
apperceive is to bring the results of earlier experience to bear
actively upon the new impression, it must involve a reactive, or
attentive, state of consciousness; for, as noted in our study of the
learning process, it is only by selecting elements out of former
experience that the new impression is given definite meaning in
consciousness. For the child to apperceive the strange object as a
"bug-in-a-basket," demands from him therefore a process of attention in
which the ideas "bug" and "basket" are selected from former experience
and read into the new impression, thereby giving it a meaning in
consciousness. A reference to any of the lesson topics previously
considered will provide further examples of these apperceptive factors.

CHAPTER XXVII

IMAGINATION

=Nature of.=--In our study of the various modes of acquiring individual
notions, attention was called to the fact that knowledge of a particular
object may be gained through a process of imagination. Like memory,
imagination is a process of re-presentation, though differing from it in
certain important regards.

1. Although imagination depends on past experiences for its images,
these images are used to build up ideal representations of objects
without any reference to past time.

2. In imagination the associated elements of past experience may be
completely dissociated. Thus a bird may be imagined without wings, or a
stone column without weight.

3. The dissociated elements may be re-combined in various ways to
represent objects never actually experienced, as a man with wings, or a
horse with a man's head.

Imagination is thus an apperceptive process by which we construct a
mental representation of an object without any necessary reference to
its actual existence in time.

=Product of Imagination, Particular.=--It is to be noted that in a
process of imagination the mind always constructs in idea a
representation of a _particular_ object or individual. For instance, the
ideal picture of the house I imagine situated on the hill before me is
that of a particular house, possessing definite qualities as to height,
size, colour, etc. In like manner, the future visit to Toronto, as it
is being run over ideally, is constructed of particular persons, places,
and events. So also when reading such a stanza as:

The milk-white blossoms of the thorn
Are waving o'er the pool,
Moved by the wind that breathes along,
So sweetly and so cool;

if the mind is able to combine into a definite outline of a particular
situation the various elements depicted, then the mental process of the
reader is one of imagination. It is not true, of course, that the
particular elements which enter into such an ideal representation are
always equally vivid. Yet one test of a person's power of imagination is
the definiteness with which the mind makes an ideal representation stand
out in consciousness as a distinct individual.

TYPES OF IMAGINATION

=A. Passive.=--In dissociating the elements of past experience and
combining them into new particular forms, the mind may proceed in two
quite different ways. In some cases the mind seemingly allows itself to
drift without purpose and almost without sense, building up fantastic
representations of imaginary objects or events. This happens especially
in our periods of day-dreaming. Here various images, evidently drawn
from past experience, come before consciousness in a spontaneous way and
enter into most unusual forms of combination, with little regard even to
probability. In these moods the timid lad becomes a strong hero, and his
rustic Audrey, a fair lady, for whose sake he is ever performing untold
feats of valour. Here the ideas, instead of being selected and combined
for a definite purpose through an act of voluntary attention, are
suggested one after the other by the mere law of association. Because
in such fantastic products of the imagination the various images appear
in consciousness and combine themselves without any apparent control or
purpose, the process is known as passive imagination, or phantasy. Such
a type, it is evident, will have little significance as an actual
process of learning.

=B. Active, or Constructive.=--Opposed to the above type is that form of
imagination in which the mind proceeds to build up a particular ideal
representation with some definite purpose, or end, in view. A student,
for example, who has never seen an aeroplane and has no direct knowledge
of the course to be traversed, may be called upon in his composition
work to describe an imaginary voyage through the air from Toronto to
Winnipeg. In such an act of imagination, the selecting of elements to
enter into the ideal picture must be chosen with an eye to their
suitability to the end in view. When also a child is called upon in
school to form an ideal representation of some object of which he has
had no direct experience, as for instance, a mental picture of a
volcano, he must in the same way, under the guidance of the teacher,
select and combine elements of his actual experience which are adapted
to the building up of a correct mental representation of an actual
volcano. This type of imagination is known as active, or constructive,
imagination.

=Factors in Constructive Imagination.=--In such a purposeful, or active,
process of imagination the following factors may be noticed:

1. The purpose, end, or problem calling for the exercise of the
imagination.

2. A selective act of attention, in which the fitness or unfitness of
elements of past experience, or their adaptability to the ideal
creation, is realized.

3. A relating, or synthetic, activity combining the selected elements
into a new ideal representation.

USES OF IMAGINATION

=Imagination in Education.=--One important application of imagination in
school work is found in connection with the various forms of
constructive occupation. In such exercises, it is possible to have the
child first build up ideally the picture of a particular object and then
have him produce it through actual expression. For example, a class
which has been taught certain principles of cutting may be called upon
to conceive an original design for some object, say a valentine. Here
the child, before proceeding to produce the actual object, must select
from his knowledge of valentines certain elements and interpret them in
relation to his principles of cutting. This ideal representation of the
intended object is, therefore, a process of active, or constructive,
imagination. In composition, also, the various events and situations
depicted may be ideal creations to which the child gives expression in
language. In geography and nature study likewise, constant use must be
made of the imagination in gaining a knowledge of objects which have
never come within the actual experience of the child. In science there
is a further appeal to the child's imagination. When, for instance, he
studies such topics as the law of gravity, chemical affinity, etc., the
imagination must fill in much that falls outside the sphere of actual
observation. In history and literature, also, the student can enter into
the life and action of the various scenes and events only by building up
ideal representations of what is depicted through the words of the
author.

=Imagination in Practical Life.=--In addition to the large use of
constructive imagination in school work, this process will be found
equally important in the after affairs of life. It is by use of the
imagination that the workman is able to see the changes we desire made
in the decoration of the room or in the shape of the flower-beds. It is
by the use of imagination, also, that the general is able to outline the
plan of campaign that shall lead his army to victory. Without
imagination, therefore, the mind could not set up those practical aims
toward the attainment of which most of life's effort is directed. In the
dominion of conduct, also, imagination has its important part to play.
It is by viewing in his imagination the effect of the one course of
action as compared with the other, that man finally decides what
constitutes the proper line of conduct. Even when indifferent as to his
moral conduct, man pictures to himself what his friends may say and
think of certain lines of action. For the enjoyment of life, also, the
exercise of imagination has a place. It is by filling up the present
with ideals and hopeful anticipations for the future, that much of the
monotony of our work-a-day hours is relieved.

=Development of Imagination.=--A prime condition of a creative
imagination is evidently the possession of an abundance of mental
materials which may be dissociated and re-combined into new mental
products. These materials, of course, consist of the images and ideas
retained by the mind from former experiences. One important result,
therefore, of providing the young child with a rich store of images of
sight, sound, touch, movement, etc., is that it provides his developing
imagination with necessary materials. But the mere possession of
abundant materials in the form of past images will not in itself develop
the imagination. Here, as elsewhere, it is only by exercising
imagination that ability to imagine can be developed. Opportunity for
such an exercise of the imagination, moreover, may be given the child in
various ways. As already noted, a chief function of play is that it
stimulates the child to use his imagination in reconstructing the
objects about him and clothing them with many fancied attributes. In
supplementary reading and story work, also, the imagination is actively
exercised in constructing the ideal situations, as they are being
presented in words by the book or the teacher. Nature study, likewise,
by bringing before the child the secret processes of nature, as noting,
for instance, the life history of the butterfly, the germination of
seeds, etc., will call upon him to use his imagination in various ways.
On the other hand, to deprive a young child of all such opportunities
will usually result in preventing a proper development of the
imagination.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THINKING

=Nature of Thinking.=--In the study of general method, as well as in
that of the foregoing mental processes, it has been taken for granted
that our minds are capable of identifying different objects on the basis
of some common feature or features. This tendency of the mind to
identify objects and group individual things into classes, depends upon
its capacity to detect similarity and difference, or to make
comparisons. When the mind, in identifying objects, events, qualities,
etc., discovers certain relations between its various states, the
process is especially known as that of thinking. In its technical sense,
therefore, thought implies a more or less explicit apprehension of
relation.

=Thinking Involved in all Conscious States.=--It is evident, however,
that every mental process must involve thinking, or a grasping of
relations. When, by my merely touching an object, my mind perceives it
is an apple, this act of perception, as already seen, takes place
because elements of former experience come back as associated factors.
This implies, evidently, that the mind is here relating elements of its
past experience with the present touch sensation. Perception of external
objects, therefore, implies a grasping of relations. In the same way,
if, in having an experience to-day, one recognizes it as identical with
a former experience, he is equally grasping a relation. Every act of
memory, therefore, implies thinking. Thus in all forms of knowledge the
mind is apprehending relations; for no experience could have meaning
for the mind except as it is discriminated from other experiences. In
treating thinking as a distinct mental process, however, it is assumed
that the objects of sense perception, memory, etc., are known as such,
and that the mind here deals more directly with the relations in which
ideas stand one to another. As a mental process, thinking appears in
three somewhat distinct forms, known as conception, judgment, and
reasoning.

CONCEPTION

=The Abstract Notion.=--It was seen that at least in adult life, the
perception of any object, as this particular orange, horse, cow, etc.,
really includes a number of distinct images of quality synthesised into
the unity of a particular idea or experience. Because of this union of a
number of different sensible qualities in the notion of a single
individual, the mind may limit its attention upon a particular quality,
or characteristic, possessed by an object, and make this a distinct
problem of attention. Thus the mind is able to form such notions as
length, roundness, sweetness, heaviness, four-footedness, etc. When such
an attribute is thought of as something distinct from the object, the
mental image is especially known as an abstract idea, or notion, and the
process as one of abstraction.

=The Class Notion.=--One or more of such abstracted qualities may,
moreover, be recognized as common to an indefinite number of objects.
For instance, in addition to its ability to abstract from the perception
of a dog, the abstract notions four-footedness, hairy, barking, etc.,
the mind further gives them a general character by thinking of them as
qualities common to an indefinite number of other possible individuals,
namely, the class four-footed, hairy, barking objects. Because the idea
representing the quality or qualities is here accepted by the mind as a
means of identifying a number of objects, the idea is spoken of as a
class notion, and the process as one of classification, or
generalization. Thus it appears that, through its ability to detect
sameness and difference, or discover relations, the mind is able to form
two somewhat different notions. By mentally abstracting any quality and
regarding it as something distinct from the object, it obtains an
abstract notion, as sweetness, bravery, hardness, etc.; by synthesising
and symbolizing the images of certain qualities recognized in objects,
it obtains a general, or class, notion by which it may represent an
indefinite number of individual things as, triangle, horse, desert, etc.
Thus abstract notions are supposed to represent qualities; class
notions, things. Because of its reference to a number of objects, the
class notion is spoken of especially as a general notion, and the
process of forming the notion as one of generalization. These two types
of notions are technically known as concepts, and the process of their
formation as one of conception.

=Formal Analysis of Process.=--At this point may be recalled what was
stated in Chapter XV concerning the development of a class notion.
Mention was there made of the theory that in the formation of such
concepts, or class notions, as cow, dog, desk, chair, adjective, etc.,
the mind must proceed through certain set stages as follows:

1. Comparison: The examination of a certain number of particular
individuals in order to discover points of similarity and
difference.

2. Abstraction: The distinguishing of certain characteristics
common to the objects.

3. Generalization: The mental unification, or synthesis, of these
common characteristics noted in different individuals into a class
notion represented by a name, or general term.

=But Conception is Involved in Perception.=--From what has been seen,
however, it is evident that the development of our concepts does not
proceed in any such formal way. If the mind perceives an individual
object with any degree of clearness, it must recognize the object as
possessing certain qualities. If, therefore, the child can perceive such
an object as a dog, it implies that he recognizes it, say, as a hairy,
four-footed creature. To recognize these qualities, however, signifies
that the mind is able to think of them as something apart from the
object, and the child thus has in a sense a general notion even while
perceiving the particular dog. Whenever he passes to the perception of
another dog, he undoubtedly interprets this with the general ideas
already obtained from this earlier percept of a dog. To say, therefore,
that to gain a concept he compares the qualities found in several
individual things is not strictly true, for if his first percept becomes
a type by which he interprets other dogs, his first experience is
already a concept. What happens is that as this concept is used to
interpret other individuals, the person becomes more conscious of the
fact that his early experience is applicable to an indefinite number of
objects. So also, when an adult first perceives an individual thing, say
the fruit of the guava, he must apprehend certain qualities in relation
to the individual thing. Thereupon his idea of this particular object
becomes in itself a copy for identifying other objects, or a symbol by
which similar future impressions may be given meaning. In this sense the
individual idea, or percept, will serve to identify other particular
experiences. Such being the case, this early concept of the guava has
evidently required no abstraction of qualities beyond apprehending them
while perceiving the one example of the fruit. This, however, is but to
say that the perception of the guava really implied conception.

=Comparison of Individuals Necessary for Correct Concepts.=--It is, of
course, true that the correctness of the idea as a class symbol can be
verified only as we apply it in interpreting a number of such individual
things. As the person meets a further number of individuals, he may even
discover the presence of qualities not previously recognized. A child,
for instance, may have a notion of the class triangle long before he
discovers that all triangles have the property of containing two right
angles. When this happens, he will later modify his first concept by
synthesising into it the newly discovered quality. Moreover, if certain
features supposed to be common are later found to be accidental, if, for
instance, a child's concept of the class fish includes the quality
_always living in water_, his meeting with a flying fish will not result
in an utterly new concept, but rather in a modification of the present
one. Thus the young child, who on seeing the Chinese diplomat, wished to
know where he had his laundry, was not without a class concept, although
that concept was imperfect in at least one respect.

=Concept and Term.=--A point often discussed in connection with
conception is whether a general notion can be formed without language.
By some it is argued that no concept could exist in the mind without the
name, or general term. It was seen, however, that our first perception
of any object becomes a sort of standard by which other similar
experiences are intercepted, and is, therefore, general in character.
From this it is evident that a rudimentary type of conception exists
prior to language. In the case of the young child, as he gains a mental
image of his father, the experience evidently serves as a centre for
interpreting other similar individuals. We may notice that as soon as he
gains control of language, other men are called by the term papa. This
does not imply an actual confusion in identity, but his use of the term
shows that the child interprets the new object through a crude concept
denoted by the word papa. It is more than probable, moreover, that this
crude concept developed as he became able to recognize his father, and
had been used in interpreting other men before he obtained the term,
papa. On the other hand, it is certain that the term, or class name, is
necessary to give the notion a definite place in consciousness.

FACTORS INVOLVED IN CONCEPT

It will appear from the foregoing that a concept presents the following
factors for consideration:

1. The essential quality or qualities found in the individual things,
and supposed to be abstracted sooner or later from the individuals.

2. The concept itself, the mental image or idea representative of the
abstracted quality; or the unification of a number of abstracted
qualities, when the general notion implies a synthesis of different
qualities.

3. The general term, or name.

4. The objects themselves, which the mind can organize into a class,
because they are identified as possessing common characteristics. When,
however, a single abstracted quality is taken as a symbol of a class of
objects, for example, when the quality bitterness becomes the symbol for
the class of bitter things, there can be no real distinction between the
abstracted quality and the class concept. In other words, to fix
attention upon the quality bitterness as a quality distinct from the
object in which it is found, is at the same time to give it a general
character, recognizing it as something which may be found in a number of
objects--the class bitter things. Here the abstract term is in a sense
a general notion representative of a whole class of objects which agree
in the possession of the quality.

=Intension of Concepts.=--Certain of our general notions are, however,
much more complex than others. When a single attribute such as
four-footedness is generalized to represent the class four-footed
objects, the notion itself is relatively simple. In other words, a
single property is representative of the objects, and in apprehending
the members of the class all other properties they chance to possess may
be left out of account. In many cases, however, the class notion will
evidently be much more complex. The notion dog, for instance, in
addition to implying the characteristic four-footedness, may include
such qualities as hairy, barking, watchful, fearless, etc. This greater
or less degree of complexity of a general notion is spoken of as its
intensity. The notion dog, for instance, is more intensive than the
notion four-footed animals; the notion lawyer, than the notion man.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25